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THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 
AND ITS DECISIONS, 1914-1916 



THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 
AND ITS DECISIONS, 1914-1916 



BY 

GENERAL von FALKENHAYN 




NEW YORK 
^ DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY 
1920 






OOPTEMHT, 1920, 

By DODD, mead AND COMPANY, INO. 






^/ <ll r^ ti ^ 



VAIL>BALLeU COMPANY 

aiHSHAMTON AND H(W YORK 



FEB -3 1920 

©CI,A559643 



PREFACE 

This book is written in memory of all those who gave 
their lives and of those who suffered for the Father- 
land. 

It will not praise their deeds in detail. It needs no 
herald for those who are living and want to see, and 
a stronger voice than mine will render to the coming 
generations the sublime song of German self-sacrifice, 
of German loyalty, and of German heroism in grave 
but glorious days. 

But the book will attempt to set forth in an intel- 
ligible form, according to my knowledge at the time 
of their occurrence, those operative ideas by which the 
best of us were guided in battle and victory during the 
two years of the war when I was at the head of the 
General Staff. 

My statements do not afford any history of the war 
in the ordinary sense of the world. They touch upon 
the events of the war, and other occurrences connected 
with the latter, only in so far as is necessary to justify 
the decisions of the General Staff. 

They are not written for or against anybody. A 
judgment is only given, or a deduction made, where 
it seemed unavoidable in order to explain my actions. 
I have purposely avoided all secondary matters, all 



PREFACE 

digressions and amplifications. My other official ac- 
tivities will be dealt with separately later. 

Rhetoric, self-adulation and lies plunged Germany 
into the deepest abyss, when they stifled the sense of 
reality in our once strong and good people. The con- 
tinuance of their rule threatens to make us slaves for 
ever. They shall at least find no place here, where is 
recorded our leadership in the mightiest struggle that 
ever a nation had to endure. 

Von Falkenhayn. 

Berlin, August, ipip. 



I 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I The Change of Chief of the General 

Staff i 

The idea and scope of General Headquarters — 
The relations between General Headquarters and 
the allied Headquarters — The most prominent 
members of the General Staff. 

II The General Military Situation in the 

Middle of September, 1914 .... 10 

A dangerous weakening of the Western front in 
favour of the Eastern — A further withdrawal of 
the front rejected — The impossibility of resorting 
to an offensive campaign in the East and a defen- 
sive in the West — The Navy gives no active sup- 
port for the time being — The importance of the 
permanent closing of the Dardanelles — Decision to 
support our Allies in Galicia — The gravity of the 
situation — England's plan of starvation. 

III The Battles of the Yser and around Lodz 2^ 

Failure of the advance against the San and the ' 
Vistula — The attack in Flanders continued — The 
Commander-in-Chief in the East decides on a flank- 
ing movement — The Ypres Battle — Principles of 
trench warfare — Division into Army Groups; its 
disadvantages. 

IV The Period from the Beginning of 

Trench Warfare in November-Decem- 
ber, I914, UNTIL the recommencement 

of the War of Movement in 191 5 . . 43 
Advantages and disadvantages of trench warfare 
— Increase of fighting units by decrease of fighting 
strengths — Supplementing war material and muni- 
tions in the winter of 1914-1915 — Development of 
the Air Force — Turkey comes in — The deficien- 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

cies from which the Turkish Army suffered — The 
leaders in the East claim further reinforcements — 
The importance of Russia to the issue of the war — 
The winter offensive in the East is decided upon 

— The offensive in the East only leads to partial 
successes — Results of the battles in the Carpath- 
ians, and the Battle of Masurian Lakes — Relief 
attacks in the West — Situation in the Dardanelles 

— Italy's attitude — The submarine war, 

V The Break-through at Gorlice-Tarnow 

AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 8o 

The situation on the Western Front in the 
spring of 1915 — The condition of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Army — Reflections before the decision to 
break through — Considerations before the break- 
through — ■ Preparations for the break-through — 
Feints before the break-through — Relief attacks in 
the West — The effects of the break-through — 
Procedure with regard to Italy — Reflections on 
action against Italy — Decision to conduct a defen- 
sive war against Italy for the time being — Rela- 
tions between Germany and Italy — The situation 
in Galicia at the end of May and the beginning of 
June, 1915 — The offensive in Galicia is resumed 
in 1915. 

VI Operations against Russia in the Sum- 
mer AND Autumn of 1915. Beginning 
of the Unrestricted Submarine Cam- 
paign 115 

The situation in the East in the middle of 1915 — 
Reflections on the situation in Galicia at the end of 
June, 1915 — Formation of the Bug Army^ — The 
nature of the terrain in the Pripet area — Relief 
measures for the attacking group in Poland — At- 
titude of General Headquarters towards the inten- 
tions of the Commander-in-Chief in the East — 
Serious reverse of the fourth Austro-Hungarian 
Army at the beginning of July, 1915 — Renewed 
relief measures for the attacking group — Woyrsch's 
passage of the Vistula ; Mackensen's victory — 
The taking of Warsaw and Ivangorod — Discus- 
sion between General Headquarters and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East — Mistakes in the 
conduct of operations — Separate operations on the 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PACE 

part of the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters as well 
as of the Commander-in-Chief in the East — Trans- 
port of troops to the Serbian frontier begins — 
The taking of Novo Georgievsk — The Russians 
reinforce near Vilna — The Vilna offensive of the 
Commander-in-Chief in the East begins — The 
Vilna operations come to a standstill — Discussion 
between General Headquarters and the Commander- 
in-Chief in the East — Position consolidated — 
Situation in the autumn of 1915 — Peace feelers 
towards Russia — The intensification of the sub- 
marine campaign — America's proposal of media- 
tion. 

VII Attempts to break through in the West 
IN the Autumn of 1915, and the Cam- 
paign against Serbia 179 

Conclusion of the alliance with Bulgaria — Draft 
of operations against Serbia — French successes 
in the Champagne in the autumn of 1915 — The 
enemies' massed attacks are broken — Arrival of 
reinforcements for the West only in the nick of 
time — German heroes in France in the autumn of 

1915 — Conditions of a break-through — Passage 
of the Danube in the autumn of 1915 ; operations 
in Serbia — Collapse of the Serbian Army — 
Greece's difficult position is taken into account — 
Serbian campaign a secondary operation — Bul- 
garian and Austro-Hungarian friction — The con- 
tinuation of operations against Salonica abandoned 

— Position consolidated on the Greek frontier. 

VIII The Situation at the end of 191 5 . . 220 

Rejection of the Austro-Hungarian proposal to 
attack Italy — The Austro-Hungarian Command 
refrains from operations against Italy — Reflec- 
tions on an offensive against Rumania — We refrain 
from an attack on Rumania in the autumn of 1915 

— The Dardanelles are free — Plan of operations 
for 1916 — Policy hinders the submarine campaign 
in 1916. 

IX The Campaign of 1916 255 

Position of the operations in the Meuse area, 

1916 — 1916 Army Reserves — No hope of assist- 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

ance in the West from our allies — Reflections on 
the direction of the attack and the preparations for 
it — Measures to cloak our intentions — The attack 
in the Meuse area begins — Successes on the west 
bank of the Meuse — Counter-attacks in the Meuse 
area — Big successes in the Meuse area — A Rus- 
sian reUef attack — Austro-Hungarian ofifensive in 
Italy — Failure of the Austro-Hungarian offensive; 
success of the Russian — Situation completely 
changed by the failure of our allies in Galicia — 
The Western reserves have to go to the East — 
The Russian offensive in Galicia — Preparatory 
measures against Rumania — Military situation in 
the Balkans in the middle of igi6 — Military sit- 
uation in Asia in the summer of 1916 — The enemy 
offensive on the Somme begins — The Somme of- 
fensive — 'Moderate success of the enemy on the 
Somme — Military situation inthe West at time of 
the Somme offensive — Excessive weakening of the 
Galician front ascertained — The powers of Ger- 
man leaders are extended — Measures against_ Ru- 
mania — The Polish question — Rumania's attitude 
becomes threatening — Measures against Rumania 
— Counter-thrust by the Italians — Italy's and Ru- 
mania's declarations of war — Resignation of the 
Chief of the General Staff — The general situation 
at the end of August, 1916. 

Comparative Review of the Relative 
Strength of Forces ....... 333 



INDEX TO MAPS 

(Produced by the Geograph. Anstalt of C. C. Keller, 

Berlin) 



Map I.- 


— Situation in the Western 
Theatre of War middle of 
September, 1914 .... 


Facing page 


12 


FlG. I.- 


— Situation in the East middle 
of September, 1914 . 


» 


>j 


20 


MaP 2 - 


— Situation in the Western 
Theatre of War middle of 
October, 1914 . . . . . 


»» 


>» 


28 


Fig. 2.- 


— Situation in the East begin- 
ning of November, 1914 . 


» 


j» 


34 


Map 3- 


— Attack on the Wing of the 
Russian Front January- 
February, 191 5 .... 


»> 


»j 


58 


" 4.- 


— Summer Campaign in the 
East, 1915 


» 


n 


82 


" 5.- 


— Operations in Serbia in the 
Autumn, 191 5 


» 


>» 


124 


FiG. 3- 


— Italian Theatre of War . . 


f> 


» 


222 


" 4.- 


- Battles on the Meuse, 1916 . 


j> 


>> 


256 


" 5.- 


- Battle of the Somme . . . 


>j 


» 


298 


Map 6- 


— Brussilofif's Offensive in the 
Summer of 1916 .... 


>» 


>» 


306 



THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 
AND ITS DECISIONS, 1914-1916 



THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 
AND ITS DECISIONS, 1914-1916 

CHAPTER I 

THE CHANGE OF CHIEF OF THE GENERAL 

STAFF 

On the evening of the 14th of September, 1914, in 
Luxemburg, Lieut. -General von Falkenhayn, then Min- 
ister of War, was entrusted by His Majesty the Em- 
peror and King with the post of Chief of the General 
Staff of the Army in the Field, in the place of the 
invalided General von Moltke. 

The change was not universally made known forth- 
with. It took place, however, to the full extent of the 
duties of this post, so that from that day onwards until 
his resignation on the morning of August 29th, 19 16, 
the General assumed sole responsibility for Germany's 
conduct of the war, whilst until the day of his appoint- 
ment he had had neither indirect nor direct influence 
upon it. 

The choice of this extraordinary form of procedure 
was due to his own wish. It did not seem fitting to 
disquiet any further the population at home, which was 
already sufficiently agitated by the events of the war, 
and by means of this change of leadership to give 
enemy propaganda further ostensible proof of the com- 



2 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

pleteness of the victory obtained on the Marne, so long 
as there was any prospect of a speedy improvement in 
General von Moltke's health, enabling him to par- 
ticipate once more in the duties of his office in one 
form or another. This hope was not fulfilled. On 
November 3rd, 1914, the definitive appointment of 
Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General 
Staff, retaining at the same time his position as Min- 
ister of War, was made known. 

The General had himself proposed the temporary 
retention of this post in his hands. 

This matter was decided by the memory of the un- 
edifying relationship between the Minister of War and 
the General Staff in the War of 1 870-1 871, that had 
not been generally known, although it had existed as 
a matter of fact. Prompt dealing with the enormous 
demands, which, as was already clear at this early 
juncture, had to be made upon the capacity of the 
Ministry in the course of the war, and the necessity of 
effecting its intelligent, smooth, even intimate co- 
operation with the General Staff, made the unity of 
command absolutely desirable until the authorities were 
working easily together. It was mainly owing to this 
unity that the regulation of the question of raw ma- 
terials introduced by the War Minister immediately 
after the outbreak of war, and the raising of strong 
new formations of troops, that was ordered at the 
same time, proceeded without interruption, as well as 
the fact that the reorganization and enormous increase 
of the production of war material, that were soon de- 



THE CHANGE OF CHIEF 3 

manded by the War Minister, were effected without 
any hindrance in the shape of " departmental consid- 
erations." 

During the first two years of the war the relationship I 
thus established between the General Staff and the 
War Ministry was never disturbed. Indeed, it has, on 
the whole, withstood all tests right up to the end of: 
the war. There is no need to count the fruits of this 
arrangement. It may even be said that the temporary 
union of the posts of Chief of the General Staff and 
Minister of War in one hand at the beginning of the 
war was one of the most important premises for its 
prosecution in the face of an immeasurable superiority 
in armaments. When the posts were separated again 
in January, 1915, at the instigation of the Imperial 
Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, for perfectly jus- 
tified constitutional reasons, co-operation was then so 
firmly established that it could hardly be endangered 
again. In addition to this the personality of the new 
Minister of War, Lieut.-General Wild von Hohenborn, 
guaranteed the maintenance of it. As former Quarter- 
master-General, the Minister was thoroughly con- 
versant and in accord with the plans and intentions of 
his predecessor. 

In connection with the foregoing, it will be useful, 
before beginning to discuss events, to explain both the 
idea of the " Supreme Command " and also the ques- 
tions of its relations with the allied Army Commands. 

On the basis of the Imperial Constitution the control 
of the whole of Germany's armed forces, and conse- 



4 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

quently the supreme command of the army, not only 
of that of the army in the field, but of all that could 
be regarded as belonging to the army — as well as of 
the navy — lay directly with the Emperor as Supreme 
War Lord. Thus the Supreme Command was centred 
in his person. His organs in the fulfilment of the 
duties of Supreme War Lord were*the Prussian Chief 
of the General Staff of the Army for the land forces, 
and ''the German Chief of the Naval Staff for the sea 
forces, whereby it was tacitly accepted that the voice of 
the Chief of the General Staff would be the deciding 
factor in matters which touched the conduct of the 
war, both on sea and land. 

In order to facilitate, or, rather, to render possible 
a regulated business procedure, the Emperor had con- 
ceded to the Chief of the General Staff the right to 
issue operative commands in his name. 

As a result of this, and still more by historical de- 
velopment, the Chief of the General Staff had become 
the actual bearer of the authority of the Supreme Com- 
mand, and in any case the only person who was re- 
sponsible for its actions or omissions. 

The natural premise was that he kept the Emperor 
currently informed of the events of the war, and se- 
cured his decision before taking important steps. This 
was done without exception during General von Falk- 
enhayn's period of office. Neither was any event of 
any importance concealed from the Supreme War 
Lord, nor was any important measure taken which had 
not been previously submitted to him. 



THE CHANGE OF CHIEF 5 

The domain of the Chief of the General Staff, in his 
capacity of representative of the Supreme War Lord 
in the Supreme Command, was limited only by the 
powers constitutionally conferred upon the highest of- 
ficials of the Empire. Thus — and it is worth men- 
tioning in this connection — the conduct of the policy 
of the Empire, which was incumbent upon the Imperial 
Chancellor, and the conduct of the army administra- 
tion, which was the War Minister's duty, remained in- 
dependent of one another. This illuminates the im- 
portance, which has been indicated, of the temporary 
fusion of the offices of War Minister and Chief of the 
General Staff in the circumstances which the war had 
produced, and which had not been foreseen to their 
full extent. 

The execution of the allied idea of attaining the 
same object by instituting a special Commander-in- 
Chief, who would have been above both the Minister 
of War and the Chief of the General Staff, did not 
come into question in a strong but constitutional Mon- 
archy, such as was the Prussian. The Commander-in- 
Chief already existed in the person of the Emperor, 
and even if he was often claimed by other business, he 
never allowed his duties as Commander-in-Chief to be 
put in the background. 

On the other hand, it is not intended to suggest that 
the activities of the Minister of War, after the sepa- 
ration of the posts, or those of the Imperial Chancellor, 
would be effected without the co-operation of the Chief 
of the General Staff, although not always in accord- 



6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ance with the wishes of the latter. Politics and army 
administration were so closely bound up with the com- 
mand of the army in this fight for existence that they 
could not be separated from it. Wherever this did 
happen, misfortune was always the result. The Chief 
of the General Staff had to occupy himself with them 
often enough, particularly with politics. Apart from 
a few unavoidable exceptions, however, he severely 
avoided taking any part in their execution ; for he was 
convinced, and he was strengthened in this conviction 
in the main by his experience during the period in 
which he conducted affairs as Minister for War and 
Chief of the General Staff, that no man could have the 
strength to attend for any length of time to other 
offices besides the affairs of General Headauarters. 
This view has certainly not been refuted by events dur- 
ing the latter course of the war. 

It may be maintained that the German solution, as 
described here, of the problem of leading a great mod- 
ern State in war was a successful one in principle. 
No better existed anywhere among our enemies. 

Whether the solution proved itself in actual life 
depended, to be sure, as in all things in this imperfect 
world, primarily upon the men who had to put these 
principles into practice. 

The problem of the conduct of an alHed war had not 
been settled between Germany and Austria-Hungary 
either before the war or after its outbreak. The rea- 
sons why this had been omitted in spite of the experi- 
ences of former allied wars are not known. After 



THE CHANGE OF CHIEF 7 

the change in the Chief of the General Staff an al- 
teration of the existing state of affairs was not con- 
sidered opportune, because an unfavourable effect upon 
the internal conditions in the Austro-Hungarian Army 
and in the Dual Monarchy was feared, all the more so 
because both the latter were already shaken by the 
reverses at the front. If an alteration had been com- 
pelled then, a change of personnel in the leading posts 
of the allied army command could have been expected 
with certainty, and in its train a change of system 
would have been probable. In time of war a change 
of this kind is always such a risky undertaking with the 
gigantic mechanism of a national army of today, that 
it was inadmissible except under the most compelling 
necessity, and especially as the present leaders were 
known in Germany, their virtues as well as their faults 
and it was uncertain who could take their places. 
Finally the change did not seem to be urgent. Ger- 
many's allies were forced by the pressure of the mili- 
tary situation to subordinate any particular wishes of 
their own to the common ends. 

In order to bring their views into harmony with one 
another, the German and the Austro-Hungarian Com- 
mand, which latter was officially styled the Imperial 
and Royal Supreme Army Command, had to settle 
each point as it came up. That the German G.H.Q's 
view carried most weight in such cases was only nat- 
ural in view of the relative strength of the forces. 

The system of Commands worked satisfactorily, 
chiefly owing to far-reaching consideration on Ger- 



8 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

many's part, until Austria-Hungary was tempted by 
the improvement in her position during the winter of 
191 5-16 to go her own ways. This led to unhealthy 
symptoms which soon became so marked that the sys- 
tem had to be abandoned towards the end of General 
von Falkenhayn's period of office, and the way had to 
be prepared for the formal acknowledgment of the 
German Command as the " Supreme Military Com- 
mand " by all allies. Further opportunity will offer 
itself of dealing more closely with the development 
which led to this. 

No difficulties ever arose in the relations of the 
German Command with the Bulgarian and Turkish 
Commands. They were always ready to consider 
Germany's wishes. 

It had been remarked that the responsibility for the 
measures of the General Headquarters reposed solely 
with the Chief of the General Staff. Of course he was 
only able to bear this enormous burden because he had 
around him a circle of selected men as his collaborators, 
who must be regarded as belonging to the G.H.Q. 
Their names ought not to be missing in a work which 
deals with the activities of the G.H.Q. 

Immediately under the Chief of the General Staff 
were the chiefs of departments in the General Staff: 
Colonels Tappen — Operations Section — and von 
Dommes, later von Bartenwerffer. Political Section : 
Lieut.-Cols, von Fabeck, later von Tieschowitz — 
Personal Services and General Business — and 



THE CHANGE OF CHIEF 9 

Hentsch, later von Rauch — Information ; and finally 
Major Nicolai, Intelligence Service. 

In a wider circle there were the Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral, Major-General von Voigts-Rhetz, later Major- 
General Wild von Hohenborn and Lieut.-GeneraJ 
Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, with Major-Gen- 
eral Zoellner as Chief of Staff; the Intendant-General, 
Major-General von Schoeler; the Director of Muni- 
tions in the Field, Lieut.-General Sieger; the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Service, who at the same time filled the 
post of Commander, Major Thomsen; the Director of 
Field Railway Services, Colonel Groener; the General 
of the Foot Artillery, General Lauter; the General of 
the Engineers and Pioneer Corps, General von Claer; 
the Director of Medical Services, Surgeon-General Dr. 
von Schjerning, and some others. 



CHAPTER II 

GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE 
OF SEPTEMBER, 1914 

THE SITUATION IN THE WEST 
(See Map i) 

The general situation of the Central Powers had 
become extremely difficult by the middle of September, 
1914. 

The retiring movements which were connected with 
the Battle of the Marne had, at any rate, come to an 
end. The German Western Army faced the enemy 
again. Yet the front between the Oise and Rheims 
was only maintained with difficulty against the as- 
saults of the oncoming enemy. In the Champagne, 
too, the German lines were not yet consolidated. 

In addition the danger of an effective outflanking 
movement threatened from beyond the Oise. The 
German right wing, which stood on this river without 
any reserve worth mentioning, was hanging in the air. 
; There was definite information to hand that the 
enemy was continuing the movement of strong forces 
westwards. Whether the formations which had been 
drawn after September 5th and later from the German 
Armies in the Vosges and the Argonne, where the 
enemy's pressure was slighter, and which were either 

IQ 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION ii 

on the march or ready to start, would arrive in time 
could not be foretold, owing to the shortage of rail- 
ways in working order, the long distances and the 
fluctuating state of things at the front behind which 
they had to miarch. Only one army corps could be 
safely reckoned upon, and that was coming from Bel- 
gium, and was marching upon Noyon from St. Quen- 
tin. Two other army corps, which had already been 
disposable from the Vosges and from Maubeuge, had 
had to be thrown into the positions which were broken 
through for a time a little to the west of Rheims. 
Further reserves were not immediately available. The 
weakening of the Western front, which had taken place 
during the rearrangement of the command in the East 
before the Battle of Tannenberg, after General von 
Hindenburg had taken over the command of the Eighth 
Army in place of General von Prittwitz, still made 
itself gravely felt.^ The numerical superiority of the 
enemy in the West, that had existed from the outset, 
was considerably increased thereby. The formations 
which had been withdrawn for the East were taken 
from the Western half of the army, therefore from 
the attacking wing. Consequently their absence was 
particularly felt during and after the decision on the 
Marne. 

The great distance from General Headquarters in 

1 To this end three army corps had been withdrawn from the 
battle-front. Only two of them, however, were transported. 
The third was sent back again to the Western front when the 
fateful consequences of the step were realized. 



12 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Luxemburg to the front occasioned serious difficulties 
in the transmission of information and orders. These 
had to be removed forthwith. It was therefore de- 
cided to bring G.H.Q. forward to Charleville — 
Mezieres. 

The new director of operations then took the short- 
est steps to prevent the continuance of the threatening 
movements of troops round the west flank. The 
transition to counter-attacks along the whole front was 
immediately ordered. 

They did not produce the hoped-for advantages, in 
spite of the fact that the enemy was evidently suffering 
from the same internal difficulties as the Germans. 
The beginning of the attack on too broad a front, 
necessitated as it was by shortage of time, was just 
as much to blame for this as the condition of the 
troops. 

Owing to the unexpectedly swift advance, the many 
fierce battles during it, and the severing of lines of 
communication, the fighting strengths had been greatly 
reduced. Reinforcements could not arrive quickly 
enough. There was everywhere a shortage of junior 
officers. The battles of the invasion had torn huge 
gaps in their ranks that could not be immediately filled. 
The supply of reinforcements was often blocked, be- 
cause the rail-heads on the Western wing were five 
days' march behind the troops. Materiel was urgently 
in need of replenishment. The spectre of the shortage 
of munitions was already apparent. According to the 
view's accepted hitherto the German Army had gone 




MAP 1. 

Situation in the Western Theatre of War, Middle 
OF September, 1914 



a — Grrmaii*, 
b — French, 
c — English. 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 13 

into the war well prepared. The Ministry of War had [ 
done everything possible during the last few years be- 1 
fore the war, according to the views current at that ! 
time, to meet the demands of the General Staff. Con- 
sumption, however, exceeded peace-time estimates 
many times over, and was on the increase in spite of 
the strict measures taken to avoid wastage of ammuni- 
tion. A propos of which it may be remarked that our I 
enemies were undergoing exactly the same experiences 
in this matter. C^, 

As has been stated, the counter-attacks improvised | 
by the Germans did not attain their real object. Both \ 
the French and the English were compelled to asstime j 
the defensive on the battle-fronts from the Moselle to ( 
the Oise. Their mistake in assuming the events after / 
the Battle of the Marne to mean the collapse of Ger- 
many was hammered into them. The attempt to di- 
vert or put a stop to their movement of troops round 
the German right wing was unsuccessful. Any, even 
if only temporary, gain there on the part of the enemy, 
however, would be bound to lead to incalculable con- 
sequences. 

The only line of supply of any use to the greater ' 
part of the western half of the German Army was the 
railway connection leading from Belgium into the St. 1 
Quentin district. This was almost wholly unprotected 
against enemy attacks. It is a puzzle why the French 
and English cavalry divisions did not avail themselves 
of this circumstance. 



14 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF, 

Even though the Belgilan Army had been thrown 
back upon Antwerp, with its English supports, its 
strength and proximity to the most important German 
lines of communication necessitated a continuous and 
close watch on it. It was not possible to say when 
those troops which had been turned against it could be 
set free for other purposes. Their numbers were 
very considerably inferior to those of the enemy op- 
posing them. 

It only remained, therefore, to carry out with the 
greatest speed movements behind the German front 
corresponding to the enemy's movements, with the ob- 
ject of not only meeting the enemy's efiforts at envelop- 
ment but of countering them also so far as the circum- 
stances permitted by means of an enveloping movement 
by the Germans. At the same time the threat to the 
rear from Antwerp had to be removed at all cost. 
General von Beseler, who was commanding in that 
area, received orders to push forward the attack upon 
the fortress by all means, without regard to the relative 
strengths of the forces engaged. The necessary ar- 
tillery was sent to him with all haste. 
j The question as to whether it would be expedient by 
\ withdrawing the front to facilitate the German move- 
■ ments in the West, and render the enemy's attempts at 
envelopment more difficult, was negatived. 

A withdrawal of the front could not affect the neces- 
sity of immediately parrying the threatening outflank- 
ing movement by counter-measures and of firmly es- 
tablishing the right flank on the sea at any cost. The 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 15 

western territory of the Empire, with its sensitive as 
well as indispensable resources, had to be protected at 
all events. Any new front which came into consid- 
eration was exposed from the outset to a renewed en- 
veloping movement, owing to the enemy's start and the 
good means of communication at his disposal. The 
maintenance of Holland's neutrality and the inviol- 
ability of her frontiers could not be included as definite 
quantities in the reckoning. 

It still seemed possible, if the present German front 
held, to bring the northern coast of France, and there- 
fore the control of the English Channel, into German 
hands. It was all the more inadvisable to abandon 
this possibility, since the Chief of the General Staff 
clung to the object which was at the root of the original 
plan of campaign — first of all to seek the decision in 
the West; at any rate to restrict the forces employed 
in the East to a minimum, so long as the front in the 
West was not securely established. There is no need 
to prove that this condition had not been approximately 
realized in September, 19 14. 

Often has the question been debated, whether a 
" two-front " war might not have been begun the other 
way round — in other words, whether it should have 
begun with a defensive in the West and an offensive in 
the East. The supporters of such a scheme refer 
among other things to a statement made by Field- 
Marshal Count von Moltke, which is reported in Bis- 
marck's " Gedanken und Erinnerungen." Yet it is 
scarcely right to base such an assertion upon this 



i6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

[ weighty voice. The Field-Marshal certainly did not 
\ take into account England's participation in the war. 
) With this reservation, the method of procedure men- 
( tioned in the conversation with Bismarck would have 
j been applicable. The creator of the scheme carried 
I out in 1914, General Count von Schlieffen, had on the 
' contrary to take England's intervention very seriously 
into consideration. If this was done, then scarcely 
any other method of conducting the war was imagin- 
able than that which was actually chosen. In view of 
the almost unlimited power of the Russians to evade 
a final decision by arms as long as they pleased, there 
/ was no hope of finishing with them before the enemies 
in the West had either won a decisive success or had 
so strengthened themselves with their almost unlimited 
( resources as to leave little prospect of any German suc- 
' cess over them. The fact that the Russians in 19 14 
; acted contrary to the intentions here ascribed to them, 
probably being fully aware of the German schemes of 
concentration is no proof to the contrary. 

However that may be — once the deployment had 
been effected on the lines I have just mentioned and 
the enemy engaged in battle accordingly, and once the 
decision on the Marne had not secured the desired re- 
sult, the Chief of the General Staff, who was respon- 
sible for the conduct of the whole war, could not hesi- 
tate. Every attempt to deal with the East before the 
Western front was thoroughly consolidated, must nec- 
essarily lead to an intolerable situation in the West, 
whilst a smashing success was not to be hoped for in 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 17 

the East, if only on account of the advanced state of 
the year. 

But to a German leader it was quite beyond doubt 
that the securing of the Western front had to be at- 
tempted by means of an offensive, so long as such a 
thing seemed at all possible. 

At the moment it could certainly not be foreseen 
when a new blow could be struck in the West. One of 
the main stipulations, as was believed at the time, was 
to supplement those deficiencies among the troops that 
have been already mentioned. It seemed justifiable 
to assume that the Germans could do this better and 
swifter than the enemy, who was in a similar predica- 
ment. If this did not prove altogether true, the reason 
for it was that the support given by America and 
Italy to the enemy in the shape of supplies of material 
from the outbreak of war, had not been reckoned with 
in the calculations, and could not be. 

Even the growing probability of having to help Ger- 
many's allies in their difficulties in Galicia could not 
upset this decision. It was assumed that, if the worst 
came to the worst, the new formations, which were 
training in the Empire at home, would suffice to hold 
the Eastern situation until the severe winter w^ould 
have brought operations to a standstill there. No such 
restrictions owing to weather were expected in the 
West. The course of the war, however, has shown 
that the nature of the ground in Belgium and North- 
eastern France imposes very considerable restrictions 
upon big military operations during the wet season. 



i8 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. 

. If, however, the determination to force the decision 

\ in the West first was maintained, then there were fur- 

/ ther grave scruples against a withdrawal of the front. 

I Quite apart from the fact that it would have given 

over to the enemy large tracts of territory, the exploita- 

I tion of which was of the greatest value to Germany in 

i the war, it would in any circumstances have placed the 

I German Army in a much more unfavourable position 

I than its present one for the resumption of the offensive. 

[ The enemy would have gained for a considerable time 

a free hand to do as he pleased ; at one stroke he would 

have been freed from the pressure which hampered 

^ him, in spite of the events on the Marne. 

This had to be avoided all the more as the naval 
I engagement off Heligoland, on August 29th, had 
( plainly shown that an effective prevention of English 
I sea traffic could not be demanded of the Navy for the 
■ time being. The naval command refused to risk a de- 
cision with the fleet by an offensive into enemy waters. 
i In the event of an unfavourable issue, which was con- 
sidered probable in view of the relative strengths of 
the fleets, the naval command did not believe that it 
would be able to ensure the safety of the German 
coasts. The important role which was later to fall to 
the lot of the submarine in this direction was not yet 
realized at that time, and moreover they were wholly 
insufficient as regards numbers. Attempts at landings 
by the enemy on German or neutral territory could not 
be left altogether out of consideration. 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 19 

In addition to all this the psychological and political 
effects weighed heavily, and these, as had been suffi- 
ciently experienced after the Battle of the Marne, had 
to be eradicated in friend and foe, and particularly in 
the so-called neutrals, in the event of our giving ground 
again. These would have to have been borne, and 
could have been, if the beginning of the new offensive 
could have been foreseen. But it was not so. 

THE SITUATION IN THE EAST 
(See Fig. 1) 

In the East, in the German sector of the theatre of 1 
War, the Russians were retiring about the middle of \ 
September out of East Prussia, behind the middle • 
Niemen and the upper Narew, before the 8th German 
Army, under General von Hindenburg, whose Chief of 
Staff was Major-General Ludendorff. It could be 
taken for granted that they would not attempt a de- 
cisive operation here, in the near future. On the other 
hand, it was known that fresh Russian forces were 
massing on the other side of the two rivers named. 
The continuation of the frontal pursuit of the enemy's 
Niemen Army, which had developed out of the 
Battle of the Masurian Lakes in the first half of Sep- 
tember, and only a small part of which had been de- 
feated, did not allow, therefore, any prospects of 
'speedy, far-reaching results. The situation on the 
Polish Galician front forbade such action. 

There the Austro-Hungarian Army was in retreat 



20 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

from the Sans sector. It had defended itself valiantly 
in the battles around Lemberg at the end of August and 
beginning of September, against the superior numbers 
of the Russians.^ Its loose structure had not been 
equal, however, to such a test. About the middle of 
September the German G.H.Q. came to the conclusion 
that the decision as to whether and when this retiring 
movement would cease depended mainly upon the de- 
cisions of the enemy, owing to the weakness and the 
condition of the allied troops. If the enemy took ad- 
vantage of this and pressed ruthlessly forward, a 
grave danger to the province of Silesia would neces- 
sarily arise. Even a temporary over-running of Up- 
per Silesia by the Russians, however, was inadmissible. 
It would have robbed Germany of the rich resources of 
Silesia, and consequently would have made it impos- 
sible for her to continue the war beyond a limited time. 
Further, the dangers of the proximity of the Russians 
to Bohemia could not be underestimated. This would 
presumably have led to internal convulsions within the 
Dual Monarchy, which would have completely crippled 
the latter' s military strength. 

Last, but not least, it seemed at that time as though 
any further successes on the part of the Russians over 
the Austro-Hungarian forces would destroy the hope 
of inducing the Balkan nations, principally Turkey, to 
join the Central Powers. The Chief of the General 
Staff considered it indispensable that this alliance 

1 See Appendix : Relative Strengths of the Forces on the 
Eastern Front, under i. c. 



KRenrfenkampF) 




upper 

^"^■f Silesia^ 



%. 



^(jstrQ-J; 



1:5000000. 

9 y ^ 



^"'"'llir., ^'"'y^ 
''lie, ^J^,j, 



Fig. 1. 

The Situation in the East, Middle of September, 1914 

a — Germans. 

b — Austro-Hungarians. 

c — Russians. . , , .c ^ c ^ „t,«_ 

d— Line of Austrian retreat in second half of beptemDer. 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 21 

should materialize. If the Straits between the Medi- 
terranean and the Black Sea were not permanently- 
closed to Entente traffic, all hopes of a successful 
course of the war would be very considerably dimin- 
ished. Russia would have been freed from her sig- 
nificant isolation. It was just this isolation, however, 
which offered a safer guarantee than military suc- 
cesses were able to do, that sooner or later a crippling 
of the forces of this Titan must take place, to a cer- 
tain extent automatically. If such a strictly disciplined 
political organism as Germany, accustomed as she had 
been for centuries to conscientious work, and having 
at her disposal an inexhaustible wealth of skilled or- 
ganizing forces in her own people, was only barely 
able to accomplish the mighty tasks imposed upon her 
by the war, it was certain that the Russian State, so 
much weaker internally, would not succeed in doing 
this. As far as human calculations went, Russia 
would not be able permanently to meet the demands of 
■such a struggle, and at the same time to effect the 
reconstruction of her whole economic life, which was 
necessitated by her sudden isolation from the outer 
world, owing to the closing of the western frontiers 
and of the Dardanelles. 

These reflections pointed to the necessity of an im- 
mediate, speedy and ample support of Germany's allies. 
The question how this was to be done was, to be sure, 
not easy to answer. 

From what has already been said, any weakening 
of the Western Army was inexpedient. Moreover, 



22 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

it was not to be assumed that sufficient forces could be 
sent from there to the allies in time. Against any at- 
tempt to do this, there was a warning in the fact that 
the forces which were withdrawn in the West before 
the battles on the Marne and of Tannenberg were 
sorely missed on the Western front, and had produced 
no decisive advantage in the East at the time. This 
is mentioned here once again because its evil influence 
upon the course of this part of the war can scarcely 
be sufficiently emphasized. 

Within the Empire there were, at all events, num- 
erous divisions of infantry in training. Their forma- 
tion had been ordered by the Minister of War in the 
first days of mobilization, as soon as he was con- 
vinced beyond doubt by England's attitude, together 
with the intelligence of the early appearance of Asiatic 
contingents in West Russia, that the peace-time calcu- 
lations of the General Staff as to the numerical 
strengths of the opponents for the first months of the 
war would be far behind reality. The Ministry of 
War, under the guidance of the Deputy War Minister, 
Lieut.-General von Wandel, who found an indispen- 
sable assistant in the Director of the General War 
Department, Colonel von Wrisberg, had proceeded 
with these new formations to the utmost possible limits 
of the available officers and materiel, and had speeded 
them up as much as possible. Yet the young portions 
of the German Army could not be regarded as ready 
for use at the time in question. 
■; The most natural, and, if it succeeded, the most ef- 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 23 

fective operation, that of directly relieving our allies, 
had to be abandoned. It would have consisted in con- 
verting the offensive from East Prussia into a deep 
thrust into Russia or East Poland. A preliminary 
condition for such indirect assistance would have been 
the transferring of considerable other forces in addi- 
tion, as direct supports of the allies on the latter's 
northern flank. Without this the consequences of a 
further Russian advance towards Silesia, as described 
above, would certainly materialize before the thrust 
from East Prussia would have become sufficiently 1 
menacing to the enemy to cause him to relieve his pres- 
sure upon the Austro-Hungarian Armies. It was fur- 
ther considered extremely questionable whether such a 
far-reaching operation could take effect before the be- '■ 
ginning of the " roadless season," owing to the ad- .1 
vanced time of the year. This was the period, often j 
lasting many weeks, in which the autumn and spring ! 
rains render any traffic impossible, except on the few I 
main roads. It is only the frost, in the first instance, 
and the sun getting higher in the sky in the other, that / 
brings any relief from this. Moreover, the experi- 
ences of the winter of 1914-15, which were a revela- 
tion to every soldier concerning the capability of mod- i 
ern man under the most unfavourable climatic and at- 1 
mospheric conditions, were not yet available. But 
even if they had been known it would not have been 
possible to have reckoned upon a well-timed success, I 
owing to the gigantic distances which were involved. 
Similar reasons opposed an operation on the Eastern 



24 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

bank of the Vistula against the swampy sector of the 
lower Narew, that was strong, by nature and had been 
strongly fortified. 

Consequently the Chief of the General Staff re- 
solved to continue the pursuit from East Prussia only 
with the weaker forces of the 8th Army under General 
von Schubert. The main mass of the troops there was 
then moved as swiftly as possible to Upper Silesia and 
Southern Poesen, as a newly formed 9th Army under 
General von Hindenburg. From there it was to move 
to the attack in conjunction with the Austro-Hun- 
garian Army. When the new offensive was contem- 
plated, in spite of the blow which the army had already 
suffered, the justification of this step lay in the fact 
that numerous reinforcements had been sent to it in 
the meantime. 

It was also believed that better achievements might 
be expected from the allied troops in the impetus of 
the advance than in a purely defensive action of long 
duration, which demands the strictest discipline. 

The object of the offensive was to remove the main 
mass of the enemy as far as possible from the German 
frontier and to cause it to draw further reserves to this 
battle front. By this means other sectors of the 
Eastern front would be able to get considerable relief. 
Thus the Chief of the General Staff hoped to gain time 
for the development of plans in the West. The man- 
ner of carrying out this very difficult task was left to 
the discretion of the local commanders, the Command- 
er-in-Ohief of the 9th Army and the Chief of the 



GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION 25 

Ailstro-Hungarian General Staff, General Conrad von 
Hotzendorf. 

General von Falkenhayn left the political leaders 
in no doubt as to the seriousness of his view of the gen- 
eral military situation. He supplied both the Imperial 
Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary von Jagow with 
the necessary information. 

In this he started from the assumption that there was 
no reason to despair of a satisfactory conclusion to the 
war, but that the issue of the war had been rendered 
altogether uncertain by the events on the Marne and 
in Galicia. 

The intention of forcing a speedy decision which 
had hitherto been the foundation of the German plan 
of campaign had come to nought. 

Even if it was assumed that the circumstances to 
whidh the reverse was to be ascribed would not repeat 
themselves in the future, it was impossible to make up 
for the irrecoverable time which had been lost, and 
difficult to efface the influence of the retreat on the 
Marne, upon the strengthening of the enemy's morale. 
And it was certain that it would not be altogether pos- 
sible to cure the evils which had revealed themselves in 
isolated cases it is true but still plainly, in the allied 
army. 

One had, therefore, to familiarize oneself with the 
possibility of the success of England's plan, which was 
daily becoming clearer, of winning the war by starva- 
tion and attrition. According to the opinion of the 
Chief of the Naval Staff there was no prospect at pres- 



26 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ent of frustrating this plan by any offensive action on 
the part of the navy. It was to be hoped that with 
careful economy of Germany's and her allies' means, 
this plan would not be successful. A very much longer 
duration of the war than was generally assumed was, 
however, certainly to be reckoned with. This meant 
that demands of quite extraordinary magnitude on the 
internal force of resistance on the part of the Central 
Powers would have to be made. It could not yet be 
seen how they would respond to these demands, but 
meanwhile any relief of the pressure bearing upon them 
from two sides was of the greatest importance. If 
the political leaders had at their disposal any prac- 
ticable method for the opening a way to an understand- 
ing with the enemy — whether in the East or in the 
West was all the same from a military point of view — 
it was advisable to employ it. If this was not the case, 
as was convincingly maintained by the political leaders 
in perfect agreement with the Chief of the General 
Staff's estimate of the situation, then no means should 
be left untried by which the capability and the will to 
hold out could be raised and strengthened in the Ger- 
man people and in the Dual Monarchy. 



CHAPTER III 

THE BATTLES OF THE YSER AND AROUND LODZ 

The offensive begun by the 9th German Army and 
the Austro-Hungarian Army at the end of September 
on both sides of the Upper Vistula did not attain its 
object. 

The enemy forces which had pushed forward over 
the Vistula and the San, were indeed driven out of 
these sectors. But when the enemy brought his main 
body into action the situation was changed. Our allies 
were not able to hold the Russians in the San sector. 
The latter consequently moved very strong forces from 
Galicia to the north at the right moment. They also 
received reinforcements from the rear. By this means 
they succeeded not only in driving in the Austro-Hun- 
garian northern flank on the left of the Vistula, but 
also in threatening to encircle the northern flank of 
the 9th Army from Warsaw. In order to escape this 
danger, the army had to begin the retirement upon 
Silesia towards the end of October, which then also 
caused the Austro-Hungarian Army to give ground. 

Again and again urgent appeals for assistance came 
from the Eastern front to the West, from the middle 
of October onwards. Their justification could not be 
denied. In spite of this the Chief of the General Staff 
was not in a position, owing to developments in France, 

27 



28 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

to comply with them to anything like the desired ex- 
tent. In particular the demand made by the Austro- 
Hungarian General Headquarters, and supported by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the 9th Army, for about 
thirty divisions to be sent from the West to the East 
had to be refused. The sending of these would have 
made the position on the Western front untenable. 
Never could the advantages to be expected from such a 
transference of forces to the East stand comparison 
with this disadvantage in the West, even if it was not 
taken into account that the transport of those forces 
would be bound to take so much time that they could 
not have afforded any relief in the present emergency. 
Considering the military situation as a whole, there 
only remained a delaying action in the East to be 
carried out by turning to account the greater manceuv- 
ring ability of the allied armies. If the enemy could 
be taken successfully in the flank, there was a hope that 
the desired object would be attained. To this end it 
was necessary to give the 9th Army greater liberty of 
movement, i. e., not to compel it to keep permanently 
in direct contact with the northern wing of the Austro- 
Hungarian front in South Poland. The German Gen- 
eral Headquarters urgently recommended that this 
should be done, and at the same time did everything 
possible to create the fundamental conditions for such 
action, without, however, necessitating any abandon- 
ment of the Western plans. 

The 9th Army was therefore supplemented by the 
assignment of almost the whole of the trained reserves 




MAP 2. 
Situation in the Western Theatre of War, ]\riDDLE 
OF October, 1914 

a_G,.rnuin line, midclK- of October. 
U — Hostile attacks beaten off. 
e_Gcrnian line, November 1st. 



THE BATTLES OF THE YSER 29 

at home, to make good its very serious losses. One of 
the newly established army corps from home had al- 
ready been sent to the East, as it was greatly feared 
that since the 9th Army had been transferred to Silesia 
the Russians might break through on the southern 
wing of the weakened 8th Army and occasion grave 
consequences. This army corps was now followed by 
two cavalry divisions from the West. The 8th Army 
was also subordinated to the former Commander-in- 
Chief of the 9th Army, General von Hindenburg, in 
order to give him a free hand over all German troops 
on the Eastern front for his own decisions, as Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East, whilst the command of 
the 9th Army was taken over by General von Mack- 
ensen, with Major-General Griiner as his Chief of 
Staff. The dispatch of further forces from the West 
could not, however, come into question until after the 
decision had been taken in the operations which were 
proceeding on the Franco-Belgian front. 

THE DECISION TO USE THE NEW ARMY CORPS IN 

FLANDERS. END OF SEPTEMBER, I9I4 

(See Map 2) 

Here the enemy's attempts at envelopment were re- 
pulsed at the end of September and the beginning of 
October, but the German enveloping movement was not 
realized. This had been prevented by the superiority 
of the French network of railways. Although very 
considerable forces had been employed meanwhile, as, 
for instance, the bulk of the 2nd Army from the 



30 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Rlieims area, the 6th Army, which had hitherto been 
employed in Lorraine, and strong cavalry detachments, 
which were pushed forward in a wide circle round the 
northern wing, the German front did not progress be- 
yond a line west of Roye, west of Bapaume, and west 
of Lille. The coast on which the right flank was to 
rest, and from which it was hoped to obstruct Eng- 
land's Channel traffic, effectively attack the Island it- 
self, and turn the French flank, was not reacihed. 

In order to compel this end, a new 4th Army was 
formed in Belgium towards the middle of October ^ 
out of three divisions of the besieging troops from 
Antwerp, who had been set free by the fall of the 
fortress on the 9th of the month after a siege of barely 
twelve days, and four army corps from Germany which 
had just become fit for service, under the command of 
General Duke Albrecht of Wiirtemberg, with Colonel 
Use as Chief of Staff. It was ordered to advance 
against the Yser sector with its right flank resting on 
the sea. At the same time from the 6th Army under 
General the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, with 
Major-General Krafft von Dellmensingen as Chief of 
Staff, an attacking group massed to the north of Lille, 
concentrated the former right wing of the German 
front in Flanders, was to attack straight ahead west of 
Lille. 

If the shortage of artillery had made itself seriously 
felt in the race to the sea which had been going on 

iSee Appendix: Relative Strengths of the Forces on the 
Western Front. 



THE BATTLES OF THE YSER 31 

till then, it was thought that this could now be 
remedied by bringing up the siege guns from Antwerp. 
Unfortunately, lack of ammunition afterwards pre- 
vented this circumstance from being turned to ac- 
count. 

While exhausted troops had had to be brought into 
action in the previous enveloping movements, the ma- 
jority of the formations which advanced to the new 
struggle were quite fresh. 

The prize to be won was worth the stake. Strong | 
French and English forces had already reached the i 
Yser during the first ten days of October — the English 
had been withdrawn altogether from the old front 
near Rheims — and were trying to get into touch on ■ 
the eastern bank with the Belgian divisions which were ) 
retreating from Antwerp. Our forces had not been \ 
sufficient to prevent the withdrawal of these troops be- i 
fore the fall of the fortress. Although the Belgians ' 
were in an extremely miserable condition they would ; 
soon be able to attack again if supported by English or | 
French formations. There was no doubt about the (' 
resolute offensive intentions of the English and the ] 
Frendh. Not only had the danger that the Germans 
would be finally cut off from the Belgian coast again / 
become acute, but also the danger of an effective en- ! 
circlement of the right wing. They both had to be \ 
removed unconditionally. If this, at least, was not >^ 
done, then the drastic action against England and her / 
sea traffic with submarines, aeroplanes and airships, ' 
which was being prepared as a reply to England's war \ 



32 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

of starvation, was impossible in their present stage of 
development. It was also questionable in certain cir- 
cumstances whether the occupied territory in Northern 
France and Western Belgium was to be held ; the loss 
of it would necessarily have led to evil results. 

If, on the other hand, the German Army succeeded 
in throwing the enemy back across the Yser sector and 
in following him, it could expect to force a favourable 
change in the whole situation on the Western front 
after the supplies of troops and munitions had been 
meanwhile replenished. The same result could nat- 
urally have been expected from a big success in another 
part of the Western front. It was therefore examined 
whether an attempt to break through could be more 
expediently undertaken with the help of the new army 
either in Artois or Picardy or Champagne. A con- 
sideration of the transport and other requirements of 
concentration showed that it would no longer be pos- 
sible to forestall in this way the enemy who was press- 
ing strongly forward in the Yser area. Other forces 
would, therefore, have been required to hold him up. 
These did not exist. The same calculations showed 
that there was no longer time to exchange the young 
troops for tried formations. 

Under these conditions the Chief of the General 
Staff was still firmly convinced of the necessity of car- 
rying out the attack in Flanders when symptoms be- 
came evident that the objective which had been set in 
the East would, perhaps, not be attained. It seemed 
as if the numerical superiority of the enemy and the 



THE BATTLES OF THE YSER 33 

diminished driving power of a portion of the attacking 
troops would prevent the Russians from being brought 
to a standstill on the Vistula and the San. 

THE FIGHTING ON THE VISTULA AND THE SAN IN 

OCTOBER, I914 

(See Sketch 2) 

This did not, in fact, happen. While the German 
attacking columns in the West were moving against 
the Yser sector from October 17th onwards, it be- 
came evident almost at the same time that the allies 
could not maintain themselves on the Vistula and on 
the San. Soon afterwards the retiring movements had 
to be begun there before the counter-thrusts of the 
superior forces of the enemy. The only prospect of 
our front being formed for any length of time was in 
the Carpathians behind the Dunaczek, the Nida and 
the Upper Pilitza. Moreover, it could certainly be 
taken for granted from the outset that the army would 
also be further outflanked in the north. The in- 
tercepted wireless, which allowed us to follow ac- 
curately the movements of the enemy in the East from 
week to week and often from day to day since the be- 
ginning of the war till far into 19 15, and to take cor- 
responding measures, showed this beyond a doubt — 
by this means the war in the East assumed quite a 
different and a much simpler character for us than 
that in the West. 

The new Commander-in-Chief of the German forces 
in the East resolved at the beginning of November to 



34 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

take advantage of this change in the situation to make 
a surprise flanking movement with the assistance of the 
efficient German railways ; it was to be made from the 
North with all the forces at his disposal and supported 
by the left bank of the Vistula. He, therefore, ar- 
ranged for the transference of considerable portions 
of the 8th Army from Lithuania and for the transport 
of the mass of the 9th Army, which was retreating 
from the Vistula above Warsaw, into the area of 
Thorn and Gnesen. The basis for the removal of this 
army was provided by the readiness of the Austro- 
Hungarian G.H.Q., (which was obtained by the strong 
representations of the German G.H.Q.), to fill the gap 
which would thereby be caused in the Polish front by 
the Austro-Hungarian army on the Austro-Hungarian 
southern wing in the Carpathians. This proof of 
solidarity in case of need was all the more highly to be 
valued because it deprived a portion of the Hungarian 
frontier of its protection. At any rate this front did 
not seem to be directly threatened at the moment. 

During these happenings in the East until November 
1 2th, on which day the offensive of the 9th Army, un- 
der the leadership of General von Mackensen, began 
from Thorn and Gnesen, the offensive which was be- 
gun in Flanders in the middle of October, and is popu- 
larly styled the Ypres Battle, was carried out. 

The enemy's offensive was completely broken. He 
was thrown back almost everywhere either to or across 
the Yiser, and a firm connection was established be- 



dood> 



/?, 



or,?.'" ^he. 




Fig. 2. 

The Situation in the East, Beginning of Novem- 
ber, 1914 



a — Germans. 

b — Austro-Hungarians. 

c — Russians. 

A- — Ottensive south of the Vistula. 



THE BATTLES OF THE YSER 35 

tween the coast at Nieuport and the previous German 
right wing near Lille, thus forming a front from the 
Swiss frontier to the sea. That which had to be at- 
tained under any circumstances, if the war was to be 
carried on with any hopeful prospects, was attained. 
Several times it seemed as though it only needed per- 
severance in the offensive to obtain a complete suc- 
cess — how near we actually were to it has since been 
made sufficiently plain. At the time, however, our 
movement came to a standstill. 

DECISION TO BREAK OFF THE FLANDERS OFFENSIVE 

Inundations, skilfully managed by the Belgians, put 
an end to the attack of the German right wing, which 
was making good progress and bore the main pressure. 
The young army corps further South fought with in- 
comparable enthusiasm and unexcelled heroism. The 
disadvantages of their urgent and hasty formation and 
training, and the fact that they were led by older and 
for the most part retired officers, as others were not to 
be had, naturally made themselves felt. In particular 
there were deficiencies in the new field-artillery forma- 
tions, a fact that was emphasized all the more strongly 
by the shortage of ammunition. Nor was the leader- 
ship entirely satisfactory. At the beginning of No- 
vember, G.H.Q. could not conceal from itself that a 
further thorough-going success was no longer to be 
obtained here, particularly in the inundated area, in 
the face of an opponent who was continually growing 
stronger. 



36 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

It was now debated whether by suddenly shifting the 
pressure a break-through should be attempted against 
a portion of the enemy's front on which he had weak- 
ened himself for the sake of the defence of Flanders. 
The district of Artois and Picardy, in the area of the 
2nd Army commanded by General von Biilow, with 
Lieut.-General Lauenstein as Chief of Staff, again 
came under consideration for this purpose. The idea, 
however, soon had to be dropped. After the East had 
been provided with all the reserves at hand, both of 
men and ammunition, the forces in the West were no 
longer sufficient for its realization. 

It was just as strongly opposed by the prospects 
which opened for us in Poland. The Russians evi- 
dently had no knowledge of the storm that was brew- 
ing for them on the left bank of the Vistula. They 
continued their advance westwards slowly, i. e., as well 
as the communications permitted, which had been thor- 
oughly destroyed by the 9th Army on its retreat from 
the Vistula above Warsaw to Silesia and Southern 
Posnania. Their right (northern wing), which was 
advancing approximately along the line Warsaw- 
Kalisz, was not echelonned deeply enough. On the 
other hand they had left strong forces on the right 
bank of the Vistula north-east of Warsaw. Appar- 
ently they were led to do this by the fear lest the 8th 
Army might be suddenly thrown on to the Vistula 
from East Prussia, to attack the Russian lines of com- 
munication there on the right of the Vistula. The 



THE BATTLES OF THE YSER 37 

half voluntary retirement of the army, when it had to 
be weakened for the Mackensen offensive, was no se- 
cret to them, and many have caused them to dispose 
their flank-protection in such deep order of echelon. 
Demonstrations by the main reserves from Thorn and 
Graudenz across the line Lipsno-Mlawa may have had 
the same result. 

Thus the operations entrusted to the 9th Army of- 
fered favourable prospects. There was no doubt at 
G.H.Q. that all forces that could be spared even from 
the West must be used to make it a success, after it 
was realized that the hoped-for decision in the West 
could not now be forced. In contradistinction to the 
view represented by the Commander-in-Chief in the 
East it was, to be sure, quite clear to G.H.Q. that the 
advanced season of the year and the numerical su- 
periority of the Russians would not allow matters to 
come to a really decisive success in the East. The 
Chief of the General Staff trusted, however, that the 
success would be big enough to check the enemy for a 
long time. Even this was a gain which justified the 
attempt. About seven infantry divisions and one 
cavalry division were withdrawn from the West and 
dispatched as speedily as possible to the East to be at 
the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. This was 
only rendered possible, however, by the decision to act 
purely on the defensive in France, with the most care- 
ful application of every imaginable technical device. 
Trench warfare in the real sense, with all its horrors, 
began. 



38 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE ON THE WHOLE 
WESTERN FRONT 

1 In the regulations issued to this end, G.H.Q. broke 
^ with the hitherto accepted German principle that only 
one line of defence was to be constructed. A defence 
system consisting of several lines connected with one 
another was everywhere to be instituted, with two or 
several positions one behind the other. It was intended 
to provide by this means a security against the front 
lines, or even the positions, being broken through, for 
this was unavoidable, owing to the immense superiority 
of the enemy even if the troops acted in the bravest pos- 
sible manner. In spite of this innovation the second 
German principle that the line apportioned to troops 
for defence was to be maintained at all costs, and if lost 
I to be retaken, was rigidly preserved. The garrisons in 
the front line were indeed to be kept as small as possible 
in order to avoid losses by artillery fire. But they had 
to hold out at all costs until the reinforcements sta- 
tioned in the rear-lines could come up to give what 
support they could. 

These regulations were often challenged and were 
even altered at times later in the war. They were 
believed to be to blame for the high losses that occurred 
now and again. It was hoped to avoid these by allow- 
ing the men holding the front line to retire in case of 
need to a comparatively distant line where the main 
resistance was to be offered. Reinforcements were 
only to be brought so far and not into the front lines. 



THE BATTLES OF THE YSER 39 

Experience, as a whole, will scarcely support/the asser- 
tion that this regulation proved its value in general. 
It did not sufficiently take into account the psychology 
of the average soldier. It also compelled the artillery 
to be kept so far behind the main line of resistance, if 
one did not want to run the danger continually of 
losing one's artillery, that it was scarcely possible to 
support the front line effectively. If chosen, excel- 
lently trained troops, under perfectly safe leaders, ap- 
plied this precept, it may have fulfilled its purpose as 
a rule. Very often it has not done so, but has rather 
caused heavier losses both of men, in the gravest of all 
forms, namely voluntary surrender, as also of posi- 
tions. It has been proved that it is a great danger in 
trench warfare for a man to be placed at a post where 
he feels himself abandoned because he knows that he 
cannot hope for assistance. If, in addition, he is left 
a possibility of interpreting regulations concerning re- 
tirement, then the ordinary mortal is readily inclined 
in the hell of a modern battle to interpret them in a way 
which may indeed promise him salvation, but which is 
ruinous for the whole front. It gives rise to voluntary 
surrender or premature retirement, which it is also 
impossible to stop at the main line of resistance. 

In order to enable mobile reserves to be held in readi- 
ness and to secure their timely concentration in threat- 
ened sectors, the armies on the Western front were 
first arranged in three, and later four, army groups. 
This arrangement was, however, annulled again in 
March, as the desired objects could not be fully at- 



40 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

tained. Just as in the East it became difficult for the 
Army Group Commands, obviously as a result of de- 
ficient peace-time training, to agree to exercise great 
self-denial for the sake of the general good in certain 
circumstances. They inclined very often to regard 
their own work as the most important and the troops 
allotted to them as a kind of private possession. In- 
stead, as was hoped, of promoting the preparation of 
reserves for the purposes of G.H.Q., they were the 
more ready to support their armies in resisting the sur- 
render of forces which had once been allotted to them. 
Such tendencies, thoroughly in keeping as they are with 
human nature, have existed as long as there have been 
commands. But they have never been less justified 
than in this war, in which the great tension, resulting 
from the numerical disproportion of forces, constantly 
compelled the German G.H.Q. to count on every single 
battalion. Cases of friction arose which often had 
a very unpleasant influence upon the course of affairs. 

THE FIGHTING AROUND LODZ IN NOVEMBER, I9I4 

The boldly conceived, admirably prepared and force- 
fully executed operations on the left of the Vistula, 
in which the foremost columns of the formations com- 
ing from the West were soon able to take part, won 
brilliant initial successes. Even such experienced lead- 
ers as were on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief 
in the East allowed themselves to be temporarily misled 
by them. In reply to a question from the Chief of the 
General Staff it was reported that if further reinforce- 



THE BATTLES OF THE YSER 41 

ments could be liberated in the West for the East, 
these should not be employed in the battle-area west of 
the Vistula, but in East Prussia, where the Russians 
had taken advantage of the weakening of the 8th 
Army, in favour of the 9th Army, to push forward 
over the frontier again, and were advancing towards 
the Masurian chain of lakes. The enemy leadership, 
however, soon showed in Poland how much it had 
learnt since the days of August. Very swiftly it 
swung the flanking corps northwards, brought up other 
corps from the Austro-Hungarian front, and hurled 
the troops which had hitherto been guarding its flanks 
across the Vistula against the German flank on the left 
of that river. The German attack became paralysed 
and threatened to change into a retiring movement, 
when the other forces arriving from the West instilled 
fresh life into it. Lodz was now captured from the 
Russians; then they were driven back behind the 
Bszura, the Ravka and the Pilitza. They even 
stopped their pressure on the Austro-Hungarian front 
east of Cracow, after the forces there, in conjunction 
with von Besser's German infantry division, succeeded 
in the Battle of Limanova on December 12th in throw- 
ing back again those Russian troops which had pushed 
over the Dunaczek. The blows administered to the 
enemy had accomplished all that they could do. The 
force of the German offensive was exhausted. The 
influence of the Eastern winter made itself acutely felt. 
It also compelled the Russians in East Prussia to stop 
at the chain of lakes. 



( 



42 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

TRENCH WARFARE IN THE EAST 

The trench war began in the East, where, like the 
war of movement, it took different and far lighter 
forms than in the West. Only in a few sectors and 
at intervals was it carried on here with that grim bit- 
terness which was always characteristic of it on the 
other side. The climate, the temperament of the 
enemy, and his military stolidity, moderated it. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PERIOD FROM THE BEGINNING OF TRENCH 

■WARFARE IN NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1914, 

UNTIL THE RESUMPTION OF THE WAR 

OF MOVEMENT IN 1915 

G.H.Q. WAS fully conscious of the disadvantages in-^ 
volved by the transition to trench war. It was chosen ) 
purely and simply as being the lesser evil. 

No progress was made because of the shortage of 
troops and material. A retirement was not desired 
because, as the German lines were very thinly held, 
the gain which might have been obtained by economiz- 
ing troops through a shortening of the front, bore no 
relation to the certain disadvantages of such a step. 
They have already been dealt with in another place. 
Added to this, no positions and dug-outs had been con- 
structed behind the army at that time. It was doubtful 
whether it would be possible to build them in time in 
the winter. It was to be assumed that the increase of 
the front line garrisons necessitated thereby would use 
up almost all the troops that were thus economized. 
In no case would the troops obtain the rest which they 
needed for the welding of their formations, for train- 
ing and for re-equipment. 

The transition to trench warfare was not effected 

43 



44 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. 

(^ by the independent decision of the Chief of the General 
/ Staff, but under the stem pressure of necessity. 

It was very soon realized, however, that this kind of 
> warfare, alternating with hard, well-prepared blows 
directed against sections of the enemy, was the only 
means by which it could be hoped to bring the war to 
a favourable end in view of the change made in the 
Central Powers' position by the events on the Marne 
and in Galicia. It was only by its adoption that Ger- 
many was able permanently to hold her frontiers. 
But the frontiers had to be held, not because G.H.Q. 
lacked the courage to abandon German soil temporarily 
to the enemy if the common good had demanded this, 
but because the loss of the frontier territories would 
have rendered the continuation of the war impossible 
after a comparatively short time. The industrial and 
agricultural districts of the East were quite as impor- 
tant as the industrial districts on both banks of the 
Rhine. Neither the exclusion of the one nor the other 
was practicable for Germany or her allies. 

But the transition to trench warfare once more al- 
lowed full advantage to be taken of the internal lines 
and so restored the freedom of action to strike with 
sufficient forces wherever a decision was necessary. 

It was the systematic application of trench warfare 
which first rendered possible such an increase in the 
capacity of the railways that they became in effect the 
equivalent of a reduplication of the reserves. 

It was this which first gave time to exploit science 
and engineering to their full extent in the interests of 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 45 



) 



the war. Thereby it supplied a basis on which brave 
and well-trained men inferior in number could hold out ^ 
indefinitely against a manifold superiority. , 

The first premise, at all events for the successful 
application of this form of warfare, was the intrinsic 
superiority of one's own troops over the enemy. That 
this existed with regard to the Russians was certain. | 
After a short observation, however, the question / 
whether a similar comparison existed with regard to ; 
the enemies in the West, who were to be rated more 
highly, could also be answered with a definite affirma- 
tive. Although the German Army, in contrast to the 
French, for example, had not had a really thorough 
peace-time training in trench fighting, the troops suc- 
ceeded in mastering it far more quickly and better 
than any one of the enemies. Contrary to all expecta- 
tions, the French, in particular, did not distinguish 
themselves at all in this. The old truth that the soldier 
who is well-disciplined and has his heart in the business, 
and in addition has learnt to attack, is equal to any 
situation in war, was once more fully confirmed. 

Nowhere have the admirable warlike qualities of the 
German, supplemented by his strict training, celebrated 
greater triumphs than in the trench war; that is, of the 
German as he was before the accursed revolution, 
which was just as unnecessary as it was unfruitful. 

When G.H.Q. decided to adopt trench warfare in the 
two last months of 1914, the answering of the further 
questions as to the sector in which the next offensive 



46 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

was to be made was not an urgent matter, as the re- 
quired forces were not available. The first that could 
be reckoned upon were a new army o£ nine divisions. 
Their mobilization had been ordered by the Minister 
of War immediately the new formations which were 
used at Ypres and Lodz later, were ready, and training 
personnel and equipment had been set free. These 
divisions, however, could not be ready for use before 
the end of February, unless they were to be sent pre- 
maturely to the front. Experiences with the first new 
formations had shown that it was absolutely essential 
to avoid this. The eagerness, therefore, of one leader 
or another, and the impatience of the allied G.H.Q., 
had to be curbed. This reticence was repaid in excel- 
lent fashion. The new divisions responded brilliantly 
to the expectations placed in them by the result of the 
winter battle in Masuria. The fact that they were ul- 
timately rendered unfit for further fighting for a long 
time by these short operations, was due to the very 
high demands which had to be made upon them under 
particularly unfavourable weather and road conditions, 
in order to attain any result at all from the under- 
taking. 

The further mobilization of troops at home was out 
of the question for the time being, owing to the short- 
age of junior officers and equipment. Another ob- 
stacle was the necessity of practising economy with the 
reserves of men, owing to the long duration of the war 
which was now inevitable. The biggest successes at 
the front were fruitless if the situation at home was 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 47 

rendered impossible by a scarcity of labour, or if the 
swiftly increasing requirements of the army in the field 
could not be satisfied for the same reason. 

On the other hand G.H.Q. entertained no doubts 
that the mere addition of the nine divisions in training, 
even if they were most carefully prepared, would not 
be sufficient to effect a real decision either in the West 
or in the East. The moral and technical superiority 
of the German soldier over his opponents, that was 
daily becoming more evident, also offered a way out of 
this difficulty. It turned out to be so great that it was 
possible to entertain the suggestion of the Director of 
the General War Department, Colonel von Wrisberg, 
to reduce by about 25 per cent, the strength of the 
fighting units, the divisions, without doing any harm 
to their effectiveness, to correspond to that of the 
enemy units lin their original strength. This created 
the possibility of forming new fighting units out of 
the surplus of the old formations that were already 
trained, equipped and provided with leaders. This 
plan was adopted with great success after the artillery, 
guns and other war material, which was needed to sup- 
plement the arrangement, could be supplied. The ad- 
vantages gained in the Eastern campaign in the sum- 
mer of 191 5 were largely due to the adoption of this 
plan. * 

Just as the course of the war hitherto had given 
every soldier new conceptions of human powers of 
endurance, so it had also established totally new stand- 



48 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ards for the requirements of materiel and its effi- 
ciency. Only those who held responsible posts in the 
German G.H.Q. in the winter of 1914-15, during 
which almost every single shot had to be counted in 
the Western Army, and the failure of one single am- 
munition train, the breaking of a rail or any other 
stupid accident, threatened to render whole sections of 
the front defenceless, can form any estimate of the 
difficulties that had to be overcome at that time. The 
requirements of the Eastern Army were always given 
the preference on account of its being composed of 
miany units in which the process of consolidation was 
incomplete. Only those who had to listen to the mov- 
ing complaints of our wonderful troops about these 
conditions, and the incessant appeals of our allies for 
assistance in the shape of war supplies of all kinds, can 
understand the ardent efforts with which some relief 
was sought. Thanks to the co-operation of the widest 
and best sections of the people it was found more 
quickly than could have been expected. The adjust- 
ment of science and engineering, the re-construction of 
the whole of industry in the interests of the war, with 
due regard for their usual indispensable work, took 
place almost noiselessly, so that they were accomplished 
before the enemy quite knew what was happening. 
Indispensable assistance was afforded by the regula- 
tion of the raw materials question which was effected 
by the Minister of War with the advice of Dr. Walter 
Rathenau; for this question had become of decisive 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 49 

importance now that Germany was cut off from the 
outer world. 

Particular stress was laid upon the promotion of the 
production of munitions and the manufacture of long- 
range guns, the elaboration of the trench mortar into a 
serviceable weapon, the increase of the machine-gun 
supply and of the air-service, as well as the develop- 
ment of gas as a means of warfare. 

The most urgent was the supplementing and in- 
crease of artillery ammunition. It is not possible 
within the limits of this book to give sufficient praise 
to the admirable achievements in this matter, which 
were all the more admirable as the most careful atten- 
tion was always paid to home requirements. It is to 
be hoped that a more famous pen will take this task in 
hand. It shall only be mentioned here that as early 
as spring, 191 5, G.H.Q. was relieved of any serious 
anxiety with regard to the munitions supply. This 
welcome state of things continued until midsummer, 
19 1 6, although the Entente was able gradually to avail 
itself of the munitions supply of the whole world, 
excluding the Central Powers, whilst Germany was not 
only thrown back upon her own resources, but was also 
forced to guarantee her allies ample assistance in this 
matter as well as in every other province of war ma- 
terial. It was only the requirements during the sim- 
ultaneous battles on the Meuse, on the Somme, in 
Galicia, and in Italy in August, 19 16, that, exceeding 
as they did all anticipations, brought about a critical 



50 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

period lin the supply of ammunition for a time. How- 
ever, the program of production which had been 
drawn up continued to supply such increasingly enor- 
mous quantities of munitions that it was very quickly 
possible to remove the deficiency which had occurred. 
This program then held good till far into 191 7 at 
least. Its conception and execution was primarily due 
to the expert knowledge and indefatigable work of 
Major-General Coupette, Majors Wurtzbacher and 
Koeth in the Ministry of War, and also Major Bauer, 
who belonged to the General Staff, as Artillery ad- 
viser. 

Although the high-angle fire of all calibres was very 
effective, particularly of the light and heavy field how- 
itzers, against which the enemy produced nothing ap- 
proaching them in value during the first years of the 
war, yet the troops felt very acutely the inferiority in 
range and effect of our field-guns against the French. 
In order to remove this deficiency steps were taken to 
construct a new field-gun and more effective ammuni- 
tion. The manufacture of this, it is true, as is always 
the case with new productions in w'ar time, was bound 
to take considerable time; the issue of the new guns 
to the troops could not be begun before the end of 
19 1 6. In the meantime an attempt was made to meet 
the deficiency by extensive adaptation of the materiel 
at hand in the fortresses at home, in the navy and in 
captured stocks. As always where patriotic interests 
were involved, the Krupp works in Essen took the 
lead in this. The long-range artillery which was thus 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 51 

obtained has done excellent service. Its most brilliant ") 
technical feats were the bombardment of the English ) 
landingplace at Dunkirk and the arsenals near Nancy 1 
and at Bel fort. Still more important was the fact that 
it made it possible to compel the enemy continually 
to keep his batteries, stores and other establishments 
of importance, as well as his concentrations, far back 
from the front line. Yet its powers were just as in- 
sufficient as those of the high-angle artillery to pre- 
pare for assault those positions which were constructed 
with all the modern methods of the art of fortification, 
owing to the still restricted number of guns and am- 
munition. Where one party had gained time, by the 
adoption of trench warfare, to apply these means 
methodically, the ordinary weapons of attack often 
failed completely. A weapon had, therefore, to be 
found which was superior to them but which would 
not excessively tax the limited capacity of German war 
industry in its production. Such a weapon existed in 
gas. The use of this in fights for fortified positions is 
known from times of old. The use of it by the French 
in the form of gas-shells with asphyxiating effect and 
of so-called stink-pots, frequent announcements in the 
French press that a gas of annihilating effect discov- 
ered by a famous physicist would shortly be used, the 
serious wounds caused by the French incendiary shells 
filled with phosphorus, as well as the poisonous effect 
of the English picrin shells, had directed attention 
again and again to this weapon. German chemistry 
soon succeeded in solving the problem which was thus 



52 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

put to it. But these inventions too were not spared the 
shortcomings of new productions in time of war. It 
was years before it was possible to control gas with any 
certainty as a weapon. 

During the first months of the war the German air- 
services had shown themselves to be fully equal to the 
enemy's, if not in numbers at least in value, although 
the chief merit, to be sure, was not due to the technical 
perfection of the materiel, but to the self-sacrificing 
spirt of the personnel. It was also evident, however, 
that the peace-time doubts of the Ministry of War as 
to the utility of the dirigible airship in war were jus- 
tified. Quite apart from many other obvious diffi- 
culties, so long as it was not possible to discover a less 
dangerous gas wherewith to fill the balloon, the great 
hopes placed in Count von Zeppelin's productions could 
not be fulfilled. The dirigible airship had a Hmited 
importance for a few special purposes. In general 
the duties assigned to it had to be taken over by the 
aviators. As a result of this, and also of the palpable 
efforts of the enemy to lay the greatest stress on the 
war in the air, a speedy expansion of the Grman air- 
service became necessary, although it was in fact 
equivalent to a new construction enlarged many times 
over. Major Thomsen, as he was then, was entrusted 
by the Chief of the General Staff with the elaboration 
of this question; in his work he has erected an abiding 
monument to himself. He not only understood the 
right paths to indicate for aeroplane construction at 
home, but also the true spirit to be maintained among 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 53 

the flying men, and without which all technical per- 
fections would have meant nothing at all. As could 
not be otherwise in the case of so young a service which 
was dependent upon the spasmodic progress of engi- 
neering, the superiority in the air was many a time in 
the balance. Again and again, however, the German 
air forces triumphed, thanks to the sound foundations 
upon which their development was henceforward 
based, over the disproportion in the resources of the 
belligerents. 

Side by side with the organizing activities of G.H.Q., 
which have only been suggested in outline, and in spite 
of the trench war and the advanced season, it was 
faced by other important problems during the weeks 
about the New Year 19 14-15. 

TURKEY JOINS THE CENTRAL POWERS 

At the end of October Turkey had declared for the 
Central Powers. The great services rendered by the 
German Ambassador, Freiherr von Wangenheim, in 
this matter, and by the German naval attache Humann 
as a result of special circumstances, ought not to be left 
unmentioned. The decisive importance of Turkey 
joining in the struggle against Russia has already been 
touched upon. Turkey was absolutely indispensable in 
this context and was to be valued all the more highly 
at the given moment because she provided at the same 
time a certain counterpoise to Bulgaria's attitude, 
which had become rather doubtful. Conversations 
with the latter regarding the conclusion of an alliance 



54 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

had not been continued after the events upon the 
Marne, upon the San, and upon the Vistula, although 
Bulgaria had on the other hand steadily resisted all 
the Entente's temptations to get her to join them. 

The Turkish Command resolved forthwith to fore- 
stall the danger which threatened from an invasion 
in process of preparation of the politically unreliable 
province of Armenia by the Russians, by a surprise 
move into Georgia. She achieved this object also. 
The operations, however, had soon to be stopped as a 
result of heavy losses incurred by the unusually early 
coming of winter in the frontier mountains. The 
same circumstances, however, also removed the Rus- 
sian danger, at least until the late spring. This pro- 
vided an opportunity of moving Turkish forces against 
Egypt. Even if the Chief of the General Staff did 
not expect any decisive influence upon the war from 
such operations, he yet hoped to cut the Suez Canal, 
one of Great Britain's most important arteries, for a 
time, or at least to keep strong English forces away 
from the main theatre of war, whilst Germany's re- 
sources were not involved to any harmful extent by 
enterprises in Asia. 

At the same time a propaganda on a grand scale 
was instituted in the Caucasus and Persia, as well as 
being sent over Afghanistan into India. Among other 
thngs this was aided by the proclamation of a " Holy 
War " by the Sultan of Turkey in his capacity of 
Caliph. It was evident that these steps could have 
but a limited success owing to the weakness of Turkey 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 55 

and the difficulty of sending German means to those 
remote regions. Yet it was considered absolutely nec- 
essary to start and to further it, if only to forestall the 
dangers created by the activities of England, which 
were following similar lines but in a contrary direction. 
The latter had in her favour the fear, deeply rooted in 
the East, of England's power, superior means and 
greater liberty of movement. Yet the boldness and 
tenacity of the work of men like Niedermayer, Hentig 
and others made it possible to sow a seed which would 
have borne fruit a hundred-fold in the event of a 
satisfactory conclusion of the war. 

In criticizing Turkey's achievements in the war, the j 
fact must not be lost sight of that she came into the \ 
world- war deeply exhausted by six years of almost 
uninterrupted war and was altogether dependent on 
Germany's support in all technical matters and ques- 
tions of equipment. This could not really be given 
until the Balkan corridor had been opened through 
Serbia and Bulgaria in the winter of 191 5-16, and even 
then it could only take effect very gradually. The 
difficulties of communication with Constantinople were 
not altogether overcome right up to the end of the 
war. Germany's own needs and the necessity of hav- 
ing to help Austria-Hungary also in this province pre- 
vented it. \ 

Still less were the difficulties of the further con- 
nection with Asia Minor overcome. In peace time, 
traffic between Constantinople and the coast of Asia 
Minor as well as the Syrian and Armenian coasts had 



56 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

been for the greater part by way of the sea. This was 
1 now closed. Recourse had therefore to be had to the 
\ land routes. There was no through railway connec- 
{ tion, however. In the promotion of the building of 



the Bagdad Railway economic and financial considera- 
tions had played a decisive part, and the military con- 
siderations had been neglected. The Anatolian line, 
which led across the highlands of Asia Minor to the 
I south-east, ended at the western foot of the mighty 
I Taurus range. From thence to the front in Armenia 
/ the traffic had to pass along 450 or 500 miles of coun- 
) try roads running through wild and barren mountain 
"^j districts. Communication with the fronts in the 
f south-east was indeed facilitated by the fact that differ- 
^; ent sections of the railway could be used to this end. 
I Thus one railway was working in the plain of Adana 

\ from the eastern foot of the Taurus as far as the wes- 

f 

f tern slope of the Amanus. Another bridged the dis- 
tance from Aleppo to Jerusalem. A third was being 
constructed from the eastern foot of the Amanus to 

^^ Aleppo, and in a north-easterly direction from thence 
to the Euphrates, where the river could be used to 
Bagdad during the short period of high water. All 
these railway sections, however, suffered most pain- 
fully from a shortage of rolling-stock, building-ma- 
terials, fuel and both workmen and personnel. The 
efforts of German engineers and German railway 
troops to master these conditions probably constitute 
the greatest achievements ever performed in this 
province. The construction of the line over the moun- 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 57 

tain range of the Taurus and across the chain of the 
Amanus, the building of a viaduct north-west of 
Aleppo and the bridge oyer the Euphrates, are tech- 
nical achievements of the highest rank. In the cir- 
cumstances, however, even the self-sacrificing devotion 
of these men was not able to effect more than a limited 
improvement. 

THE FIGHTING IN THE WEST, DECEMBER-JANUARY, 

I915 

In the Western theatre of war it was possible to 
keep in every respect to the guiding principle which 
had been formed for the conduct of the war in 
Europe. 

The French, indeed, attempted more serious attacks 
in December in Alsace against the army of General 
Gaede, Chief of Staff Lieut-Colonel Bronsart von 
Schellendorff ; in the Woevre against the army of 
General von Strantz, Chief of Staff Lieut-Colonel 
Fischer, and- soon afterwards in Champagne against 
the 3rd Army under General von Einem, Chief of 
Staff Major-General von Hoeppner, In spite of the 
heavy consignments of troops to the East they were 
roundly repulsed everywhere. And after some pain- 
ful blows had been successfully inflicted upon the 
enemy in January by throwing in at several places 
swiftly concentrated front reserves — with the 5th 
Army under Lieut.-General the Crown Prince Wil- 
helm, Chief of Staff Major-General Schmidt von 
Knobelsdorf, in the Argonne, and with the 7th Army 






58 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

under General von Heeringen, Chief of Staff Lieut.- 
General von Hanisch, north of Soissons, a welcome 
if only short pause set in. The hope was justified 
that time would be gained in order to concentrate 
really sufficient forces of troops and material for a de- 
cisive blow. 

Developments in the East did not permit such plans 
to mature. 

DECISION TO USE THE NEW FORMATIONS IN THE EAST, 

JANUARY, 191 5 

(See Map 3) 

In order to relieve the Austro-Hungarian front, in- 
cluding the hard-pressed fortress of Przemysl, the last 
bulwark in Central Galicia remaining in Austrian 
hands, by binding Russian forces in Northern Poland, 
the 9th Army, after a short breathing space, resumed 
its attacks on the Bszura and Ravka in the direction of 
Warsaw at the end of December. The attempt had no 
results worth mentioning. Under the influence of this 
impression, and also of unfavourable intelligence which 
had reached it regarding the attitude of Italy and 
Rumania, the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. proposed in 
January, 19 15, an offensive through the Carpathians 
supported by German forces. In this the intention 
permanently to secure Hungary's frontiers and to re- 
lieve Przemysl was probably the chief consideration. 
In addition to this the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. be- 
heved that it could promise a decisive success against 
Russia from a military point of view, if the new army 




;,'<w ) :;u>oco 



MAP 3. 
Attack on the Wing of the Russian Front. January - 
February, 1915 

a — Grrnun ami AustroHungarian liar at thr beginning of the oprralioiis. 
b — Line at the close ot ihe operations. 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 59 

corps training in Germany were used simultaneously 
for a thrust from East Prussia against the Russian 
right flank., 

The Commander-in-Chief in the East, Field-Mar- 
shal von Hindenburg, gave his most pressing support 
to this proposal. He, too, opined that the final decision 
in the East might be expected from such operations 
against both Russian flanks. 

It was not to be denied, indeed, that four quite 
fresh German army groups, formed and trained with 
particular care, would presumably win considerable 
successes at any point in the East where they might go 
into action. It remained doubtful, however, in the 
highest degree whether an advantage to the whole 
would, or even could, be attained thereby, which would 
be in just proportion to the value of the stake. And 
yet in the present position of the Central Powers the 
satisfactory answering of this question was the most 
important premise for any decision on the part of 
G.H.Q. Before it was answered in the affirmative 
without any ambiguity, not one drop of German blood 
should have been shed, much less should almost the 
only German military reserves have been risked. 

No pressing emergency from which Austria-Hun- 
gary had to be relieved existed at the moment. A re- 
lief of Przemysl would certainly have been valuable. 
But no such great importance with regard to the gen- 
eral conduct of the war could be attached to it as to 
make it repay the expenditure of the German reserves. 
In addition it was most improbable that an attempt at 



6o THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

relief would be successful in the depth of the Car- 
pathian winter. The Austro-Hungarian front on the 
Hungarian frontier stood fast at the time. Even if 
the enemy was continually reinforcing himself there, 
the relative strength of the forces was not such, that 
in view of the natural strength of the defence in 
mountains, a brave army could not have looked con- 
fidently into the future.^ In spite of this it would 
have been very desirable to relieve the front perma- 
nently of the Russian pressure. In a sober estimate 
of all the circumstances, however, it was to be feared 
that the proposed operations had little prospect of 
achieving this. The Chief of the General Staff was 
altogether sceptical of the possibility of conducting two 
enterprises, separated from one another by a weakly- 
held space of more than 375 miles, so as to take effect 
simultaneously, when there were only comparatively 
limited forces at his disposal. The Russians had the 
advantage of the inner lines. As not one German 
division more could be withdrawn from the West at 
the time, there were, apart from the formations which 
would be offered by Austria-Hungary, and which 
were certainly not particularly good storm troops, and 
the few troops which might be drawn from the Ger- 
man Eastern front, only the four young corps ready 
for the suggested operations. With these it was, per- 
haps, possible to win large local successes in the two 
proposed sectors of attack, if one was ready at the 

iSee Appendix: Relative Strengths of the Forces on the 
Eastern Front, under 2 C. 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 6i 

same time to run the danger of completely exhausting 
the troops participating in the operations by the hard- 
ships of the winter campaign. It was scarcely to be 
hoped that this effort would be sufficient to win from 
the enemy an advantage which was really important 
for the general situation, and especially as it was im- 
probable that the natural difficulties occasioned by the 
wintry weather, particularly in the mountains, would 
allow initial successes to be turned to full advantage. 

The assumption that a final decision in the East 
could be obtained was, of course, still more unfounded. 

Moreover, this belief was based on sophisms. ' As 
a result of the unfortunately widespread catchword 
" the war must be won in the East " even people in 
high leading circles inclined to the opinion that it would 
be possible for the Central Powers actually " to force 
Russia to her knees " by force of arms, and by this 
success to induce the Western Powers to change their 
mind. This argument paid no heed either to the true 
character of the struggle for existence, in the most 
exact sense of the word, in which our enemies were en- 
gaged no less than we, nor to their strength of will. 
It was a grave mistake to believe that our Western 
enemies would give way, if and because Russia was 
beaten. No decision in the East, even though it were 
as thorough as was possible to imagine, could spare 
us from fighting to a conclusion in the West. For 
this Germany had to be prepared at all costs. This 
would not be the case if forces which were indispens- 
able in France, either for keeping the enemy at bay 



62 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

until the decision, or for the decision itself, were tied 
up in the immeasurable spaces of Russia. The em- 
ployment of such forces would have been required, 
however, even to attempt the desired final decision 
against the Eastern colossus. Even then it was still 
very uncertain whether the object would be attained.'' 
Napoleon's experiences did not invite an imitation of 
his example, and he had been able to undertake the 
march to the East under far more favourable condi- 
tions than was the case at present. 

The Chief of the General Staff, therefore, adhered 
to his decision to use the new corps in the West. In 
order, however, to put a stop to the movement of 
Russian forces, which was taking place against the 
Austro-Hungarian front, he called upon the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East to make a further relief 
thrust with front reserves against the Russian front 
west of the Vistula — this time in the more favourable 
terrain on the Pilitza, and with the heaviest concentra- 
tion of the available forces of troops and artillery. It 
was suggested to the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. that 
an attempt should be made to crush Serbia with the 
forces which were intended for the operations in the 
Carpathians, and which could be reinforced by some 
Germans on the Eastern front. As far as could be 
seen, it would not be difficult to deal such a blow at 
the Serbian Army, which was very much weakened 
by fighting, disease and privation, and was suffering 
from a shortage of materiel. It was considered op- 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 63 

portune by the German G.H.Q., because Austria-Hun- 
gary's reputation among the Balkan peoples and in 
Rumania and Italy was urgently in need of heighten- 
ing, if serious developments were not to ensue. The 
particular cause of this was the fate of an expedition 
which had been undertaken in Serbia by the Austro- 
Hungarian Army there, under Lieut. Field-Marshal 
Potiorek, in November and December, 19 14, without 
the co-operation of G.H.Q. After a short initial suc- 
cess, these troops had been thrown back across the 
Save in dire confusion and with the heaviest losses. 
The simplest means of toning down the impression of 
this misfortune would have been a counter-stroke 
against Serbia. By opening up the communications 
with the south-east, such an action held more promise 
than did any local successes in the Carpathians or on 
the East Prussian frontier. 

It soon appeared, however, that this attitude could 
not be maintained. Under the increasing Russian 
pressure, it proved to be impracticable to send any 
Austro-Hungarian forces from the Carpathian front 
to Serbia.^ On the contrary, formations which were 
already on the Danube had to be sent to support the 
Carpathian front. Moreover, the condition of the al- 
lied troops gave rise to well-founded doubts as to 
whether that front could be maintained at all without 
strong German assistance. The collapse of it would 

1 See Appendix : Relative Strengths of the Forces on the 
Eastern Front, under 3 C. 



64 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

have been insupportable, for it would have cut out 
Hungary, the strongest pillar of the war-spirit in the 
Dual Monarchy, Steps had immediately to be taken 
to give direct support to the Carpathian front. This 
swallowed up the available German forces for the un- 
dertaking that had been planned on the Pilitza, which 
was also hindered by weather conditions. It soon be- 
came clear, however, that even this immediate stiffen- 
ing of the front would not be of any permanent use, 
especially as terrain and winter in the mountains, as 
well as the bad communications to and on the Car- 
pathian front, only allowed a scanty measure of troops 
to be sent there by the Central Powers. An end had 
to be put to the uninterrupted stream of Russians ar- 
riving there, if the fall of Przemysl was not to be fol- 
lowed within a conceivable time by an irremediable 
break-through in Hungary. The need for some re- 
lief by means of an attack in another spot, therefore, 
became imperative. With a heavy heart, therefore 
the Chief of the General Staff had to make up his 
mind to employ in the East the young corps who were 
the only available military reserves at the time. This 
decision meant the further abandonment of any active 
campaign on a large scale in the West for a long time. 
It could not have been hoped to shake seriously the 
solid Anglo-French front with the new formations 
which were contemplated. It was, on the other hand, 
not at all out of the question that it might be possible, 
by using them later in the East, to get rid of the Rus- 
sian danger for an appreciable period, if the enemy 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 65 

was successfully driven to the same enormous con- 
sumption of men and materiel as hitherto. 

The proposals of the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. 
were agreed to. Although the Chief of the General 
Staff reserved to himself the use elsewhere of those 
excellent troops which were now going to the East, 
as soon as the object was achieved on that front, he 
did not entertain any illusions as to the uncertainty 
of these calculations. His consent could only be ob- 
tained on condition that the operations in the East 
were directed with constant regard to all the require- 
ments of the whole situation. To this end the presence 
of G.H.Q. was necessary. The Chief of the General 
Staff therefore began to famiharize himself with the 
idea of taking the conduct of operations in the East 
into his own hands. The translation of this idea into 
fact was prevented at the moment by gigantic prepa- 
rations on the part of the enemy for an offensive in the 
West. Consequently one reason alone actually justi- 
fied the new decision: the conviction that Austria- 
Hungary must otherwise collapse in a short time under 
the burdens of the war. 

From the middle of January, 191 5, Field-Marshal 
von Hindenburg was given four corps of the army 
reserve ^ — including the best that Germany possessed 
in the war — to carry out the offensive from East 
Prussia, according to his proposal and that of the 

1 There were three fresh corps among, these; the fourth a 
corps that had been kept in reserve on the Western Front, and 
was replaced there by a fresh one. 



66 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. They formed a new loth 
Army, under General von Eichhorn, Chief of Staff 
Colonel Hell. 

The Austro-Hungarian offensive in the Carpathians, 
for which, in addition to the Austro-Hungarian 
Armies participating, the so-called Southern Army, un- 
der General von Linsingen, Chief of Staff General 
von Stolzmann ^ had been formed out of three German 
and some Austro-Hungarian divisions, came to a stand- 
still after making very little progress. As had been 
feared, the mountain winter proved to be stronger 
than human powers of endurance. It did not even 
succeed in quite clearing Hungarian soil of the enemy. 
Soon the allied troops once more had difficulty in beat- 
ing off the Russian counter-attacks. The German 
troops of the Southern Army did, indeed, continue the 
offensive and performed individual feats. Progress 
was also made in the Bukovina, where German cavalry, 
under Lieut.-General Freiherr Marschall, was fighting 
in conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian Army un- 
der General Pflanzer. It was soon apparent, however, 
that the relief of Przemysl or any other decisive suc- 
cess was not to be counted upon. 

A little later the offensive in East Prussia set the 
winter battle in Masuria ablaze on February 8th. 
Besides the loth Army, the left wing of the 8th under 
General von Below, Chief of Staff Major-General 

1 For the preparation of these operations General Ludendorff, 
who had given his particular support to the undertaking, was 
lent to General von Linsingen temporarily. 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 67 

Bockmann, also took part in it. As the enemy was 
taken by surprise and the fresh German troops readily 
responded to the most gigantic demands, it succeeded 
in liberating German territory once more from the 
Russians. The greater part of their wing army, the 
loth, met with its destruction in the Forests of Au- 
gustow. But the German forces were also at the end 
of their endurance. Weakened as they were by 
weather conditions and difficulties of commissariat, 
they were no longer able to break the resistance of 
the Russian reinforcements, which were once more 
thrown against them swiftly and skilfully. 

In order to prevent further sacrifices, which in his 
opinion could scarcely be of any more use, the Chief 
of the General Staff pointed out to the Commander- 
in-Chief in the East that the general situation imposed 
certain limits upon the endeavour to complete the 
victory in the winter battle by trying the powers of 
the troops to the utmost. 

The Commander-in-Chief, however, adhered to his 
resolve to continue the offensive. He hoped by means 
of this further pressure to compel the Russians to 
withdraw their front from the left of the Vistula be- 
hind the river. To this end another attacking group 
of front reserves, gathered together under the com- 
mand of General von Gallwitz, was thrown against 
the lower Narew front. This had practically no result, 
neither was any further progress made in the North. 
On the contrary the Russians gained advantages at 
several points in their counter-attacks. The forces 



68 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. 

used in these were partly brought up out of Poland, 
west of the Vistula, but the Russian front there was 
kept in its old position. Attempts by the Germans to 
take advantage of this by offensive action in this sector 
came to nothing. Towards the middle of March the 
allies were once more thrown on the defensive along 
the whole Eastern front. This was effected without 
any particular trouble where there were German for- 
mations, but it was only with great exertion that the 
Austro-Hungarian troops, against whom the Russians 
directed their main pressure, succeeded in maintain- 
ing their front generally. This made itself particu- 
larly felt after the fall of Przemysl, on March 22nd, 
which set at liberty the Russian besieging army. 

The operations against both wings of the Russian 
front had not come up to the far-reaching expecta- 
tions which had been placed upon them in the East. 
The reports which came in regarding the situation 
and the condition of the troops showed this. As early 
as the first days of March, the Chief of the General 
Staff had to refrain from carrying out his intention 
of again withdrawing the forces which had lately been 
sent to the Russian theatre of war on the conclusion 
of the operation. Luckily, he was in a position to do 
this at the moment without getting into any awkward 
dilemma. The favourable issue for us of the relief 
offensives attempted by the enemy on the Western 
front to help the Russians could already be foreseen, 
and Italy was still keeping quiet, although relations 
with this former ally had become dangerously acute, 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 69 

On the other hand, these operations had done their 
duty, inasmuch as they had inflicted losses upon the 
Russians which must be described as quite extraordi- 
nary, even when it was considered that our allies also 
had to lament very severe losses. G.H.Q. took oc- 
casion from this to hope for the coming of at least a 
temporary lull in the crisis on the Carpathian front. 
It therefore returned once more to its old idea. The 
Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. was called upon to profit 
by the occasion, while maintaining the strictest de- 
fensive in the Carpathians, to strike a surprise blow at 
Serbia. This undertaking was just as desirable for 
the securing of the flank and rear of a front which 
might have to be formed in the near future against 
Italy, as for the opening of the corridor by which help 
could be sent to Turkey, which was just then being 
hard pressed in the Dardanelles. Meanwhile, the 
premise upon which this proposal was based proved to 
be incorrect. According to reports from the Carpa- 
thian front, the Russians were not slackening their 
attack, and the allies were not faring any better than 
they had done before. There could be no thought of 
transferring any forces from there. On the contrary, 
German support had to be sent along again at the end 
of March at the instigation of the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. The Beskides Corps, under Lieut. -General 
von der Marwitz, composed of three divisions from the 
German section of the Eastern front, was pushed for- 
ward into the mountain sector of the same name, in 
order to counteract a serious reverse which had hap- 



TO THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

pened to the Austro-Hungarians there. The corps 
succeeded in doing this, as regards the enemy, very 
much 'more easily than was expected. Symptoms ap- 
peared among the Russians which could not be inter- 
preted otherwise than as a considerable diminution of 
their fighting strength. Together with other observa- 
tions made upon the Eastern front during this time, 
they furnished G.H.Q. with important bases for con- 
clusive decisions soon to be arrived at. 

Similar signs, though of a negative nature, had been 
obtained by the Chief of the General Staff from the 
general course of the operations. In his opinion, a 
fact had become clearly evident therein which had 
already proclaimed its existence in the fighting on the 
Vistula in October, and still more in the struggle for 
Lodz in November. With the comparatively modest 
forces at Germany's disposal for offensive action, the 
continuation of the operations against flank or wing of 
the Russian front could no longer offer prospects of 
important successes. The enemy had long been watch- 
ing for them with particular attention, and knew very 
well how to make the counter-strokes. He could not 
be prevented in this, because Germany was not in a 
position, with the existing proportion of forces, to tie 
him down sufficiently along the front, and he always 
had plenty of room in Russia into which to withdraw. 
No less valuable than this knowledge was the fact that 
a measure had been obtained of the performances 
which might generally be expected of the Austro- 
Hungarian troops. If, in future, they were to do use- 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 71 

ful service in big offensive actions, then care had pre- 
viously to be taken to use them side by side with the 
Germans, and to let the latter do the real work of the 
attack. This method of procedure was accordingly 
adopted as the war went on, in so far as G.H.Q. could 
render it possible. 

Where this was not done, owing to a shortage of 
available German forces or for other reasons, as in the 
Austro-Hungarian offensive in Volhynia, in the au- 
tumn of 1915, or in that from the Tyrol, in the spring 
of 19 1 6, the deviation from the rule has bitterly 
avenged itself. 

THE WINTER BATTLE IN CHAMPAGNE 

Whilst all these events were taking place in the East, 
relief offensives for the Russians had been developed 
by strong forces of the English and the French in the 
Western theatre of the war. 

In the middle of February immensely superior 
masses of the French attacked the German positions 
of the 3rd Army in Champagne, others, north of Arras 
(in the neighbourhood of the Loretto heights), the por- 
tions of the 6th Army there. 

In the first half of March the English attempted in 
dense formations to over-run the very weak German 
forces of the 6th Army, which opposed them south- 
west of Lille, by a massed attack. 

Almost at the same time the French attacked on the 
right bank of the Meuse, south-east of Verdun 



^2 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

(Combres heights, then Bois du Pretre, St. Mihiel), in 
the 5th Army sector. 

No notable advantages were gained anywhere by the 
enemy. After unimportant initial successes the fight- 
ing developed everywhere into a monotonous fluctuat- 
ing struggle. In it the Germans had a very hard time 
in consequence of their inferiority in numbers — dur- 
ing the winter battle in Champagne the proportion was 
no more than one to six, and around Lille one to six- 
teen. Everywhere, however, they held their lines in 
the main, and inflicted disproportionately heavy losses 
upon the attackers. At many points they were even 
able not only to wrench from the enemy the territory 
■which he had taken at the first onset, but to proceed to 
counter-thrusts into the enemy's lines. The behaviour 
of the troops was sublime beyond praise. In just the 
same way did the German system of defence prove its 
own worth, and similarly the construction and gar- 
risoning of the lines, as well as the measures for the 
swift transference of the reserves. 

Towards the end of March the German G.H.Q. ar- 
rived at the firm conviction that it would not be pos- 
sible for the enemies in the West to force a decision 
within a measurable time, even if further portions of 
the formations in process of reconstruction on the 
Western front had to be used in the East to annihilate 
the offensive power of the Russians for all time. This 
gave G.H.Q. an unusually free hand in its decisions, 
which was all the more valuable since the general 
situation in the East had begun to cloud again. 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 73 

At the beginning of February the Turks had actually- 
reached the Suez Canal, but were unable to maintain 
themselves upon it. Thereupon the English and 
French fleets immediately began a bombardment of the 
Dardanelles fortifications. At first they were pro- 
nounced to be merely a counter-stroke to the Suez ex- 
pedition. It was soon proved, however, that they were 
seriously endeavouring to force the opening of the 
Dardanelles. The safeguarding of this claimed the 
whole of Turkey's limited resources of troops and 
materiel. The rapid dwindling of the latter in par- 
ticular gave the German G.H.Q. the greatest anxiety. 
Turkey had no factories at her disposal for the pro- 
duction of serviceable weapons and ammunition. 
Communications with her were cut off progressively 
by Rumania, as Austria-Hungary's powers of resis- 
tance in the Carpathians threatened to go to pieces. 
This circumstance exercised a similar effect upon 
Italy's attitude. 

THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ITALY, I915 

How far before the outbreak of war, the German 
General Staff had hoped that Italy would, in a case of 
necessity, fulfil her obligations as a member and co- 
partner of the Triple Alliance for more than thirty 
years, may be set on one side. If any assumption of 
this kind had been made, it would have been based, in 
the main, on the promises of Polliao, the Italian Chief 
of the General Staff at the time, and of the Staff Of- 
ficers whom he had sent to Germany. Unhappily, 



74 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Pollio died suddenly a few days before the war be- 
gan. For the rest the hopes placed by the General 
Staff in him, and Italy were not generally shared in 
Germany. Italy's open coasts, with their populous 
towns, and her dependence on sea-traffic for her food 
and coal supplies, made it almost impossible for her to 
take part in a war against England. Indeed, it was 
generally evident in the very first days of the war that 
there was no question of this. Italy declared herself / 
neutral. The immediate entry of England into the 
war had achieved one of its most important ends. 
On the other hand, the secession of Italy to Germany's 
enemies still seemed to be outside the bounds of pos- 
sibility in those days. It was not until the defeat of 
Austria-Hungary in Serbia, in December, 19 14, and 
the crucial developments in the Carpathians, that this 
question caused serious anxiety. In order to prevent 
its materialization, the German political leaders sug- 
gested to Austria-Hungary that she should satisfy 
Italy's demands without delay. When this proposal 
met with strong resistance, G.H.Q. was requested to 
support it. The latter did so, with all the means at 
its disposal, and ultimately succeeded, after tedious 
and painful negotiations, which lasted from January 
to March, 191 5, in inducing the Dual Monarchy to 
take the necessary steps. Whether these concessions 
were made too late is not yet known for certain. In 
any case, Austria-Hungary's resistance to the pro- 
posed cession of territory to Italy was quite intel- 
Ugible. She pointed out, with justification, that ex- 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 75 

perience had taught her of old that it is impossible to | 
silence a blackmailer by giving way, and further, that 
any acquiescence in the blackmail, in view of the loose 1 
structure of the Dual Monarchy and the attitude of ! 
Rumania, would bring in its train two-fold danger in \ 
the future. Yet neither the German political leaders I 
nor G.H.Q. could withdraw their proposal. From all 
that was known, there still existed a possibility of pre- 
venting Italy by this means from going over to the 
enemy. If it became fact, it was not inconceivable 
that a more amicable change in Italy's attitude could 
be brought about later. Even if this did not succeed, 
however, any delay in Italy's joining the opposite 
party was of the greatest importance. Considering ' 
the tension which continued unabated on all fronts 
after the battles on the Marne and in Galicia, and the 
abortive offensive against Serbia, it would have been 
scarcely possible for the Central Powers in the winter 
of 191 4- 15 to hold another enemy at bay. Forces 
would not be available for this purpose until Russia's 
offensive powers had been crippled. Moreover, our 
communications with the outer world through Italy, 
which provided us with extremely important raw ma- j 
terials, could not be dispensed with except under the J 
most compelling necessity. It is often enough main- / 
tained that a firmer attitude towards Italy would have 
borne better results than complaisance. The support- 
ers of this view overlooked the real facts of the situa- \ 
tion in which the Central Powers were placed at that ( 
time, and Italy's close knowledge of them. G.H.Q. 



76 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

could not run the risk of prematurely breaking-off 
relations by using methods of intimidation. It was 
fully aware of this at the time, and during the whole 
period that can be discussed here, never lost sight 
of the fact that this war was a life-and-death struggle 
for Germany, and that any overstraining of her pow- 
ers, even though they might lead to initial successes, 
must in the long run unquestionably end in collapse 
from exhaustion, owing to the superiority of the 
enemy. 

BEGINNING OF THE UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE CAM- 
PAIGN IN FEBRUARY, I915 

The period under discussion included the first ap- 
pearance of one of the most important questions which 
occupied G.H.Q. during the war. At the beginning 
of February, 191 5, Vice-Admiral von Pohl, the Chief 
of the Naval Staff, informed the Chief of the General 
Staff that the Navy now believed itself in a position to 
take up the war with submarines against England, with 
a prospect of overwhelming success, if it could be con- 
ducted in the only way befitting the nature of this 
weapon, namely, without restriction in its application. 
In the case of neutral vessels, acts of violence would be 
refrained from only when they were recognizable. To 
be sure, complications with the Neutral Powers, par- 
ticularly with America, were not unlikely. But their 
movements in the waters round England would be 
prohibited altogether, i. e,, still further restricted than 
was permissible on the basis of international agree- 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE j-j 

ments after a blockade had been declared. A declara- 
tion of blockade, however, could not be made, because 
the premises for such were entirely lacking. On the 
other hand the submarine weapon had not been taken 
into consideration at all in these agreements. More- 
over, there was no doubt that according to the law of 
self-preservation it was just as incumbent upon Ger- 
many as it was justifiable to take counter-measures 
against the blatant violations of international law by 
England, These violations consisted of the war of 
starvation which had been initiated against the non- 
combatant population of Germany, including old men, 
women and children, by the declaration of the North 
Sea as a war area; a method of warfare that was being 
maintained with ruthless severity and utter disregard 
for the rights of neutrals; by England's interpretations 
of the regulations concerning contraband, which were 
contrary to all the precepts of international law, and by 
her action against all German nationals whom she could 
lay hands on, outraging not only every written law, but 
the very dictates of humanity. 

The Chief of the General Staff was naturally not 
deaf to these persuasive representations. He agreed 
with them all the more readily, since they opened up a 
possibility of turning to account the valuable portion 
of Germany's forces, contained in the Navy, for the 
war on land, by preventing England from bringing her 
forces into play. However valuable might have been 
the protection of Germany's coast, which the Navy had 
accomplished so thoroughly, it had not fulfilled the 



78 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

hopes entertained for this arm in the event of war. 
Unfortunately they have remained unfulfilled for the 
whole of the war. The naval leaders, during the first 
two years of the war, adopted the standpoint that an 
offensive was only advisable under extraordinarily 
favourable circumstances, owing to the very great risk 
entailed by bringing out the German fleet for a de- 
cisive action against the infinitely superior naval forces 
of the enemy, particularly for the protection of our 
coasts. These circumstances were not forthcoming. 
The infection of the North Sea with mines, the com- 
prehensive bases of operations for the enemy's fleet, 
their unenterprising caution, prevented them from com- 
ing to pass. An offensive with a view to forcing a 
decision had therefore to be abandoned. 

As for the United States of America, G.H.Q.'s de- 
cision was mainly determined by the answer given to 
the question, whether the advantage which might ac- 
crue to the general conduct of the war from the un- 
restricted submarine campaign could be balanced by the 
attitude by that predominating neutral, or not. 

In the opinion of the naval staff, the result of the 
submarines was to render England incapable, within a 
period to be reckoned in months, of continuing the war 
on the Continent, in anything approaching the same 
manner as hitherto. If this proved correct, then an 
advantage of inestimable value would certainly be ob- 
tained. There was no better means than the failure 
of England for breaking the fighting spirit of all other 
members of the Entente, Even the danger of serious 



BEGINNING OF TRENCH WARFARE 79 

camplications with America could not justify an ab- 
stention from the use of it. 

If matters came to a breach, it was not to be assumed 
that America would make her influence felt in the war 
before the submarine campaign had taken effect. It 
was, however, not yet certain that matters would come 
to a breach. In face of the grave violations of inter- 
national law by the Entente, the Government in Wash- 
ington had restricted itself to protests, and, indeed, had 
said nothing when these protests remained unanswered. 
As things stood, it was not evident why it should adopt 
a different attitude to Germany's action, which, as a 
counter-measure, was incomparably more justifiable. 

Public opinion in America, it is true, was for the 
greater part on the side of the Anglo-Saxons. The 
ever-growing association of America's economic inter- 
ests with the welfare of the Entente threatened to gain 
a fateful importance. The heart-rending fact was al- 
ready well-known that the Americans of German blood 
were exerting only a small and ever diminishing influ- 
ence in favour of their old fatherland. 

Further, people were still convinced at the time that 
the Government of the United States seriously in- 
tended to remain neutral, and it was also credited with 
the strength of carrying out its intentions, all the more 
so as it was not expected that this Government, too, 
which could not be a stranger to the real whys and 
wherefores of the war, would fall a victim to the 
hypnosis of the lying propaganda of the Entente. 

The opening of the submarine campaign in the form 
mentioned above was accordingly decided upon. 



CHAPTER V 

THE BREAK-THROUGH AT GORLICE-TARNOW 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 

THE DECISION TO ATTEMPT TO BREAK-THROUGH 
(See Map 4) 

The general military situation, at the beginning of 
April, 191 5, was summed-up as follows: 

The serious attacks of the French and the English 
during recent weeks had left the German front in the 
West completely unshaken, in spite of their superior 
;; equipment in artillery and ammunition, which they 
owed to America's assistance, and in spite of their su- 
periority in infantry, to the extent of 600 battalions. 
True, the French were obstinately continuing their of- 
fensive betweeen the Meuse and the Moselle. Nor was 
the outcome definitely ascertainable as yet. But there 
was little reason to fear that the result would be of 
any more than local importance. 

In the long struggle on the Western front, the 
French had proved themselves to be the more danger- 
ous enemy, compared with the English. Yet it was 
known that their resources in men in their depots at 
home would not permit them to strengthen their for- 
mations at the front to any appreciable extent within 
the next few months. The reserves would probably 

80 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 8i 

at most suffice to replace the heavy losses they had 
suffered. 

Conditions were much the same in this respect with 
the English, particularly when the fact was taken into 
account that they had evidently dispatched strong 
forces to the Mediterranean. They certainly did not 
suffer from a shortage of men. On the other hand, 
however, they had difficulties with their recruiting, 
and still greater with the training of their men, owing 
to their lack of suitable officers and N.C.O.'s. On the 
assurance of the Navy, it was also permissible to hope 
that the submarine war would embarrass the English 
supply of men and materiel. 

In any case, the English troops, in spite of un- 
deniable bravery and endurance on the part of in- 
dividuals, had proved to be so clumsy in action, that 
they could offer no prospect of accomplishing anything 
decisive against German troops for the immediate 
future. 

The latter stood at a higher degree of efficiency in 
the West. Firmly confident in their leaders and in 
their positions, which were being strengthened from 
day to day, and supported by the consciousness of 
their moral superiority over the enemy, they looked 
forward to further attempts at a break-through with 
a feeling of security and self-confidence, undisturbed 
by the relative strengths of the armies. The greater 
part of fourteen new divisions, which, to be sure, repre- 
sented no numerical increase, since they were, com- 
posed of sections of formations already existing, had 



82 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

almost completed their concentration behind the front. 
The training, of those which remained to be brought 
up, was nearing completion. 

Conditions on the German portion of the Eastern 
front, between the Baltic and the Pilitza, were not so 
favourable. This front, too, stood firm. But it had 
not been possible to prepare army reserves, although 
the superiority of the enemy was not so great as in 
the West, and the Russians, as far as military value 
is concerned, were not even to be compared with either 
the English or the French. The new formation of 
five divisions desired by G.H.Q., on the lines of the 
method applied in the West, had not yet begun here. 
This was due to the fact that in many cases the troops 
in the East were composed of older categories, and 
that good fighting units were continually being detailed 
to our allies. Notwithstanding all this, it was as- 
sumed that the German front would be equal to any 
attack that might be made upon it by the Russians. 
Unfortunately, from the reports, it seemed to be 
equally certain that it would not be capable of pro- 
ceeding on its own to any big undertaking, even within 
its limits, or of giving further support to its allies 
should necessity arise. 

On the other hand the imminence of the latter even- 
tuality had to be reckoned with, although the Austro- 
Hungarian front was already strongly reinforced with 
German contingents.* 

1 See Appendix : Relative Strength of Forces on the Eastern 
Front, under 4 C. 




MAP 4. 



Summer Campaign in the East, 1915 



a — German-Austrian battle line, end of April. 1915. 

b— German-Austrian battle line, end of May, 1915. 

c — German-Austrian battle line, June 20, 1915. 

d — German-Austrian battle line, July 11, 1915. 

e — German-Austrian battle line. September 9, 1915. 

f — German-Austrian position beginning November, 1915. 

OPERATION'S IN COURLAND 
g — German battle line, end of May. 1915. 
1- — German-Austrian attacks, beginning of May. 1915. 
i — German-Austrian attacks, middle of July, 1915. 
j — .Attacks on September 9, 1915. 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 83 

On the Nida, in the region between the Pilitza and 
the Upper Vistula, General von Woyrsch's detach- 
ment, with Colonel Heye as his faithful Chief of 
Staff, was keeping watch with the ist Austro-Hun- 
garian Army. Between the Upper Vistula and the 
foot of the mountains, von Besser's division was in- 
serted in the front occupied by the 4th Austro-Hun- 
garian Army. In the Beskiden, the strong corps un- 
der von der Marwitz had just stiffened the wavering 
lines of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army. General 
von Linsingen's Southern Army was working slowly 
forward through the Carpathians, east of Munkacs. 
The cavalry of Lieut.-General Freiherr Marschall was 
taking an ample share in the burden of the fight- 
ing in the Bukovina. 

However, the equilibrium, which was aimed at, had 
^not only not been effected, but further Russian at- 
tempts to break through into Hungary were to be 
feared. The appeals of the Allies for assistance, in 
constantly new forms, never ceased. To be sure the 
attentive observer was able to notice on the Russian 
side symptoms favourable to the Central Powers. 
The persistence of the enemy's offensives diminished 
from week to week. Even where successes were ob- 
tained, the attacker was no longer in a position to 
exploit them fully. The enormous losses which the 
Russians had suffered in their reckless attacks during 
the winter in the Carpathian mountains, could only be 
made good by bringing up ill-trained troops. Signs of 
an incipient shortage of arms and ammunition among 



84 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

them were reported in many cases. But even in this 
state they threatened the Austro-Hungarian front in 
a way which could not be borne for any length of 
time on account of the decreasing morale of certain 
sections of the Allied troops. Symptoms of disinteg- 
ration became more and more evident in formations of 
Czech and Southern Slav recruits. In these circum- 
stances, there could be no question of concentrating 
reserves for special eventualities. The Austro-Hun- 
garian G.H.Q., however, considered the concentration 
to be absolutely necessary, because it had arrived at 
the conviction that Italy and Rumania could not be 
prevented by any negotiations from entering the war 
at an early day, and that even Serbia was contem- 
plating a new offensive action. In order to take pre- 
cautionary measures against this, the Austro-Hun- 
garian G.H.Q. demanded from the German more as- 
sistance in the shape of ten additional German di- 
visions. These were to be used in the Carpathians to 
relieve an equal number of Austro-Hungarian di- 
visions. Of these latter, it was intended to concen- 
trate seven on the Italian, and three on the Rumanian 
frontiers. In addition the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. 
promised itself the advantage of shattering the enemy 
front by an attack from East Prussia against the Rus- 
sian right wing. 

In Turkey, the exertions of the French and the 
English against the Dardanelles were constantly on 
the increase. The Turkish command defied them with 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 85 

admirable tenacity. Loyally supported by the person- 
nel of the former German warships lying in Con- 
stantinople and General Liman von Sanders, the com- 
mander at the Dardanelles, it did all that was possible 
to supplement the weaknesses of Turkey's equipment. 
Of course the German G.H.Q. helped wherever and 
in any way it could. Everything that could be pro- 
vided was sent by means of the very limited com- 
munications through Rumania, by the most various 
other ways, by the air and under the water. Un- 
fortunately it was not much. It was not enough to 
cover Turkey's needs. It was to be assumed that a 
serious attempt at landing, such as was being pre- 
pared according to definite information, would be 
bound to succeed forthwith under the protection of 
the superior enemy artillery. What would happen 
then was shrouded in darkness. Upon one thing it 
was possible to depend absolutely: on the firm deter- 
mination of the leading men in Turkey to defend 
every inch of Turkish soil and to continue the war 
even if Constantinople was to be lost. During the 
whole length of the war Enver Pasha never wavered 
for a moment in this heroic fidelity to the alliance. 
The fact that the basis for this was the unshakable 
conviction that this was the only way to maintain 
the Ottoman rule against the greed of Russia, Eng- 
land, France, Italy and Arabia, did not diminish its 
value for us. 

It was impossible to prevent the situation in the 
Dardanelles making itself felt on the other Turkish 



86 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

fronts. At times the necessary reserves could not be 
sent thither. After the failure of the expedition 
against the Suez Canal, the Turkish troops had re- 
tired behind the Turkish frontier on the Sinai 
Peninsula. Even if the time of the year had permitted 
a repetition of this advance, which would have been 
urgently desired for the purpose of holding English 
troops, it would have been out of the question for the 
reasons given above. 

Things were no better on the Mesopotamian front. 
The English were pressing forward along the rivers, 
and slowly but surely gaining ground towards Bag- 
dad. 

In Armenia there was a lull in the fighting. The 
Russians had not turned to account the advantage 
obtained by them during the winter. If they had at- 
tempted to do so, the Turkish troops which still re- 
mained there would not have been able to hold them 
in check. In short, a review of the military situation 
in Turkey presented no more satisfactory aspect than 
that of Austria-Hungary. 

The moment had come when the decisive action in 
the East which had been contemplated for a whole 
month by G.H.Q., as an emergency measure, could be 
delayed no longer. But it was thought that a solution 
of the question was to be found by other means than 
those recommended by the leaders in the East and 
once more by the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. 

The mere relieving of Austro-Hungarian forces in 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 87 

the Carpathians by Germans would have established 
those formations in process of development in a region 
that was highly unfavourable for a military advance, 
without offering any security that the Austro-Hun- 
garian front would not be pierced by the enemy at 
some other rotten spot. It would have led once again 
to the consumption of German troops in the form of 
auxiliaries in Austro-Hungarian formations, which 
previous experience had proved to be altogether un- 
desirable. The concentration meanwhile of the lib- 
erated Austro-Hungarian troops against Italy, Ru- 
mania, or Serbia, before any more definite conclusions 
were possible regarding the intentions and measures 
of the latter, meant a holding up of forces which the 
Central Powers could not afford — and still less since 
G.H.Q., according to information which had been re- 
ceived, did not believe that Rumania would soon come 
into the war, nor that Serbia was meditating an of- 
fensive, and could take it for granted that Italy would 
not proceed to open acts of hostility before the end of 
May. Even then, so clumsy was the mobilization in 
Italy that weeks must necessarily pass before her 
army would be capable of undertaking serious opera- 
tions. 

It was a question of turning to account for a de- 
cisive blow the time that would thus probably be 
gained in between. This could only consist in deliv- 
ering a powerful offensive with all the means that 
could be made available to that end. An offensive in 
the form of a new edition of the operations against 



88 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

the Russian right wing facing East Prussia, offered 
no prospects of success. If the German forces which 
were just ready, were put against this wing of the 
enemy, then they would be missed in the Carpathians. 
Nor was there any prospect of any successes which 
would be gained on the frontier of East Prussia, mak- 
ing themselves really felt on the frontiers of Galicia 
and Hungary. And if these forces were put into the 
Carpathians, then there would not be sufficient re- 
sources left for operations from East Prussia. The 
object now desired by G.H.Q. could only be attained 
if the intended blow was so dealt, that it had in view 
the permanent crippling of Russia's offensive powers 
as its ultimate aim, but in the first place the freeing 
of the allies' front from the pressure upon it. 

This could only be expected from a break-through, 
and not from operations against the Russian wings. 
Operations against the Russian right wing were pro- 
hibited by the reasons just mentioned, and they could 
not even be considered against the left wing, owing to 
the technical difficulties in their way — mountains, bad 
communication. 

Thus the choice of the place of break-through was 
from the beginning limited to a few sections of the 
front. It could only fall either on the sector between 
the Pilitza and the Upper Vistula, or on that between 
the Upper Vistula and the foot of the Beskiden. The 
Chief of the General Staff decided in favour of the 
latter. 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 89 

This allowed of a sharper concentration of the 
break-through troops. Their flanks were here ex- 
posed to considerably less danger of encirclement — 
in consequence of the restrictions imposed upon the 
movements of the Russian troops by the valley of the 
Vistula on the north, and the ridge of the Beskiden 
in the south — than is usually the case with break- 
throughs, and as would have been the case between 
the Pilitza and the Upper Vistula from the direction 
of Warsaw. The difficulties caused by the natural 
obstacles which had to be met in the event of any fur- 
ther progress of the operations in Western Galicia, the 
water-courses of the Vislok and the San — were not 
to be compared with those of the passage of the Vis- 
tula. The Russians had just withdrawn such strong 
forces from Western Galicia for their Carpathian of- 
fensive that they were no longer able to replenish this 
front in time, even if they did perceive the danger 
which threatened it. We could hope with some cer- 
tainty to appear at the decisive spot with undoubted 
superiority. There was even a probability that this 
favourable proportion could be preserved for some 
length of time, if the operations were conducted with 
energy. For swift sideward movements of the Rus- 
sians from their attacking fronts, either in the Car- 
pathians or the bend of the Vistula, were, as stated, 
not possible. They would always have to be pre- 
ceded by inconvenient and extensive movements to 
the rear, which wasted time. Even if the break- 



90 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

through was only conditionally successful, it could be 
assumed that it would render the northern portion of 
the Russian Carpathian front untenable, and thereby 
give the allies the most valuable relief. In just the 
same way a serious shaking of the front at the bend 
of the Vistula lay, even in such an event, thoroughly 
within the bounds of possibility. 

The good prospects of the operations as planned 
were still further improved by securing for the Ger- 
mans the advantage of surprise by delivering the 
thrust with great force. 

THE DECISION IS CARRIED OUT I PREPARATIONS 

Specially seasoned troops were therefore selected 
for the undertaking. They were provided as abun- 
dantly as was possible with artillery, even with the 
heaviest calibre, which had scarcely been used at all 
in the open field till then, with ammunition and trench- 
mortar batteries. Numerous officers who were inti- 
mately acquainted with the incisive modern meth- 
ods of war on the Western front were detailed to 
them. 

The work on the preparations proceeded with par- 
ticular caution, in order to keep them secret. The 
consequent proposals were not even made known to 
the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. till about the middle of 
April, until the troops were already entrained at the 
stations and munition trains were moving in the di- 
rection of Galicia. It was possible to proceed in this 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 91 

way, because the consent of the allies was certain, for 
they had just begun again to send repeated requests for 
German assistance on the front of the 4th Austro- 
Hungarian Army in Western Galicia and of the 2nd 
and 3rd Austro-Hungarian Armies in the mountain 
region south-east of Gorlice. The Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. either intended to put these supports straight- 
way into the positions of the 2nd Army, or use them 
for a relief offensive in the flank and rear of the Rus- 
sian forces which were pressing the army in the 
mountains. These proposals could not be accepted as 
they would not have meant an effective piece of work. 
It was now pointed out to the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. that the break-through itself would be facili- 
tated, and its " harvest prospects " improved, the more 
the Russians entangled themselves previously in the 
mountains south of the front of attack. In this re- 
spect it was suggested that it would be an important 
advantage if the Austro-Hungarian lines in the sector 
in question could be withdrawn a short time before 
our offensive began, in order to induce the enemy to 
follow in as deeply as possible. 

This suggestion was not acted upon. It was prob- 
ably determined by the hesitation, intelligible in itself, 
to abandon voluntarily Hungarian soil. Further the 
notorious difficulty of getting troops who have once 
begun a retiring movement to form front again, may 
have influenced matters. All the same, it is regret- 
table that this step was not taken. As circumstances 



92 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

developed later it might have led to quite an astound- 
ing success,^ 

The German transport was taken to Galicia by 
wide detours. Nobody knew his destination till 
shortly before arrival at the detraining station. Strict 
postal censorship was instituted. 

iThe telegrams exchanged before the operations ran as fol- 
lows: 

" Mezieres, 

"April 13th, 1915. 
" To General von Conrad, Teschen. 

"Your excellency knows that I do not consider advisable a 
repetition of the attempt to surround the Russian extreme 
(right) wing. It seems to me just as ill-advised to distribute 
any more German troops on the Carpathian front for the sole 
purpose of supporting it. On the other hand, I should like to 
submit the following plan of operations for your consideration, 
but I may add that, in view of its urgently necessary secrecy, 
I have not yet had it worked out by my own Staff. 

" An army of at least eight German divisions will be got ready 
with strong artillery here in the West, and entrained for 
Muczyn-Grybow-Bochnia, to advance from about the line Gor- 
lice-Gromnik in the general direction of Sanok. This army 
must be joined by Von Besser's division, which must be relieved 
of its position by Austro-Hungarian troops at the proper mo- 
ment, and by one Austro-Hungarian cavalry division. This 
army and the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army would also be united 
in one command, and naturally a German one in this instance. 
If, during the concentration of the attacking forces, the 2nd and 
3rd Austro-Hungarian Armies could give way step by step, 
drawing the enemy after them, to about the line Uczock- 
Perecseny-Homonna-Varanno-Zboro, such a movement would 
considerably increase and facilitate the success of the operations. 

" I ask your Excellency to let me know as soon as possible 
your general attitude toward this scheme and the following 
questions : 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 93 

In spite of all these arrangements the experience of 
the whole war confirmed itself in this instance, that 
preparations for big undertakings can never be wholly 
concealed from the enemy. It can only be hoped to 
delay their discovery for some time by means of 
suitable arrangements, and this in itself means such a 
big gain as to justify the severest measures against 
conscious treachery as well as unintentional disclosure. 
The Russians received intelligence of the concentration 

" Is the area of operations perfectly accessible to troops with 
German means of transport? Would the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. be in a position to detail the usual waggon-trains to the 
German Army? What is the capacity of the railways from 
Rutka-Eperyes-Muczin and Rutka-Nowytarg and Sucha-Neu- 
sandec-Grybow, and, lastly, Cracow-Bochnia ? Further arrange- 
ments would have to be made in a personal interview, for which 
purpose I might meet your Excellency in Berlin to-morrow 
afternoon, April 14th. 

" Apart from the strictest secrecy there remains a further pre- 
liminary condition for the execution of the operations, and that 
is, that Italy is kept quiet by meeting her as far as possible, at 
least, until we have dealt the blow. It is indeed well known to 
your Excellency that no sacrifice seems to me too great if it 
keeps Italy out of the present war, etc. 

"Von Falkenhayn. 

" Teschen, April 13th, 1915. 
"Excellency, General von Falkenhayn, Mezieres. 

" The operations proposed by your Excellency coincide with 
those that I have so long desired, but which were hitherto im- 
possible, owing to a lack of sufficient forces. The use of the 
largest possible forces is necessary to ensure success. I shall 
arrive in Berlin to-morrow, April 14th, about 5 p. m., to discuss 
matters with you, and shall come to the War Ministry at 6. 

" In reply to your questions, etc. 

"General Conrad." 



94 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

soon after the middle of April, but they did not realize 
its importance in time. It is possible that the move- 
ments arranged in other sectors of the front played 
some part in diverting attention. 

Lively activity in the positions along the whole 
Western front, combined with attacks, in so far as the 
modest numbers remaining there permitted, were to 
cloak the transportation of the troops to Galicia. One 
such undertaking in the area of the 4th Army before 
Ypres developed into a serious attack because the gas 
weapon, which was used for the first time on a large 
scale, supplied the opportunity. Its surprise effect was 
very great. Unfortunately we were not in a position 
to exploit it to the full. The necessary reserves were 
not ready. The success achieved, however, was con- 
siderable. The English suffered heavy losses. The 
fact that the English relief offensive after the break- 
through at Gorlice-Tarnow did not last, was in some 
measure due to this. 

A similar course of action was also prescribed for 
the German portion of the Eastern front. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief obeyed this by pushing forward 
against the enemy's right wing an army corps from 
his left wing on the northern frontier of East Prussia. 
It was the duty of the corps at the same time to act 
as a support for a larger, far-reaching cavalry sweep 
behind the Russian front. Such an operation around 
the Russian right wing near Kovno in a south-easterly 
direction, with the sole purpose of interrupting the 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 95 

enemy's lines of communication, had been suggested 
by G.H.Q., and the cavalry had been got ready, when 
the Russians concentrated their reserves in the Grodno 
district as a result of the winter battle in Masuria. 
The sweep was not then carried out, probably because 
the condition of the roads was against it. Its failure 
in the present instance was due to the fact that the 
enemy had changed his position in the meantime. 
He had once more disposed serviceable forces in order 
of echelon behind his flank. Partly to blame may 
also have been the fact that the cavalry did not ad- 
vance in mass, but distributed itself over the space 
between the Niemen and the Baltic Coast. The Ger- 
man thrust reached Schaulen, and cavalry patrols even 
swept up to the Aa; with the help of the fleet Libau 
was occupied. Soon, however, a reaction set in. 
Schaulen had to be evacuated again. It was only 
with difficulty, after reinforcements had been brought 
up, that the Dubissa sector was maintained and the 
cavalry kept on the Windau. Yet the main purpose — 
the distraction of Russia's attention from Galicia and 
the binding of the forces belonging to the Russian 
right wing, was achieved. It is true that in return for 
this the disadvantage of tying up considerable German 
forces in a new direction had to be accepted into the 
bargain. And a resumption of relations with the 
Baltic populations of German origin subsequently 
caused operative considerations in this locality to be 
influenced to an undesirable extent by sentimental 



96 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

values. Both circumstances proved to be most dis- 
advantageous later on. 

THE BREAK-THROUGH 

The Galician operations for the break-through be- 
gan on May 2nd, under the leadership of General von 
Mackensen, with Colonel von Seeckt as his Chief of 
Staff. Under him were placed the nth German 
Army, consisting of eight German and two Austro- 
Hungarian divisions of infantry, as well as one Aus- 
tro-Hungarian division of cavalry, and the 4th Austro- 
Hungarian Army, composed of five Austro-Hungarian 
divisions of infantry, one Austro-Hungarian division 
of cavalry, and one German infantry division. Its 
first objective was to break through the Russian front 
on a general line from Gorlice to Gromnik in order to 
make the enemy's position untenable as far as the 
Lupkow Pass. This limitation was considered ad- 
visable in the first place. It was to prevent any pos- 
sibility of the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. deducing 
from the agreement permanent claims for the main- 
tenance of such strong German forces on its front. 

The break-through succeeded along the whole line 
of the nth Army, and along a part of the front of 
the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army. The Russians 
showed themselves unequal to the heavy fire which 
was severely concentrated on the points to be breached. 
The troops, freed from the fetters of trench warfare, 
swept the heavy enemy before them in the exuberant 
joy of the attack. 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 97 

As early as May 4th there was no longer any 
doubt in the German G.H.Q., which had removed to 
Pless on the Eastern front, that the enemy could not 
succeed within an appreciable time in bringing the of- 
fensive to a standstill, if we were able to keep up the 
impetus of the movement forward. So that nothing 
would be neglected in this direction the transference 
of another division from the West was arranged, 
although symptoms of a relief offensive on a grand 
scale w^ere becoming evident there. 

It was begun on May 9th by the English at Loos, 
south-west of Lille, and by the French on the Loretto 
Heights, north-east of Arras, mainly in the sector of 
the 6th Army, therefore. The powers of resistance 
of the Germans were put to a hard test by this of- 
fensive, and still more the strength of nerve of the 
leaders, as always in big defensive battles, the local 
commanders no less than G.H.Q. Nevertheless, all 
previous calculations proved to be correct. After the 
situation had hung gravely in the balance for one day, 
owing to the numerical superiority of the enemy, it 
was completely restored by throwing in the German 
reserves, which were naturally very scanty. Then the 
old, hopeless struggle for positions set in once more. 
It was dragged out by the enemy with heavy losses 
until the middle of June. Of course there were also 
losses to be lamented on the German side. In pro- 
portion to far greater damage inflicted upon the enemy, 
however, they were bearable, and indeed all the more 
since the repeated successful repulse of enormously su- 



98 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

perior numbers gave the troops a very welcome in- 
crease of proud self-confidence. 

Similarly with the idea of not depriving the break- 
through in Galicia of any of its force, requests from 
the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. for the employment of 
German forces elsewhere were refused in the middle of 
May. These requests were actuated by the desire to 
support the Austro-Hungarian Army in the Bukovina, 
which was being strongly attacked by the Russians, or 
to crush the Russian front in the bend of the Vistula. 
But German G.H.Q. adhered to its opinion that every 
available man must be employed to extend and deepen 
the breach once it was made as regards Russia. It 
seemed of less consequence than usual merely to gain 
ground. The essential thing was to smash the enemy's 
fighting machine. This could be done nowhere better 
and more swiftly than in the breach where the enemy 
was forced to give battle on unprepared terrain, if he 
did not want to run the danger of upsetting his system 
of defence along the whole front. In addition to this, 
the creation of new places at which to exert pressure 
would cost time, none of which, however, could be 
lost. 

As had been feared, the English set foot on the 
Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25th. Italy's entry into 
the ranks of the enemy became daily more probable. 
Nobody could foresee how the situation would de- 
velop, as a result of these events, and whether it would 
not force us very soon to adopt special measures. 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 99 

As the forces required for these could only be taken 
in the bulk from the Galician attacking group, if the 
fronts which were already at full tension were not 
to be too over-strained at some other place, the move- 
ment of this group would certainly come to a stand- 
still. In any case it was doubtful whether any timely 
advantage would be gained at any of the places of at- 
tack which were now proposed. It was not to be for- 
gotten that the Russians had almost everywhere far 
better communications at their service than the Central 
Powers. In short, any relaxation of the main opera- 
tions was the equivalent of the action of the man who 
lets go the bird in his hand to catch the two in the 
bush. 

The question has been discussed here in some detail, 
because it often cropped up again in the most varied 
forms during the long war. Again and again there 
were local commanders who maintained that they had 
discovered a sure way of striking a more or less 
serious, indeed decisive blow — if only the necessary 
means were placed at their disposal. Now it was four, 
now twenty or more divisions, of course with the cor- 
responding heavy artillery and ammunition, which 
were to suffice. But unfortunately the advisers 
usually forgot two very important facts. These es- 
caped them because they were only perceptible from 
the centre and not from the circumference. 

In the first place, they, as sectional commanders, did 
not feel the enormous pressure under which German 



lOo THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

power had permanently to labour. They therefore 
over-estimated the forces which were at the disposal of 
G.H.Q. for special purposes. 

Then they overlooked the fact that the Central 
Powers were in many respects in a far more perilous 
situation than even the defender of a fortress be- 
sieged by a superior force. No sortie, however bril- 
liantly accomplished, could save them from ultimate 
ruin if the enemy forced his way into the inner works 
through a place where the defence had been weak- 
ened in order to strengthen the sortie. For then the 
enemy would be able to strike them in their vital parts 
before they could win a decision in the outer lines. 
They could not leave the citadel in the lurch, like the 
defender of the fortress in a case of extreme necessity, 
to save the garrison by breaking through the enemy's 
lines. 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREAK-THROUGH 

The operation of the break-through in Galicia pro- 
duced astonishingly big results. The enemy suffered 
the most serious and bloody losses. The amount of 
the booty speedily rose to improbable heights. 

On May 6th the Russians were already in full re- 
treat, which frequently degenerated into a rout, along 
the whole front of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian, the 
nth and the 4th Austro-Hungarian Armies, i. e., on 
a front more than one hundred miles wide between 
the ridge of the Beskiden and the Upper Vistula. A 
few days later their neighbouring sectors also gave 



THE BREAK-THROUGH loi 

way : in the south as far as the left wing of the South- 
ern Army astride the Munkacs-Stryj road, in the north 
on the front of the first Austro-Hungarian Army as 
well as of the Woyrsch division as far as the Pilitza. 

The allied G.H.Q.'s therefore felt themselves called 
upon to set new and further objectives for the spear- 
head group and the adjoining armies. They were or- 
dered to keep in close touch with the enemy north 
of the Upper Vistula, and south of the Vistula to reach 
the line of the San, Wisznia and Dniester as swiftly 
as possible. Further orders would not be issued until 
a firm hold was obtained upon these strong sectors. 
The reason for this spasmodic advance was the con- 
sideration due to Italy's attitude. 

These intentions were adhered to, however, when it 
became evident in the middle of May that only a few 
days remained before our former ally would formally 
secede to the enemy. The armies on the wings, which 
were unfortunately still hanging back, were urged to 
do their utmost to reach their objectives as speedily as 
possible. The nth Army, which had reached its goal, 
was ordered to assist its neighbours. 

DECISIONS ON ITALY COMING INTO THE WAR 
(See Sketch 3) 

Although there was complete unanimity on these 
points between the two G.H.Q.'s, there were differ- 
ences of opinion between them as to the measures to 
be taken with regard to Italy. 

The Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. cherished the intelli- 



I02 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

gible desire to punish with a firm hand and as speedily 
as possible the renegade ally, whose action was bound 
to make itself felt first on the body of the Dual Mon- 
archy. It saw, at any rate, that this would be by no 
means possible on the frontier, although it considered 
that a blow there was most to be desired. This was ex- 
cluded by the nature of the ground, just as much as by 
the shortness of time and the lack of available forces. 
The Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. therefore proposed to 
concentrate forces in the valleys of Villach-Klagen- 
furt, and of Laibach, with the object of taking the 
enemy, who were pushing forward along the narrow 
mountain roads, by surprise, as he debouched into 
these valleys. 

This would have been conditional on the Italians 
stepping into the trap which had been laid for them. 
If they had not done so, but had merely turned the 
tables on the Central Powers, then the latter would 
have had to step into a trap, and probably without 
regard to time and circumstances. For they were not 
in a position to allow the formations which had once 
been concentrated, to stand about waiting for an un- 
limited time. These reasons induced the Chief of the 
General Staff to reject the proposal of the allies. It 
was just as impossible owing to the fact that if it had 
been accepted, the continuation of the operations 
against the Russians would have had to have been 
abandoned. It would have too seriously weakened 
the forces required for this campaign. It would have 
been more acceptable if it had been possible to use 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 103 

those troops intended for operations against Italy for 
a swift blow at Serbia first, in order at least to open the 
way to the East before entering upon new undertak- 
ings. As a matter of fact, this question was also 
seriously examined. It had to be dropped, however, 
because Bulgaria resolutely refused to join in at this 
moment. In view of the fact that the Galician opera- 
tions had begun to drag at that time, and in view of 
Italy's secession and the complications with America 
on the question of the submarine campaign, she could 
scarcely be blamed for doing so. But without her 
co-operation there was too much danger that the 
thrust into Serbia might only result in tying up 
valuable forces which perhaps were indispensable else- 
where, without achieving its desired purpose quickly 
enough. The adoption of a watching attitude in the 
mountain valleys would probably have resulted in 
nothing decisive being done against Russia, Serbia and 
Italy, whilst waiting to see what the enemy would do 
next. Such a development did not correspond to the 
intentions which determined the break-through at 
Gorlice-Tarnow. 

On the peremptory advice of Germany it was there- 
fore decided to carry on a purely defensive war against 
Italy for the present. Whatever the Italians might do, 
the operations against the Russians were to be con- 
tinued with all energy until the offensive powers of 
Russia were crippled for an appreciable time. Mind- 
ful of the difficulties which had been encountered in 
the Carpathians and the Vosges, the Central Powers 



I04 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

proposed to win back from their new enemy the 
mountain districts which had fallen into his hands, 
and not to abandon voluntarily any territory belong- 
ing to the Dual Monarchy, but to advance the line of 
defence as far as the Isonzo. Owing to the nature of 
the ground in this area, those considerable Austro- 
Hungarian forces which were already stationed near 
the Italian frontier, together with five divisions on 
the way from Syrmia and the two Austro-Hungarian 
divisions to be taken from Galicia, appeared to be 
enough for the defence. These latter were ultimately 
to spare after the losses of the German forces in Galicia 
had been repaired. 

From Germany a division of troops specially trained 
for mountain warfare, the so-called Alpine Corps, was 
sent to the Tyrol, and a number of heavy batteries 
were detailed for the Isonzo. Three of the German 
divisions which had just been formed on the Eastern 
front went to Syrmia to relieve the five Austro-Hun- 
garian divisions taken from there. They were to 
complete their establishment on the Save and the 
Danube, and fulfil at the same time the duty of a pro- 
tection for the flank and the rear of the Isonzo front 
against Serbia, as well as that of a reserve for any 
eventuality, chiefly with an eye on Rumania. Their 
presence also served the important purpose of keeping 
down the excitement which was to be expected among 
the Southern Slavs on Italy's declaration of war. 
This, too, succeeded completely. 

On May 24th Italy declared war, but only on Aus- 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 105 

tria-Hungary, not on Germany. Both the political as 
well as the military leaders of the Central Powers 
had erred in their hopes of preventing this occurrence, 
the former by meeting Italy's demands, and the latter 
by victories over the Russians. This supports the 
fact that there was no other means at all of keeping 
Italy from coming into the war on the side of the 
Entente, apart from a totally different Austro-Hun- 
garian policy during many years before the war, or 
an uninterrupted series of victories by the Central 
Powers. The really authoritative Italian circles, al- 
though they did not come into power until the war, 
had indeed been ready to break off in 1902, and had 
definitely decided to do so after the Austrian misfor- 
tunes against the Russians and the Serbs. The fact 
that Italy hesitated, however, until May, 191 5, was 
influenced by the necessity of making this decision 
palatable to the masses of the people and to the army. 
The chivalrous sentiments existing in the hearts of 
Italians rebelled against the secession. But German 
diplomacy, under the leadership of the former Chan- 
cellor von Billow, also deserves great credit. Every 
day by which its activities delayed Italy's change of 
front was, as has already been pointed out, of in- 
estimable value. This cannot be denied by anybody 
who has visualized the situation which would have 
supervened if Italy had struck before the Galician 
break-through, or at the time of the heavy battles of 
the Carpathians, or at the moment when German re- 
serves were exhausted after the Masurian battle, or 



io6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

during the serious defeat of the Austro-Hungarians in 
Serbia in December, 1914. 

Germany's first response to the challenge levelled by 
Italy at Austria-Hungary would have been a declara- 
tion of war. Yet the Chief of the General Staff con- 
sidered that this was not immediately advisable. He 
also clung firmly to his standpoint, which for the rest 
coincided with that of the political leaders, in spite 
of the urgent solicitations of the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. to the contrary. 

It had formally been made known to Italy some 
time before, that wherever she might turn against 
Austria-Hungary, she would find the latter shoulder 
to shoulder with her German ally. In actual fact, 
Germany always acted in accordance with this. If 
this state of things had been supplemented by a solemn 
declaration of war, it was certain that the charge of 
being the aggressor would once more have been raised 
against Germany. This did happen at the beginning 
of the war as a result of the justifiable, but over-hasty 
and unnecessary, declarations of war on Russia and 
France. It was not desirable to repeat that process, 
still less in this instance, since certain apparently well- 
founded information had it that Rumania was to be 
kept to the fulfilment of the obligations of her alliance 
with Italy, immediately the latter was attacked by 
Germany. Moreover, there were political and eco- 
nomic reasons for avoiding as long as possible the 
legitimate consequences of a declaration of war. It 
would have been very ill-advised to break off voluu' 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 107 

tarily the communications with the outside world, 
which were maintained through the medium of Italy. 
It could not be denied that this procedure might give 
the appearance of a lack of harmony in the actions 
of the Central Powers. As far as is known, it did 
not give rise to evil consequences. The situation was 
so transparent that it found sympathy in the Dual 
Monarchy also. 

Italy's entry into the circle of our enemies was 
received with astonishing indifference by public opin- 
ion in the Central Powers, far more than Rumania's 
secession, for example. Yet there is no doubt that the 
latter event created incomparably less danger than the 
former. 

Public opinion was excellently prepared by the Press 
for Italy's secession. Nobody was really surprised. 
Rumania's was handled less skilfully. The Italian 
declaration of war happened at a time when feeling 
was running high, both in Germany and in Austria- 
Hungary, as a result of the course of the campaign in 
Galicia, as well as the almost more brilliant defensive 
battles in the West. Rumania's took place during a 
period of depression which was explained, even if it 
was not fully justified, by the lack of any tangible 
results on the French battlefields and the wholly unex- 
pected successes of Brussilow's offensive. The powers 
of the Italian Army were put at a low estimate. It 
was generally assumed that the successors of Radetzky 
would cope with any number of such enemies. This 
optimistic verdict proved to be correct in many re- 



io8 THE GERMAN GENERAIJ STAFF 

spects. It is not maligning the Italians to describe 
their achievements, from the purely military stand- 
point, as extraordinarily small. Yet their intervention 
was of great importance in the issue of the war. 

The political structure of the Dual Monarchy proved 
unequal to the demands of a serious war on two fronts. 
This led to Austria-Hungary making increased de- 
mands upon Germany, which it was uncommonly dif- 
ficult for the latter to fulfil, and considerably weak- 
ened her staying powers. 

There was the almost greater danger that the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian G.H.Q. could not take up the necessary 
impartial attitude towards events on the two fronts. 
The long-smouldering indignation regarding the rene- 
gade ally burst into bright flames all over the Danubian 
Empire. This had one advantage in that this just 
anger increased considerably the powers of resistance 
of the Austro-Hungarian troops employed on the 
Italian front. It had its great dangers, however, be- 
cause it caused the Austro-Hungarian Command to 
give the requirements of this front a certain precedence 
over those of the others. This tendency may have 
been influenced, though more unconsciously, by the 
conviction that Germany would be compelled to 
counteract with her own forces reverses on the other 
fronts before those on the Italian. 

The hopes placed in the defensive strength of the 
mountainous territory on the Austro-Hungarian and 
Italian frontier were altogether fulfilled. Anticipat- 
ing events, it may be stated in this context that the 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 109 

attacker was unable to gain any notable advantages, 
in spite of his great numerical superiority both in per- 
sonnel and materiel, until well after the winter of 
191 5-16. After what has been said, there is no need 
to explain any further that the fighting on this front 
made itself acutely felt in the other theatres of war 
where Austro-Hungarian troops were engaged. Its 
effects on the development of the situation, which was 
now and again unfavourable, on the Galician and 
South Polish front at the end of May, 191 5, must be 
left undetermined. 

DECISION TO CONTINUE THE OPERATIONS IN GALICIA 
ACROSS THE SAN SECTOR 

The Russians had not continued their retreat across 
the river in front of Woyrsch's detachment and the 
1st Austro-Hungarian Army in the bend of the Vis- 
tula south of the Pilitza, but had established a front 
again on the left bank. The weak forces of the allies 
there were not sufficient to eject them from their po- 
sitions. 

On the right of the Upper Vistula, in Galicia, new 
circumstances had arisen owing to the arrival of very 
considerable Russian forces. The reinforcements con- 
sisted for the greater part of the formations of the 
Odessa group, which had originally been concentrated 
for a move against Turkey. The lesser part of them 
was taken from the fronts north of the Narew and in 
front of Warsaw. The 4th Austro-Hungarian Army 
had only reached the Lower San with its right wing, 



no THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

where it was supported by the nth Army, but it was 
only just holding its own against Russian counter- 
attacks. Symptoms of disintegration in some of its 
units could not be overlooked. 

Assistance had also to be given by the nth Army to 
its southern neighbour, the 3rd Austro-Hungarian 
Army, which was attacking Przemysl. Consequently 
it did not look as if the nth Army would be able to 
continue the offensive on its own initiative. It is true 
that the Russian attacks directed against it broke down 
everywhere with the heaviest losses for the attackers. 

In spite of the assistance given to it, the 3rd Austro- 
Hungarian Army made just as little satisfactory pro- 
gress as the adjoining 2nd Austro-Hungarian Army, 
the Austro-Hungarian Division under Szurmay and 
the Southern Army. 

In the Bukovina the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army 
was engaged in heavy fighting, in which the Russians 
mostly had the advantage. 

Along the whole front of attack, therefore, the op- 
erations threatened to come to a standstill. The cer- 
tain deduction would have been either that almost 
the whole of the German forces engaged would have 
to be left there, or heavy reverses reckoned with. The 
first event would have meant the crippling of the 
German plan of campaign, and the second would have 
offered the prospect with great probability of a col- 
lapse of Austria-Hungary at no distant date. 

The only effective weapon against such dangers 
seemed to G.H.Q. to consist in bringing up sufficient 



THE BREAK-THROUGH iii 

fresh German forces to Gallcia. It accordingly ar- 
ranged for this to be done to the largest extent that 
was still possible, after it had once more ascertained 
whether they could have been used to a greater ad- 
vantage at any other part of the Eastern front. This 
idea proved to be impracticable at that moment. A 
speedier and greater success was nowhere to be ex- 
pected than by continuing the offensive on the present 
front of attack with all energy. No speedier, because 
preparations at any other point would have caused a 
very considerable loss of time; and no greater, be- 
cause the operative encirclement of the Russian armies 
effected in Galicia by the advance of the former Car- 
pathian front of the allies offered prospects which ex- 
isted nowhere else. This was particularly the case on 
the German northern wing. In response to inquiries, 
the Commander-in-Chief in the East reported that 
even if two army corps were brought from the West, 
it would only be possible to achieve, big tactical suc- 
cesses in his area. This number of reinforcements 
could not, however, be spared in the West. In addi- 
tion to this, G.H.Q. could not regard tactical successes 
as an end in themselves. Only those were of any 
value which brought us nearer to the final end, the 
securing of a good peace. Added to all this, there 
was the decisive factor that success seemed nearer in 
Galicia than anywhere else. 

The enemy had gradually brought up very great 
masses of troops there. But they were not put into 
the front in mass, but in relays, and were so scattered, 



112 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

that the superiority was not very much greater than 
on other sections of the front. The value of the Rus- 
sian troop3 in Galicia had certainly sunk below their 
ordinary level. Moreover, their movements were ex- 
traordinarily restricted by the disposition of the 
masses, and by the great confusion which prevailed 
along the rear lines of communication. Apart from 
the works around the fortress of Przemysl, they had 
no properly constructed positions at their disposal. 

Finally, when it was remembered that the capture of 
Lemberg, of which there was an immediate likelihood 
if the offensive in Galicia was continued, would create 
a disastrous impression for the Russians throughout 
the whole East as things stood, the decision was 
made. 

The offensive in Galicia was to be continued. 
Every battalion that could be spared by any means 
on the German fronts was again brought up. Austria- 
Hungary was unfortunately not able to contribute 
any. 

Two and a half divisions were transferred from the 
Western front. This reduced the army reserves there 
to a scarcely bearable minimum. It was thought that 
the danger might be borne for some time, since the 
relief offensives had hitherto been broken so brilliantly 
by the admirable behaviour of the troops. The actual 
German front in the East had to supply two divisions, 
one from the 9th Army, which stood before Warsaw, 
and the other from the new formations. The trans- 
ference was possible without any particular difficulty. 



THE BREAK-THROUGH 113 

Although the Russians had withdrawn forces from 
this sector for Galicia. they still had a numerical su- 
periority there. But they had been obliged to send 
such large quantities of materiel and ammunition to 
the broken part of the front, that an offensive of any 
promise on their part in the North was no longer to be 
feared. 

Lastly, preparations were made for the transport 
of two of the German divisions which had completed 
their establishment in Syrmia. They could be spared 
from there. The danger which threatened from 
Serbia, Rurhania, and a possible Southern Slav move- 
ment, could be regarded as past after the blow which 
had been dealt at Russia, and so long as Italy did not 
make any dangerous progress, which was not probable 
in the near future. The other German divisions 
were left on the Save and the Danube, so that a re- 
liable fighting force would be available in that district 
for any emergency. It was also necessary for the 
purpose of giving assistance in the reconnaissances and 
general preliminaries for a passage of these rivers, 
that had now been in progress for some time. 

The success attempted by bringing up these fresh 
forces was achieved, although the encircling movement 
did not take place owing to the failure of a portion of 
the Carpathian wing. After the Russians had pre- 
viously evacuated Przemysl, as soon as some of its 
forts were stormed by German troops, they were 
thrown back by the help of these reinforcements from 
position to position in quick succession with the heav- 



114 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

iest losses. The southern portion in Eastern Galicia 
of the whole Russian front broke away completely 
from the northern. For a time there was a broad 
empty space in Volhynia. The break-through was ac- 
complished. On June 22nd Lemberg fell. 



CHAPTER VI 

OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA IN THE SUMMER 

AND AUTUMN OF 1915. BEGINNING OF THE 

UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE 

CAMPAIGN 

THE DIRECTION OF ATTACK CHANGED FROM EAST TO 

NORTH 
(See Map 4) 

The events which were crowned by the reoccupa- 
tion of Lemberg on June 22nd, 191 5, meant a great 
deal to the cause of the Central Powers. The threat 
to Hungary had been completely removed; Austria- 
Hungary was given the possibility of sending sufficient 
forces to the Italian front; Turkey was relieved from 
the danger of an attack upon the Bosphorus by the 
Russian Odessa Army; these and the pacification of 
Rumania and the resumption of connections with 
Bulgaria were the immediate and highly valuable con- 
sequences. But enough had not yet been achieved. 
The enemy was able almost to repair his losses, 
which were fixed at far more than half a million, from 
his practically inexhaustible human resources. The 
value of the troops had, it is true, sunk still further. 
It was not possible really to replace the losses by half 
or wholly untrained troops, or by officers who lacked 
the first conditions for the fulfilment of their duties. 

IIS 



ii6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Even if the Russians' supply of war material had im- 
proved, it was still evidently far from being satis- 
factory. 

As later events proved, the assumption that German 
troops would not have much to fear from this opponent 
for an appreciable time, was correct. 

Unfortunately the same could not be said with re- 
gard to those Austro-Hungarian troops, who were not 
of German or of Hungarian origin. Their value had 
sunk in a similar degree to that of the Russians, but 
for quite different reasons. Whether many sections 
of them would be able to weather an attack by the 
enemy without German assistance seemed particularly 
doubtful in view of the fact that they were not oc- 
cupying constructed positions. This fact was all the 
more dangerous, as the Russians, who knew our weak- 
ness very well, kept in contact with the allies along 
the whole front from the Rumanian frontier to the 
Pilitza, and had brought up to this front considerable 
reinforcements from formations which were still un- 
broken, partly, as already stated, from Odessa, and 
partly from the Warsaw and Narew sectors. The 
main body of the Russians was disposed between the 
Vistula and the Bug in front of the 4th Austro-Hun- 
garian Army, whose composition has already been dis- 
cussed, and in front of those sections of the German 
nth Army which had wheeled northwards. 

In these circumstances it was clear that any break- 
ing off of the operations in the East was out of the 
question. 



\ 



\ 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 117 

On the other hand, there were important reasons 
for not continuing them in a way which would have 
favoured their unhmited expansion, quite apart from 
the fact that such a proceeding would have been in 
sharp contrast to G.H.Q/s views on the conduct of 
the war in general. 

Thanks to the tenacity of the Turks, the enemy had 
not yet made any important progress at the Darda- 
nelles, where the appearance of German submarines in 
the Mediterranean had exercised a beneficent influ- 
ence. Yet the English had procured for themselves a 
firm foundation on Gallipoli from which a further 
advance seemed comparatively easy. It was consid- 
ered certain that they were planning a forward move- 
ment. It was reported that considerable reinforce- 
ments were being transported to the Mediterranean. 
Meanwhile the situation in Turkey as regards ma- 
terial was getting visibly worse, in spite of all efforts 
to improve it. Not only was it a necessity for the 
plan of campaign, but we were also in honour bound 
to open the way to the E?ist as swiftly as was possible, 
in order to bring succour to this brave ally. 

One possibility of doing this appeared in conse- 
quence of the resumption of communications with Bul- 
garia. Although a swift and thorough success against 
Serbia would be uncertain with a one-sided frontal at- 
tack by the Central Powers, it could be confidently ex- 
pected with the co-operation of the Bulgarians on the 
flank. But at the time it could not be foreseen with 
any definiteness if and when matters would come to 



ii8 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

mutual operations with them. Owing to the rather 
wavering attitude of the leading politicians in Sofia, 
care had to be taken not to station on some 
other front the forces required for co-operation 
with Bulgaria, lest any opportunity should be missed 
of turning to account any favourable change in their 
feelings. It was believed, at any rate, that things 
should be kept in readiness for September at the latest. 
The probability was that the Bulgarians, who were 
mostly engaged in agriculture, would not consent to 
any military undertaking before the end of the harvest, 
which fell in this month. Against this there was the 
necessity of beginning operations without any longer 
delay, because the bad weather which usually sets in 
about November in Serbia — Danubian storms, rain, 
which renders the few unmetalled roads impassable — 
threatened to offer serious hindrances, otherwise. 

On this occasion it was considered whether it would 
be advisable to seek the way to the East through Ru- 
mania instead of through Serbia. The idea had to be 
rejected, although its advantages were obvious: the 
liberation of Austria-Hungary from anxiety concern- 
ing Rumania, and the gain of a rich corn country. 
But the disadvantages were greater. According to 
the opinion of the German political leaders there was 
no hope of inducing Rumania to join the Central 
Powers in any way. Like Serbia, therefore, she had 
to be conquered, if the road to the East was to be 
made free. This fact alone did not put the undertak- 
ing from a desirable light. It was not advisable to 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 119 

give Germany another open enemy, except under the 
stress of necessity, still less since Rumania's attitude 
towards the Central Powers had become much more 
favourable after Gorlice-Tarnow. 

The situation on the Western front also influenced 
the decision which had to be made. After the relief- 
offensive had died down in the first half of June, there 
had been no big actions there. The shortage of re- 
serves on the German side had made the tension be- 
come so acute that the restoration of four divisions 
from Galicia to the Western front was deemed neces- 
sary. Any withdrawal of troops from another part 
of the Eastern front would not have been feasible, 
partly because the various formations could not now 
be spared in their respective sectors, and partly be- 
cause experience had proved that troops which had 
hitherto fought only in the East were not equal to 
the far more serious effects of Western fighting until 
after a lengthy period of acclimatization. However, 
some speedy relief seemed to be necessary. 

In addition to this, it could already be foreseen that 
further vrry considerable reinforcements would have 
to be sent from the East to the West in the first half 
of September at the latest. There was definite intel- 
ligence of extensive preparations on the part of the 
French for a new offensive which was to force a de- 
cision. This was to be expected in Champagne. Al- 
though photographic observations showed that the pre- 
liminaries had only just been begun, the certain con- 
clusion was that it would start not later than Septem- 



I20 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ber. Only thus could the enemy hope to obtain any 
result before the beginning of the bad season of the 
year. 

All these reflections determined G.H.Q. to continue 
the operations on the Eastern front with a limited 
objective. 

This required, at all events, a distinct change of 
direction. Hitherto the main pressure of the offensive 
had consisted in an advance from west to east. If this 
was persisted in, then it was possible to capture further 
ground from the enemy, but it was scarcely possible 
to inflict any real damage upon him in the broad plains 
of Volhynia and Podolia in the short time which was 
still available. He had withdrawn thither, i. e., into 
the front stretching from Khotin on the Dniester 
through Halicsz up to Sokal on the Bug, comparatively 
weak forces not much greater in numbers than those 
sections of the Allied armies opposing them, but they 
possessed unlimited possibilities for retirement. His 
strong forces, on the other hand, stood in the area 
between the Bug and the Vistula, behind the Solokiya 
and Tanev depressions. From thence they flanked 
most effectively any advance eastwards. This would 
have possessed all the disadvantages of an excentric 
movement. It was therefore decided to exert the 
main pressure from now. onwards in a northerly di- 
rection in the area between the Bug and the Vistula. 
The hopes placed in such a movement are explained 
by a glance at the accompanying map. 

The 4th Austro-Hungarian and the nth Armies 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 121 

received orders to hold themselves ready until the 
middle of July fronting northwards. Before then 
the nth Army was to be reinforced by the German 
division which was still in Syrmia, the three divisions 
of the German Beskiden Corps, which had been fight- 
ing hitherto on the left wing of the 2nd Austro- 
Hungarian Army, and a German cavalry division from 
Belgium. In addition, two of the divisions which 
had been withdrawn in order to be sent back to France 
were transferred to this army a few days later, A 
temporary lull which had set in on the Western front 
made this feasible. As these reinforcements had 
made the i ith Army too big for a single command, the 
Bug Army was formed from it, and placed on its right 
wing, under General von Linsingen. His command 
of the Southern Army was taken over by General 
Count von Bothmer, Lieut.-Colonel Hemmer becoming 
Chief of Staff. 

In order to protect the right flank of this powerful 
attacking group against strong concentration of Rus- 
sian troops in the neighbourhood of Vladimir Volynsk, 
it was decided to transfer the three divisions of the 
first Austro-Hungarian Army from the district north 
of the Upper Vistula to the right wing of the Bug 
Army near Sokal, from whence it was to advance on 
Vladimir Volynsk, The Germans did not assume, it 
is true, that these divisions would make much progress 
there. As the army could not be given more than two 
German divisions from the right wing of the Bug 
Army for this undertaking, it lacked the attacking 



122 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

force required for a far-reaching success, which did 
not, however, lie within the scope of its task. More- 
over, from all that was known of the nature of the 
terrain on the other side of the Bug, it was to be 
feared that the further course of the operations would 
meet with insurmountable obstacles. 

This fact had also influenced the choice of the di- 
rection in which it was intended to place the centre 
of gravity of our attack. The existing maps and de- 
scriptions of the Pripet Marshes and their southern 
ramifications made them appear unsuited for the move- 
ment of large parties of troops. As a matter of fact 
this fear was confirmed, in so far as the operations of 
the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army was concerned. 
Later we discovered that the maps and descriptions, as 
well as recent reconnaissances, were either out of date 
or had exaggerated the difficulties. The great works 
which had been carried out during the years before 
the war for the improvement of conditions in the 
swamp area before the coming of the floods, had low- 
ered the water-level so much that in such dry summers 
as that of 191 5, the only real obstacles in this district 
were the watercourses. It would even have been quite 
possible to operate with large formations of troops, if 
the difficulties of transport could have been overcome. 
These existed in abundance owing to the total lack 
of railways and metalled roads. 

Whilst the storming group was preparing for the 
advance, it was important to prevent the enemy from 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 123 

bringing up reinforcements against it from other 
sectors of the front. 

This was comparatively simple in the South, It was 
to be expected that the execution of the order given 
for this purpose to the 2nd Austro-Hungarian and the 
Southern Armies, to work their way forward against 
the Zlota Lipa in the area bounded by the Dniester, 
would be sufficient. The proportion of the forces on 
this front was so favourable to the allies, that the 
Russians dare not venture to withdraw any forces of 
any note in the face of such pressure. The 7th 
Austro-Hungarian Army was not to take part in the 
forward movement of its neighbours for the moment, 
as it had to reorganize. It received orders to station 
itself on the Dniester in the enemy's flank. 

The problem was more difficult in the bend of the 
Vistula south of the Pilitza. The proposed transfer- 
ence of the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army was bound to 
lead to a considerable weakening there. An enter- 
prising opponent would have been able to turn this 
account. But the Russians were not credited with the 
necessary strength of determination to decide on a 
counter-stroke this side of the river, with the big 
offensive beginning on the right of the Vistula, nor 
did a sober estimate of time and place promise such' 
a move any great prospect of success. It could make 
matters uncomfortable for the Germans, but not dan- 
gerous. Yet it seemed advisable to conceal as far as 
possible the removal of the ist Austro-Hungarian 



124 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Army. It was therefore ordered to break through the 
Russian positions south of the Kamienna in the direc- 
tion of Tarlow with a swift thrust just before its re- 
moval. Woyrsch's division was then to take over 
the vacated sector, and by concentrating its main forces 
against one section of the Russian front, and leaving 
only scattered outposts in front of the others, to at- 
tempt to do the enemy some harm and to prevent him 
from withdrawing unscathed. 

The solution of the problem of binding the enemy 
offered still greater difficulties to the really German 
portion of the Eastern front, that from the Pilitza to 
the Baltic, under the command of the Commander-in- 
Chief in the East. 

FORMATION OF THE NAREW ATTACKING GROUP. 

GALLWITZ' ARMY DETACHMENT FIRST HALF 

OF JULY, 191 5 

(See Map 5) 

This portion of the front had not been idle during 
the month of June. Only the 8th Army — General 
Otto von Below; Chief of Staff, Major-General von 
Bockmann — whose area extended from the Schkwa 
to the Lyck, had not been able to take part, owing to 
the unfavourable terrain in front of it. On the other 
hand, the 9th Army — Field-Marshal Prince Leopold 
of Bavaria; Chief of Staff, Major-General Griinert — 
between the Pilitza and the Vistula, below Novo- 
Georgievsk, as well as Gallwitz' Army, extending oa 
the right of the Vistula to the Schkwa, had tried to 




MAP 5. 



Operations in Serbia in the Autumn, 1915 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 125 

bind the enemy by means of lively demonstrations. 
Operations of any importance, however, had only been 
undertaken by the loth Army, which stood on the 
left of the 8th Army as far as the Niemen below 
Kovno, and by the Niemen Army. These were to as- 
sist the operations begun by the Commander-in-Chief 
in the East against Courland, through Northern 
Lithuania, under the command of General von Scholtz ; 
Chief of Staff, Colonel Count von Schwerin, with 
newly-established and continually reinforced forma- 
tions, which had been taken from the other armies of 
the same Command. 

The loth Army had not been able to penetrate 
with its attacks south-west of Kovno the Russian 
reinforcements which were brought up in time. The 
Niemen Army had fared no better north of Kovno. 
Their forces got lost in the big areas in which they 
had to operate. It is true that more had been hoped 
for, after an advantage had been gained at Rossieny 
on the Dubissa at the beginning of June. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East promised at that time 
that if only two more divisions were employed north 
of the Vistula, a success would be obtainable that 
would contribute very considerably to the " annihila- 
tion " of the Russian Army. Yet the situation 
changed within the next few days. The army was 
brought completely to a standstill by the arrival of 
enemy reserves. We had to be satisfied that the ar- 
rival of those two divisions enabled the German front 
to hold north of the Niemen and near Libau. These 



126 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

divisions were taken away from the 9th Army with 
the consent of G.H.Q., as such forces could not be 
withdrawn from other fronts at that time. 

These events on the German portion of the front had 
no perceptible effects on the situation in Galicia dur- 
ing June, The Russians transferred very strong 
forces from the North to the Galician theatre of war. 
It may be left undetermined whether the capacity of 
their means of transport would have allowed them to 
include any more troops in this movement. At any 
rate, more could hardly have been employed in the 
south. 

For the rest the enemy still possessed, on the whole, 
a numerical superiority of more than one-fifth over 
the German forces in the North, which amounted to 
39% divisions of infantry and 8^ of cavalry. The 
previous victories over the Russians had certainly not 
been fought with any more favourable proportion of 
forces; but it could not be denied that the proportion 
was an uncomfortable one, if the Northern front 
was to assist in the operations planned in the South. 

This was pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief 
in the East with particular energy when he was called 
upon at the end of June to effect this support by con- 
centrating forces in a determined attack at a point in 
the Polish front — the place in view being the Narew 
district below Ossoviecz or in the Pilitza sector. He 
laid stress on the fact that he could only spare two 
divisions for this purpose, apart from the troops 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 127 

already belonging to the sector concerned, whether the 
offensive was begun in the region of the 9th Army or 
of Gallwitz' Army, or of the 8th or the loth Armies. 
Nothing much could be done with those, he added, and 
the offensive would soon come to a dead stop every- 
where. In his opinion freedom for operations ex- 
isted only on the northern wing with the Niemen 
Army, and the employment of further forces there, 
if possible with a simultaneous attack on Kovno, would 
lead ^to a complete tactical success. " Although far 
removed from the main decision, this latter will be in- 
fluenced more by the employment of these forces north 
of the Niemen than by directly feeding the main front 
with them. Therefore the reinforcement of and an 
offensive by the Niemen Army, with a simultaneous 
attack upon Kovno, remain the most effective con- 
tribution of the army in the East to the whole opera- 
tions." 

These arguments did not appear convincing to the 
Chief of the General Staff. 

The experiences of the Niemen Army only a few 
weeks before, showed that it was improbable that any- 
thing to the advantage of the main operations could be 
done by a reinforcement of only two divisions in the 
broad areas north of the Niemen. It was evident that 
also the Commander-in-Chief had it in his mind to 
bring up, over and above these, other forces from other 
fronts. -Unfortunately this was not possible at the 
time. Not one man of the slender reserves in the 



128 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

West could be spared at that moment.* Any weaken- 
ing of the attacking group in Poland and GaHcia gave 
rise to the danger of serious reverses, owing to the 
strength of the enemy facing it and the condition of 
a portion of the Austro-Hungarian troops; and such 
reverses had to be avoided in view of pubHc feeling in 
Rumania, Bulgaria, and in Austria-Hungary as well. 
Apart from that, the shifting of forces from thence 
to Lithuania would have taken so much time, and it 
would have been so difficult to conceal it from the 
Russians, that the latter would certainly have taken 
counter-measures in time. Thus it seemed that noth- 
ing further would have been achieved than an uncer- 
tain situation on the Galician front, where absolute 
safety was necessary, and perhaps a tactical success 
of local importance in Lithuania, More was not to 
be expected. The Russians had long since realized 
the dangers of an enveloping movement, as was shown 
in an earlier section of this work, and had learnt to 
apply the remedies. Their application of these was 
facilitated by their superiority in numbers, their more 
efficient railway system, and the recklessness with 
which they could and did abandon ground as soon as 
it seemed advisable to them. 

G.H.Q. could not let matters rest with a local tactical 
success, particularly not when, as in the present in- 
stance, it ran the danger of scattering eccentrically and 
of leading to a wide extension of the front. It was 

1 See Appendix : Relative Strengths of Forces on the Western 
Front. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 129 

concerned with striving for a success which would pre- 
sumably have an effect on the main operations. 

Therefore, when the Commander-in-Chief in the 
East had to admit in a personal discussion of this mat- 
ter which took place on July 2nd, that it was more a 
matter of feeling whether the attack was made on the 
Narew front or north of the Niemen, his proposal 
was rejected. He received orders to cause Gallwitz' 
Army, Chief of Staff Colonel Marquard, to break 
through the Russian positions on the Lower Narew 
on both sides of Prassnyscz on July 12th, and to ad- 
vance on the Bug to relieve Mackensen's Army Group. 
It was clear from this that an attempt had to be made 
to cut off those masses of the enemy on the Vistula 
and in front of Mackensen. All available forces were 
to be withdrawn from the 9th Army sector, for the 
Chief of the General Staff considered that there was 
no harm in leaving only a curtain of troops there, as 
had been done in the sectors south of the Pilitza. Ac- 
cording to a later estimate of the Commander-in-Chief, 
it was possible to spare three divisions of the 9th Army 
on these conditions. In order to facilitate their re- 
lease, G.H.Q. sent three active-service Landsturm 
regiments, whilst Woyrsch's Detachment succeeded in 
accomplishing the similar task imposed upon it with- 
out the help of supports. The right wing of the 8th 
Army was to join in the attack between the Schkwa 
and the Pissa in the direction of Lomsha, in which 
all the heavy artillery that could be obtained was to 
be used. 



I30 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

On the same occasion the attention of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was drawn to the fact that it would 
be necessary to make all the other available forces on 
his front take a share in the operations of Gallwitz' 
Army. Until these were accomplished, all undertak- 
ings which were not directly precautionary measures 
had to be stopped, even in the North. On the other 
hand, it was expedient to make preparations which 
would facilitate a speedy transference of troops from 
the Narew Group northwards, for a later thrust at 
the Russian lines of communication. Then it would 
presumably be advisable to strike the blow across the 
Middle Niemen in a south-easterly direction, instead 
of in the wide areas north of the river. 

Within the next few days it was shown how neces- 
sary the desired direct pressure on the Narew front 
was for the Galician front. 

During the concentration of the 4th Austro-Hun- 
garian, the nth and the Bug Armies between the Bug 
and the Vistula, a Russian counter-attack south of 
Krassnik struck the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army with 
considerable success, although the latter had gained 
ground at first. This made its support by the nth 
Army necessary, although this too had a considerably 
superior opponent in front of it. The crisis which 
had arisen was only overcome with some difficulty. 

All the more welcome was the good fortune of the 
attack begun by Gallwitz' Army on July 13th. The 
Commander-in-Chief in the East had ultimately found 
it possible to reinforce Gallwitz with four divisions 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 131 

of the 9th Army. The Russian lines were pierced on 
both sides of Prassnycz. The enemy suffered the 
heaviest losses. By the i8th the leading German 
columns were approaching the Narew valley in the 
whole sector between the Vistula and the Pissa. 

The first results of these operations appeared in the 
demoralization of the Russians in the bend of the 
Vistula. They retired in front of the 9th Army as 
far as the outer lines of Warsaw, whereupon the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East decided to send two more 
divisions of the army to the Gallwitz Group. The 
operations of the first Austro-Hungarian Armies 
against Vladimir- Volynsk had been abandoned when it 
was realized that the army would not get through. 
It received directions to protect the right flank of the 
main group by assuming the defensive on the Bug. 
The enemy also withdrew the greater part of the units 
concentrated in the neighbourhood of Vladimir- 
Volynsk to the left bank of the Bug again. He re- 
placed them, as appeared later, those forces which had 
retired to the Narew after the break-through at 
Prassnyscz. Moreover, strange to say, he also had 
scruples about going into the Pripet region with large 
bodies of troops. 

On the other sectors of the Eastern front there were 
no great changes corresponding to the situation. In 
Eastern Galicia the 2nd Austro-Hungarian and the 
Southern Army had pushed forward to the Zlota-Lipa. 
But they got no further. A thrust to relieve them, 
attempted by the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army across 



132 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

the Dniester in the region east of the Strypa, had no 
success. 

Conditions on the northern wing in Lithuania were 
taking a more favourable shape. 

The loth Army had again attacked south-west of 
Kovno. It was in the act of driving the Russians 
back behind the lesya sector, but its offensive powers 
were exhausted for the moment. North of the Nie- 
men, the left wing of the Niemen Army had reached 
the swampy sector south of Mitau. After some lively 
fighting the Russians had retired behind this region. 
Even though the nature of the ground forbade any 
further progress at this point for the moment, a 
second offensive which the army had begun east of 
Schaulen, in the neighbourhood of Schadow, seemed 
to be developing happily. 

In spite of the more pleasant prospects offered by 
these events, the Chief of the General Staff adhered 
to his view that every possible effort must be con- 
tinually directed at furthering the main operations east 
of the middle Vistula, in other words, to procure im- 
mediate relief for the heavily engaged front of Mack- 
ensen's Army. The possibilities of this were very 
limited, it is true. They consisted in an advance 
across the Vistula between Ivangorod and Warsaw 
by Woyrsch's detachment and the bringing up of two 
more divisions from the West. 

The passage of the Vistula was to clear the air for 
the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army, which hung like a 
heavy weig'ht on Mackensen's front, by striking a blow 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 133 

immediately in the rear of the Russian forces which 
were holding it in check. 

The temporary transference of the two divisions 
from the French front was permissible because recent 
and reliable intelligence showed that the big offensive 
expected there was not to begin before the second half 
of the month of September. It seemed justified there- 
fore, to shift the last available battalion to the spot 
where the decision was to take place. The Chief 
of the General Staff was in no doubt as to this spot. 
In his opinion a consideration of the situation indi- 
cated the sector of the Narew group for this purpose. 
Meanwhile objections were raised to both the relief 
measures intended. 

The idea of a passage of the Vistula by Woyrsch's 
Detachment below Ivangorod was opposed by the 
Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q., to whom this army, which 
was fighting within the Austro-Hungarian front, was 
subordinated as a matter of form. The Austro-Hun- 
garian G.H.Q. regarded the position of the 4th Austro- 
Hungarian Army as so difficult, that it considered im- 
mediate assistance by a passage of the river above 
Ivangorod to be necessary, regardless of the evident 
arguments against such an action. Only when Mack- 
ensen's Army Group formally promised to see that 
nothing serious should happen to the 4th Austro- 
Hungarian Army before the result of the operation 
was felt below Ivangorod, did the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. agree to this. 

An opposite standpoint with regard to the employ- 



134 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ment of the two divisions coming from the West was 
represented by the Commander-in-Chief in the East, 
when he suggested that they should not be used on the 
Narew, but as far east as possible, best of all with the 
Niemen Army in Lithuania. He had now decided to 
take two more divisions from the 9th Army for the 
Narew Group. With these he thought it possible to 
strengthen the group sufficiently in order to give it 
the necessary energy to make its action felt as far 
away as Mackensen's Group. He promised more ex- 
tensive advantages from the employment of these 
Western divisions north of the Niemen. 

He was supported in this view when the very skil- 
fully-led Niemen Army inflicted another heavy blow 
upon the Russians near Schadow within the next few 
days — on July 23rd — and drove them back speedily 
in the direction Jakobstadt-Friedrichstadt, and when 
the Narew Group succeeded — on July 24th — in 
crossing the river with strong forces in the neighbour- 
hood of Pultusk and Roshan. Consequently the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East extended his proposal to 
the effect that the loth and the Niemen Armies should 
be given, apart from the Western divisions, portions 
of Mackensen's Army Group, Woyrsch's Detachment, 
and the 9th Army, after these latter had carried out 
the attack on Warsaw. 

As he considered that the offensive force of the 
Mackensen Group was exhausted, and believed himself 
right in assuming that a passage of the Vistula by 
Woyrsch's Detachment would be out of the question 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 135 

owing to the river being so high at the time, so long as 
the enemy held the other bank, he was really justified 
in deducing that Gallwitz' Army would at most suc- 
ceed in driving the Russians back on to the line Brest- 
Litovsk-Bielostock. It was his opinion that the most 
damaging blow could be struck at them in the north by 
the capture of Kovno and an offensive by the loth 
and Niemen Armies against their lines of communica- 
tion. 

Once again, however, the Chief of the General Staff 
was unable to accept this tempting suggestion. The 
assumptions on which the proposal was based, had 
proved themselves to be wholly incorrect mean- 
while. 

On July 29th, Woyrsch's Detachment drove away 
the enemy on the right bank of the Vistula opposite 
the mouth of the Radomka and got such a foothold on 
the other side of the river that bridge-building could 
be begun. On the same day Mackensen's Army 
Group broke through the Russian positions in a 
brilliant attack, whereupon the enemy began a retreat 
along the whole front between the Bug and the Narew. 
In its pursuit this Army Group crossed the Lublin 
Heights on the very same day. After this it was to 
be supposed with every certainty that the enemy had 
come to the conclusion that it was impossible for him 
to assert himself in the endangered area between 
Mackensen's Group and the Narew Group. But if 
this was the case, it was to be supposed that he would 
secure himself against any surprises on his northern 



136 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

wing. It was all the more easy for him to do so, 
if the Germans attempted to bring off any such sur- 
prises by shifting forces belonging to Mackensen's 
Group or Woyrsch's Detachment to the northern 
wing. The advantage of far shorter and better lines 
of communication was altogether on the side of the 
Russians. These forces, and probably those remaining 
with Mackensen and Woyrsch too, would certainly 
have been tied up in the East until far into the winter. 
G.H.Q. did not want to risk the danger involved in 
this, nor was it advisable to do so. The storm- 
cloud which was gathering on the Western front an6 
the incontestable necessity of intervening in the Bal- 
kans at the right moment, absolutely forbade such a 
risk. It only remained to apply all energies to the 
completion of the operations as planned, i. e., to an- 
nihilate, as far as it was still possible, the Russian 
masses crowded together east of the Vistula. To do 
this it was necessary to push forward the Narew Group 
by all means on the right bank of the Bug. An answer 
to this effect was sent to the proposal of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East. 

In the same context he was consulted shortly after- 
wards as to whether it would not be advisable to throw 
two more divisions of the 9th Army on to the left 
wing of the Narew Group in order to strengthen the 
pressure. It looked as if the army could spare these, 
because an attempt by the Russians to break through 
westwards from Warsaw was now out of the question, 
nor was the fall of the city, the forts of which had 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 137 

been blown up by the enemy several days before, to 
be expected from the steps taken by the 9th Army, but 
solely and certainly from the progress of the opera- 
tions on the right bank of the Vistula. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East, however, viewed the 
situation otherwise. He considered that any weaken- 
ing of the 9th Army was not feasible at the moment 
because it was in the closest contact with the enemy 
along its whole front — these were the rear-guards of 
the Warsaw garrison. And if these divisions were to 
be detached from the rest, he would prefer to use them 
with the loth Army against Kovno, against which 
town this army was about to begin an attack. Taking 
this opinion into consideration G.H.Q. refrained from 
putting its suggestion into execution. He did not con- 
sider it proper to interfere in the actions of the local 
Commanders-in-Chief in the circumstances, although 
the latter's opinion did not seem to G.H.Q. to be fully 
justified. Moreover events on the Vistula developed 
so swiftly that it was actually questionable whether it 
would still pay to send the two divisions to the Narew 
Group. One could only regret that it had not been 
done earlier. 

On August 4th the enemy evacuated Warsaw and 
Ivangorod. At the same time he continued his re- 
treat between the Bug and the Narew and his with- 
drawal through Brest-Litovsk, frequently making a 
stand for a short time. The Narew Group could not 
prevent him from doing so, for owing to a lack of 
forces it was unable to put any real drive into its left 



138 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

wing and its direction had gradually fallen into a line 
running east and west. 

On August 13th it was advancing with the 12th 
Army, which had been formed out of Gallwitz' Army 
Detachment, across the line Ziechanoviecz-Szokei. 
The formations of the 8th Army fighting with it had 
reached the Slina sector through Rutki. The remain- 
ing portions of the 8th Army were on the other side 
of the Bobr, on both sides of the Wissa and in front 
of Psowsic. On the right of the 12th Army, the in- 
dependent Army -Group of Prince Leopold, which had 
been formed from the remains of the 9th Army and 
Woyrsch's Detachment had reached Siedlez with its 
northern wing and had taken Lukow. When this 
Army Group had crossed the Vistula and it was 
realized that it had only comparatively weak forces 
opposing it, although these forces were still in num- 
erical superiority, it received directions from G.H.Q. 
to push forward its advance ruthlessly. It responded 
to these orders with splendid performances. 

The fact that it did not succeed, as intended, in 
slipping between the enemy fronts, which were fighting 
against the Narew and Mackensen Groups, was due to 
the speedy withdrawal of the Russians as soon as they 
felt the danger that threatened. 

On the last-named day Mackensen's Army Group 
stood on the Vlodava-Lukow line. The ist Austro- 
Hungarian Army was guarding its right flank in the 
neighbourhood of Dubyenko on the Bug. In front 
of the Army Group, just as in front of the Narew 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 139 

Group, there were very superior Russian forces who 
were stoutly defending every inch of ground. 

In Eastern Galicia the situation remained unchanged 
on the whole. 

The attack on Novo-Georgievsk, which was begun 
on July 24th by three divisions of the Narew Group 
under General von Beseler, reinforced by another di- 
vision from the 9th Army after the fall of Warsaw, 
was proceeding vigorously. At G.H.Q.'s direction, 
rapid methods were applied here by making the great- 
est use of the heaviest artillery. 

The loth Army's attack on Kovno had just as good 
prospects. It had pressed back the enemy above the 
fortress as far as the Niemen and across the Suwalki- 
Olita railway. The outer positions of Kovno had 
been captured. The storming of the permanent works 
was to begin within the next few days. 

On the other hand, the operations north of the Nie- 
men had come to a standstill. After the Niemen 
Army's victory at Schadow on July 23rd, it had oc- 
cupied Mitau, which was evacuated by the enemy, and 
had pushed forward as far as a line south of 
Ponieviecs-Posvol. Here it met with a counter-attack 
which was only repulsed after heavy fighting. After 
pursuing the retreating aggressor for a short distance 
the army came to a stop on the line Onikschty-Popel 
before superior forces of the enemy. It had to be 
satisfied with being able to retain the territory that it 
had gained, and prevent a break-through by the enemy 
on the northern wing. 



140 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

It had still been possible on August 9th to retain the 
hope that the strong Russian forces crowded within 
the area between Narew-Vistula-Viepsch and Vlodava 
would be prevented from escaping eastwards and 
would be annihilated. Consequently the Austro-Hun- 
garian G.H.Q. suggested on that day that Mackensen's 
right wing on and east of the Bug should be reinforced 
in order to secure the attainment of this object. It 
proved shortly afterwards, however, that this idea had 
to be abandoned. The necessary transference of 
troops would have given the withdrawing Russians too 
much time. As the situation developed up to August 
13th this hope had to be given up once and for all. 
The enemy had obviously succeeded in drawing his 
main forces out of the danger zone in time. The free- 
dom of action which he had retained in the district 
north-west and north of Brest-Litovsk had rendered 
this possible for him. If any sensible injury was to 
be inflicted upon him now, it could only be done by 
trying to drive him northwards by means of an ener- 
getic advance on the part of Mackensen's Army Group 
on both sides of Brest-Litovsk, and by pushing the 12th 
Army through Bielsk into the flank and rear of the 
forces thus driven back. There was no time available 
for shifting large bodies of troops or for the prepara- 
tion of far-reaching operations. Orders were issued 
to this effect by both G.H.Q.'s on the 13th of August. 

It was thereby admitted to a certain extent that the 
most recent operations had not completely achieved 
their purpose. On the basis of this fact an exchange 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 141 

of views took place between the Commander-in-Chief 
in the East and the Chief of the General Staff, and it is 
reproduced here because it is the simplest way of ex- 
plaining the divergence of opinion. 

On August 13th the Commander-in-Chief reported 
to G.H.Q. as follows : 

" In spite of the excellent results of the thrust on 
the Narew, the operations in the East have not led to 
the annihilation of the enemy. As was to be expected, 
the Russian has drawn out of the pincers and is al- 
lowing himself to be driven back frontally in the di- 
rection desired by himself. With the help of his good 
railways he can concentrate just as he wishes and lead 
strong forces against my left wing which is threaten- 
ing his communications. I consider this wing to be in 
danger. On the other hand a decisive blow is only 
possible now from the Kovno region, although a 
serious amount of time has unfortunately been lost for 
this. I therefore urgently propose once more a rein- 
forcement of my left wing, so that after its arrival 
the offensive can be resmned ; or at least the territory 
captured hitherto retained. I once more stress the 
fact that I regarded an offensive by my left wing 
against the enemy's communications -and his rear, as 
the only possibility of annihilating him. This offen- 
sive is probably even now the only means of avoiding 
a new campaign unless it is already too late for it." 

The Chief of the General Staff replied as follows: 

" The annihilation of the enemy has never been 
hoped for from the current operations in the East, but 



142 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

purely and simply a decisive victory in accordance with 
) the aims of G.H.Q. Nor should annihilation, on the 
i whole, have been attempted in the present instance, 
] for it is impossible to try to annihilate an enemy who 
I is far superior in numbers, must be attacked frontally, 
1 and has excellent lines of communication, any amount 
I of time and unlimited space at his disposal, whilst we 
I should have been forced to operate with a time-limit 
in a district destitute of railways and roads. 

" That the enemy has already been decisively de- 
feated for our purposes cannot be doubted by any- 
body who visualizes the fact that the Russians have 
lost in three months about three-quarters of a million 
men in prisoners alone, endless materiel, and Galicia. 
the Kingdom of Poland, and the Duchy of Courland, 
besides the possibility of seriously threatening Austria- 
Hungary during the beginning of the Italian campaign, 
or at all for an appreciable period, and, finally, the 
other possibility of employing their Odessa Armies at 
the critical moment in the Balkans. There exists a fur- 
ther prospect that the results of the operations will be 
intensified further as we have succeeded in driving no 
less than five thoroughly beaten enemy armies into the 
space between Bielostock and Brest-Litovsk. 

" It is to be assumed that the operations would cer- 
tainly have been more decisive if it had been possible 
to deliver a simultaneous blow across the Niemen. 
But G.H.Q. had no forces at its disposal for this pur- 
pose, and Your Excellency considered the employment 
of the Niemen Army in Courland to be more neces- 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 143 

sary. This is not intended as a criticism, but merely 
as a statement of the facts." 

G.H.Q. did not share the opinion that the left wing 
of the Commander-in-Chief in the East was threat- 
ened, as the Russians were still engaged along the 
whole front, and thus would not be able to appear in 
such strong force on the Lower Dwina as to render the 
German forces at disposal there insufficient to repel 
them. Any reinforcement of the loth, or the Niemen 
Army from the West, or from Mackensen's and Prince 
Leopold's Army Groups, was out of the question at 
the time, and would only have been possible from the 
Narew Group after the conclusion of the present 
operations. 

" It will always be necessary, however, to take the 
resultant general military situation into consideration 
before any forces are transferred to the loth or to the 
Niemen Army." 

This correspondence contains everything that was 
to be said on this subject at that time. Today, how- 
ever, it needs supplementing. There can scarcely be 
any doubt that an " annihilation " of the Russian 
Armies on the Vistula would have been actually nearer 
than was the case, and still greater damage would cer- 
tainly have been inflicted on them, if it had been de- 
cided to transfer all the formations that could be 
spared to the German Narew Group at the beginning 
of its operations. 

The matter at issue here concerned the four divi- 
sions from the 9th Army, which were actually brought 



144 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

up, or could have been, during the operations, and two 
divisions at least of the forces which were transferred 
to the Niemen Army. The possibility of such a pro- 
ceeding did exist. An extensive weakening of the 
front of the 9th Army in front of Warsaw was as 
harmless as it was on the front south of the Pilitza. 
The reinforcement of the Niemen Army took place, 
however, for offensive purposes which exceeded the 
range of what was necessary for the advancement of 
the main operations. In Northern Lithuania the Rus- 
sians were the " foUowers-up " throughout. Until the 
mMdle of August the idea of threatening the German 
northern wing was certainly remote from them. 

If the Narew Group had conducted its offensive 
with twenty divisions instead of with fourteen, then 
it is in a high degree probable that it would have been 
in a position to prevent strong forces of the enemy 
from escaping from the pincers. 

Accordingly the omission of this reinforcement was 
a mistake. As is shown by this purposely detailed 
analysis of events, its cause is to be sought solely in 
the fact that it was not possible to establish a uniform 
conception of the situation between the leading and the 
executive authorities. As the fundamental idea of 
the plan of campaign in the East first demanded the 
sharpest concentration of all available forces and 
means for the main operations, the retention of one 
single man for any reasons whatever should not have 
been allowed. 

Whilst it was certainly the duty of the G.O.C., in 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 145 

the first place, to adapt himself to the operations as 
a whole, a part of the responsibility for this not being 
done also rests with the Chief of the General Staff. 
It was his duty to secure the unrestricted use of every 
portion in and for the whole, even where he was op- 
posed by extraordinary personal difficulties, as in this 
case. 

It soon appeared, a few days after August 13th, 
that the driving of the enemy to the north, which was 
intended in the Bug region, would not actually be ac- 
complished to any very great extent. The slow ad- 
vance of the 1 2th and the 8th Armies left the Rus- 
sians still plenty of freedom of operation in the region 
north-west and north of Brest-Litovsk. They put up 
an obstinate defence in front of Prince Leopold's 
Army Group as well as of the 4th Austro-Hungarian 
and the nth Armies around and west of Brest- 
Litovsk, although with heavy losses. The plan of 
driving them from the great roads and railways, which 
lead eastwards from Brest-Litovsk, by an enveloping 
movement round the east of this place did not suc- 
ceed. The Bug Army was not able to capture the 
entrances to the swamp region above Brest-Litovsk 
around Vlodava, which were tenaciously defended by 
the enemy. The ist Austro-Hungarian Army, which 
was once more moved on Vladimir- Volynsk from 
Grubeschow to Dubyenko made some progress, but it 
was improbable that it would be at all dangerous to 
the Russians, if the latter continued their retreat at 
the same pace as hitherto. 



146 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

On the other hand, the conclusion of the negotia- 
tions with the Bulgarians was coming palpably nearer. 
It necessitated the beginning of transport to the Ser- 
bian frontier before the end of August. The con- 
tinuation of big combined operations in the East had, 
therefore, to be abandoned. 

In these circumstances the Chief of the General 
Staff now agreed to the proposals of separate opera- 
tions, which were made by the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. and the Commander-in-Chief in the East, nat- 
urally on condition that the execution of G.H.Q.'s 
plans in the West and in the Balkans would not be 
crossed by them. 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFENSIVE IN VOLHYNIA, I915 

The Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. rightly considered 
that it was scarcely bearable for the Russian lines east 
and north-east of Lemberg to be only two days' march 
off this politically and strategically important railway 
centre. In order to drive the enemy further back, out 
of Galicia if possible, and in order to inflict upon him 
a severe blow at the same time, it planned a strong 
push through Kovel into the gap which actually ex- 
isted between the Russian western and south-western 
fronts. In its later stages the north wing of the south- 
western front in the region of Lutsk was to be pressed 
in and surrounded. It was intended to use the ist 
and the 4th Austro-Hungarian Armies for these op- 
erations. Simultaneously with them the inner wings 
of the 2nd Austro-Hungarian and the Southern 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 147 

Armies were to attack south of the railway line 
Krasne-Brody. The argument against these opera- 
tions was, that they had to be executed in very difficult 
terrain without the co-operation of German troops. 
They were strongly supported by the fact that only a 
partial success would mean a very considerable in- 
crease of the self-confidence and the inner value of 
the Allied Army, and a strong impression upon the 
enemy. G.H.Q. considered this gain to be so great, 
that it felt compelled to put all other scruples in the 
background. It therefore declared its readiness to 
agree to the withdrawal of the ist and 4th Austro- 
Hungarian Armies as well as of an Austro-Hungarian 
Army Corps fighting in the nth Army from 
the formation of Mackensen's Army Group. The 
1st Army was to be at the disposal of the Austro- 
Hungarian G.H.Q. immediately, the 4th Army and the 
Army Corps after the fall of Brest-Litovsk. This 
took place on August 25th. On the 27th, the above- 
mentioned Austro-Hungarian troops began their 
march to the south-east. On the same day the first 
German division was taken from the Mackensen 
Group to be sent to Orsova on the Danube. It had 
an important part to play there, inasmuch as a favour- 
able influence on the negotiations that were proceed- 
ing so well with Bulgaria might be expected from its 
appearance on Rumania's flank and not too far from 
the Bulgarian frontier. 

The Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. was aware of this 
purpose. Yet it proposed to transfer the division to 



148 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

the Army Group of the Commander-in-Chief in th© 
East for a thrust through Vilna planned by him, and 
which will be discussed later. This could not be 
agreed to by Germany. The Chief of the General 
Staff gave it as his opinion that it would have been 
very desirable during July, if strong forces could have 
appeared on the middle Niemen simultaneously with 
the offensive between the Bug and the Vistula. The 
Commander-in-Chief in the East had not produced 
these forces, however, and they were not obtainable 
elsewhere. In France the enemy now had a su- 
periority of more than seven hundred battalions. 
Therefore, reinforcements for the operations in North- 
em Lithuania and Courland could only have been taken 
from the Polish front. But the armies there had only 
just been sufficient to shake the enemy to such an ex- 
tent as was absolutely necessary owing to the condi- 
tion of the Austro-Hungarian troops. In addition to 
this, if any reinforcement from the armies in Poland 
had been intended, the thrust on the Niemen would 
not have taken effect until six weeks after the order 
for the formation of this attacking group had been 
issued. Such a delay could not possibly be accepted 
in view of the Balkan situation. The Russians would 
have been able, with the assistance of their railway 
network, to throw sufficient forces against the Niemen 
Group in time, as soon as the pressure in Poland slack- 
ened, so that the operations in the north would not 
have proceeded any more speedily than actually hap- 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 149 

pened; but, on the other hand, it is probable that no 
success would have been achieved anywhere, if all the 
attacking groups had been thinned. 

The Chief of the General Staff concluded the re- 
port, in which he represented this point of view to the 
Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q., with the words : 

" A reinforcement of the Kovno Group is certainly 
to be desired, but it is incomparably more important 
that the Dardanelles should be secured and, in addi- 
tion, the iron in Bulgaria struck while it is hot. Con- 
sequently the forces which we are able to withdraw 
from the region of Brest-Litovsk, without slackening 
our hold on the enemy's throat, must go to the 
Danube." 

Consequently the removal of the division continued. 
It was followed by eight more divisions from Macken- 
sen's and Prince Leopold's Army Groups during the 
latter days of August and the early part of September, 
some under orders for Serbia and some for France, 
whilst the remaining portions of these Army Groups 
continued the pursuit of the Russians north of the 
Pripet. They were able to inflict considerable damage 
on them too. Field-Marshal von Mackensen then 
went to South Hungary, where he was to take com- 
mand of the attacking group against Serbia. His 
former Army Group continued to operate under his 
name for some time, thereby successfully concealing 
the Field-Marshal's new mission. 



150 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

THE VILNA OFFENSIVE, AUTUMN, I915 

In the area under the command of the Commander- 
in-Chief in the East, the fortress of Kovno was 
stormed by portions of the loth Army on August 
1 8th after a concentrated assault. The Commander- 
in-Chief desired to turn this success to account by 
continuing the offensive in his area. G.H.Q. readily 
consented to this, as there was no longer any question 
of co-operation between the Northern Army Group 
with the two southern ones for a common purpose, 
and any further damage to the enemy was most wel- 
come. The reserves, which were once more asked for, 
could, however, only be promised in the event of por- 
tions of the army attacking Novo Georgievsk being 
liberated by the capture of that place. Happily this 
happened two days later. No less than eighty-five 
thousand prisoners and seven hundred guns fell into 
German hands. Of the four divisions of the besieg- 
ing army, three could be sent to the Army Group in 
the North. The order for the offensive was given by 
the Commander-in-Chief in the East on August 28th. 
According to this, the 8th and the 12th Armies were 
to follow up the enemy closely, and the 8th was to 
take the fortress of Grodno. The loth Army had to 
attack further in the direction Orany-Vilna, with its 
chief pressure directed towards and north of Vilna. 
The Niemen Army was to attack the enemy in front 
of Friedrichstadt and further cover the left wing of 
the loth Army against the Dwina. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 151 

These plans were in agreement with the orders issued 
by G.H.Q. for the Northern Army Group on the very 
same day. The latter directed it to carry out the op- 
erations begun north of the upper N'arew and east of 
the middle Niemen, and to do the enemy the greatest 
possible harm. The question as to whether the line 
to be held during the coming winter would rest on the 
sea in the Gulf of Riga or at Libau was to be left 
open. 

The choice in detail and between a mobile defence 
and a consolidated position was likewise left to the 
Commander-in-Chief. It was only important, with 
regard to the general conduct of the war, that a de- 
fensive sector should be found which could be held 
with a minimum expenditure of men and muni- 
tions. 

A propos of this choice, it was repeatedly pointed 
out that it could not be considered possible to an- 
nihilate finally an enemy, " who is firmly resolved to 
give ground regardless of the sacrifice of territory and 
population, as soon as he is grappled with, and who, 
moreover, has the whole width of Russia at his dis- 
posal." 

Before very long the necessity was bound to arise, 
for ten or twelve divisions to be taken from the region 
of the Army Group in the north, for use in other 
theatres of war. 

Similar warnings against the preparation of plans, 
which were now impossible to execute owing to the 
position of the Central Powers, and because they 



152 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

threatened to lead to an expenditure of irreplaceable 
force, had also to be sent to the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. in those days. It was informed that Ger- 
many and in the opinion of G.H.Q,, Austria-Hungary 
too, was not concerned with the occupation of Russian 
territory; but henceforward solely with the discovery 
of a line which guaranteed the permanent security of 
East Prussia and Hungary with the smallest expendi- 
ture of energy, whilst we sought to bring about the 
decision of the war on other fronts with as strong 
forces as possible. Moreover, the Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff did not conceal from the Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. the fact that the hope, also expressed by the 
latter, that the intended thrust towards Vilna would 
lead to the final annihilation of the Russians, could 
scarcely be fulfilled. The enemy's advantage in better 
lines of communication, especially in the Vilna region, 
was so great that there was little probability of over- 
coming it altogether. This prophecy unhappily 
proved correct to its full extent. 

THE VILNA OFFENSIVE OF THE HINDENBURG ARMY 
GROUP 

On August 29th the Northern Army Group began 
its forward movement. On the same day the news 
arrived that the Russians were about to dispatch two 
and a half army corps to Vilna. These reinforce- 
ments were taken from the rear columns in the sectors 
in front of Prince Leopold's and Mackensen's Army 
Groups. The transference of these troops from these 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 153 

sectors northwards to the region of Dvinsk and east of 
Vilna continued. The army groups were not able to 
prevent these movements, because they were suffering 
from difficulties of transport, and were only advanc- 
ing very slowly in the difficult terrain against the ob- 
stinate resistance of the enemy. In the early days of 
September it was clear that the enemy was working 
with the same methods that he had used with success 
between the Vistula and the Bug. He strengthened 
himself on the wing, from the Pripet to the Upper 
Niemen on the one side, and in the Vilna region and 
north of it on the other, whilst he paid little attention 
to his centre. It would still have been possible then to 
have transferred the main pressure of the German at- 
tack against this centre, about in the direction of 
Orany-Lida. By this means an important advantage 
would have been gained by driving the whole of the 
enemy's left wing on to the marshes of Slonim. The 
necessary forces could have been brought up in time, 
partly from the Niemen Army, whilst they also ex- 
isted in part in four divisions which the Commander- 
in-Chief in the East was marching from the 8th and 
1 2th Armies to the Niemen Army in front of Vilna. 
Of course, one condition for such a change in the op- 
erations was that the capture of Vilna and the offen- 
sive action in Northern Lithuania and in Courland 
would have to be abandoned. It is probable that 
the disinclination to abandon these operations caused 
the Commander-in-Chief on the spot, not only to 
cling to his old plan, but even to extend it. 



154 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

On September 4th he reported that he intended to 
attack with the reinforced left wing of the loth Army 
on the 8th or the 9th, according to the progress of 
the movement of troops, on and across the line Vilna- 
Vilkomir. Although the Chief of the General Staff 
had scruples against these operations, which were out 
of proportion to the means at hand, he did not press 
them, because local conditions could not be judged so 
reliably from a distance as from the army group itself, 
and because the freedom of decision which had just 
been granted to the Commander there ought not to be 
restricted by any interference at the eleventh hour. 
Experiences on the Narew during the summer led 
him to fear that such an interference would lead to 
half measures, and would therefore do more harm 
than good. The Commander-in-Chief in the East 
was aware how much the German plan of campaign 
in the East depended upon the considerations of the 
general situation. In order to emphasize this afresh, 
a reply was sent on the same day to the effect that 
the Northern Army Group would have to be de- 
creased by two divisions in the middle of September, 
and that after this the other forces to be withdrawn 
from this area for other fronts would have to be taken 
after an interval of about three days. 

The offensive begun by the Eastern Army Group 
on September 9th met with active resistance every- 
where, which was weak only in the region of Orany. 
This could not be turned to account, however, owing 
to the lack of forces, because troops were drawn away 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 155 

from there for use further north after initial suc- 
cesses had been gained. 

On September 12th the 12th Army was fighting for 
the Selvianka sector south of the Niemen on a level 
with the army groups of Prince Leopold and Macken- 
sen. The 8th Army, which had just taken by storm 
on September 4th the last western bulwark of the 
Russians, Grodno, was about to force the opening of 
the lake sector east of this. These armies were op- 
posed by immensely superior numbers of the enemy. 

The right wing of the loth Army had pressed back 
a weaker opponent in the direction of Orany. The 
centre was fighting on a level with Troki Nove against 
strong Russian forces in front of Vilna, the left was 
north of the lower Viliya in an enveloping movement 
against the Viliya sector above the town, and its 
cavalry was approaching the Vilna-Dvinsk railway 
south of Novo Svenczyany. 

The right wing of the Niemen Army had passed 
through Vilkomir in its eastward advance, its centre 
turned on Jakobstadt after taking Friedrichstadt, 
whilst its left wing stood unchanged north of Mitau. 

In this situation the Commander-in-Chief in the 
East thought that he had urgent need of reinforce- 
ments for the left wing of the loth Army, in the first 
place to give more weight to the intended thrust of 
this wing to the south-east, and, further, to have 
stronger reserves behind it for the event of an enemy 
advance against it from Dvinsk. He therefore re- 
quested, on September nth and 12th, that the two 



156 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

divisions of the loth Army Corps, which had been 
withdrawn from the Mackensen Army Group and were 
assembling at Bielostock for transport to the West, 
should be left with him for ten to fourteen days. 
The Commander-in-Chief wanted to concentrate the 
corps forthwith near Kovno. 

His request could not be granted. Conditions at 
the front in France allowed of no delay in the trans- 
ference of reinforcements thither. As a matter of 
fact, it was this corps that did the lion's share in the 
repulse of the great French attempt at a break-through 
in Champagne at the end of September. If it had not 
arrived in time, the situation would have been danger- 
ous in a very high degree. The one or even two 
divisions of the 12th Army offered by the Command- 
er-in-Chief in exchange for the corps did not consti- 
tute a sufficient reserve; nor could they begin to be 
transported across from Bielostock before some time 
had elapsed. Moreover, the time reckoning, " from 
ten to fourteen days " proved to be incorrect in another 
respect. Owing to the condition of the railways, 
the loth Corps could not have been used as a unit in 
the region between Vilna and Dvinsk before the end 
of September or the beginning of October at the 
earliest, and would certainly not have been free again 
before the middle of October, probably much later. 
However, as G.H.Q. informed the Commander-in- 
Chief, it would unfortunately be impossible to con- 
tinue the operations in the East with the forces hitherto 
available for so long as that. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 157 

A little later another exchange of views developed 
between the Chief of the General Staff and the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East. On September 19th the 
latter was informed that the removal of portions of 
the 1 2th and 8th Armies must be begun, and, indeed, 
a division standing in reserve (the 26th) behind the 
1 2th Army was to be sent back at once. Six more 
divisions were to follow with all speed. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief complained about such an " inter- 
ference " in his rights, as he had wanted to use those 
very troops for the taking of Riga. 

He had to be informed in reply that the withdrawal 
of portions of his Army Group had been intimated 
to him on September 4th for the 15th of the month. 
The beginning of the transfer had been postponed 
until the 19th, in spite of the most pressing need, so as 
not to disturb the Vilna operations. But a delay of 
even one day more delay could not now be allowed, 
for the division was required on the Serbian front. 
Nor could the idea of any substitute for it be enter- 
tained owing to the loss of time that this would entail. 
For the rest, the withdrawal of the division could not 
do any harm to the current Vilna operations, because it 
had been intended for use against Riga. But G.H.Q. 
had not been informed of any undertaking in this di- 
rection. Even if the left wing of the Niemen Army 
had to retire in consequence of the sudden withdrawal 
of the division, no particular disadvantage would be 
involved for it would not matter essentially to the 
general course of the war, whether the German left 



158 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

wing stood on the Dwina, or further back behind the 
Niemen or the Aa. Every part had to submit to in- 
conveniences for the sake of the whole. 

The enveloping movements of the loth Army north- 
east and, later east of Vilna, made unusual demands 
on the endurance of the troops. They responded to 
them with great self-sacrifice, but these operations did 
not achieve their object. As had been feared, the Rus- 
sians succeeded in taking counter-measures in time. 
But the continuance of the operations was hindered 
still more by the difficulties of transport, which 
speedily got worse and worse. 

The Chief of the General Staff had already come 
to the conclusion on September 19th, when that ex- 
change of views took place on the subject of the 26th 
Division, that no success of any great importance was 
to be obtained. However, the Commander-in-Chief 
was of a different opinion, as he reported on the 20th 
in reply to an inquiry. He still hoped for a favour- 
able result, even if it might take several more days. 
This was not confirmed. On the 27th the Commander- 
in-Chief reported, in reply to a further inquiry, that 
he had to stop the attack and withdraw the left wing 
of the loth Army, which had advanced to Vileika, 
back to the Lake Marotch sector. His Army Group 
would now establish itself in the consolidated posi- 
tions stretching from the confluence of the Beresina 
and the Niemen-Lake Narotch — the region west of 
Dvinsk-Mitau-Schlok. The 8th and loth Armies 
were to release forces for G.H.Q. as soon as possible. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 159 

How many more divisions and within what periods 
they could be transferred the Commander-in-Chief 
was not yet able to say. 

The last sentence of this reply created grave dif- 
ficulties for the general situation. In the West, where 
the enemy's offensive had just begun, the forces, 
whose arrival had been depended upon for some time, 
were just as urgently required as on the Serbian 
frontier, where the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. had 
been unable to send troops of the strength promised 
for the combined operations. Yet an attempt was 
made to put up with the non-arrival of the forces from 
the Eastern front, because in the meantime an en- 
gagement had begun again in front of Smorgon which 
offered prospects, according to the information to 
hand, of removing a big salient in the German 
front which existed there and was a great incon- 
venience to our permanent lines. By the 3rd of Oc- 
tober, however, it was plain from the reports, sent by 
request, that this hope would not be fulfilled. Con- 
sequently the Chief of the General Staff was able to 
demand the dispatch of further portions of the Army 
Group, and was obliged to do so with regard to the 
situation on the other fronts.^ In order to prepare 
these measures he again demanded from the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in the East the presentation of a 
statement of the position of the Army Group. This 
led to a correspondence, a reproduction of which will 

1 See Appendix : Relative Strengths of the Forces on the 
Western Front. 



i6o THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

again explain the circumstances most simply. It pro- 
vides at the same time clear information on the ex- 
isting differences of opinion regarding the conduct of 
operations during the summer. The Commander-in- 
Chief reported on October 6th: 

" Russian loth, 2nd and ist Armies are attacking 
with all forces the loth Army and the right wing of 
the Niemen Army, with the intention of breaking 
through to the Dvinsk-Vilna road or at least render- 
ing the transference of further forces to the West 
impossible by their attack.* 

" I expect that I shall succeed in preventing the 
enemy from breaking through. It is impossible, how- 
ever, at the moment to send off any further forces. 
This can only be done when the attack has been 
beaten off and after the front has been shortened by 
the taking of Smorgen and the bridge-head of Dvinsk. 
For this purpose the sending of some heavy batteries 
is urgently required. This shortening of the front 
is all the more necessary since I am even compelled 
to withdraw reserves for myself from the centre, in 
order to strengthen the left wing of the troops under 
my command, as any indentation of my front in the 
region of Mitau would have grave consequences." 

The Chief of the General Staff replied: 

1 It was improbable that the Russians would have pursued 
such aims. It was probably solely a matter of counter-attacks 
to relieve the pressure upon them. Moreover, they were re- 
pulsed so easily that a repetition of them could be regarded 
without anxiety. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA i6i 

" It would undoubtedly be of advantage if the pres- 
ent position of the Army Group could be permanently 
held and, in addition, pressure exerted in the direc- 
tion of Dvinsk. But if it is asked, whether the re- 
tention of forces there to this end is permissible when 
their absence on the Western front can endanger the 
German positions here, this question is to be denied 
unconditionally. In comparison with this danger, as 
Your Excellency has long known, it does not matter 
at all if the shortening of the front that you desire 
has to be effected by a withdrawal in consequence of 
the transference of the 58th and 115th Divisions.* 
For example, whether our position stretches from the 
Smorgon region through Dvinsk to Bausk, or goes 
in a more or less straight line from Smorgon direct to 
Bausk, is of no importance to the general course of the 
war. The loss of our positions in the West can 
mean an unfavourable conclusion of the war. Owing 
to the tension which prevails perinanently in the West, 
and to the numerical superiority of the enemy in per- 
sonnel and materiel, with which the superiority, which 
likewise unfortunately exists on all the other fronts, 
cannot be compared at all, owing to the military value 
of the Western enemies, every division counts on the 
Western front. The demand that Your Excellency 
should transfer the first of these two divisions to the 
West as soon as it is possible to entrain them from 
Vilna, must therefore be adhered to." 

Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Ohief refused to 
1 These were the two units in question. 



i62 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

submit to this decision. On October 7th he took the 
following line: 

" I cannot agree with the references to the position 
of my Army Group. The positions that are now be- 
ing taken up are, with or without a shortening at 
Smorgon and Dvinsk, by far the most favourable that 
could be chosen. They can be held with a minimum of 
forces. Any position in the rear which is not cov- 
ered by the Dwina/ would consume more troops than 
the present position as it stands, certainly not less. 

" I have always taken the general situation into 
consideration by relinquishing as many troops as I 
could, as, for example, the ten divisions to the Austro- 
Hungarian front.^ I have also sent off without delay 
any divisions that could be spared, and also dispatched 
one belonging to the Xlth Army Corps prematurely, 
an action which was described as a mistake at the time. 
The fact that the further relinquishment of divisions 
is now meeting with difficulties, is due to the plan of 
campaign favoured in the summer, which was unable 
to strike a deadly blow at the Russians, in spite of the 
favourable circumstances and my urgent entreaties. 
I am not blind to the difficulties of the general military 
situation which have ensued, and if the Russian at- 
tacks are beaten off really decisively, I shall relinquish 
further divisions as soon as it seems possible to me to 
do so — even before shortening the front at Smorgon 
and Dvinsk. But I cannot bind myself to a definite 

iThe river generally freezes from December to March. 
2 Refers to the period since the beginning of the war. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 163 

time. A premature relinquishment would give rise to 
a crisis, such as is now being experienced, to my regret, 
on the Western front, and in certain circumstances it 
would mean a catastrophe for the Army Group, as any 
retiring movement of my troops, which are but weak 
in comparison with the enemy, must lead to very great 
harm being done to the formations, owing to the un- 
favourable condition of the terrain. I request that my 
views should be represented to His Majesty." 

With all the consideration due to the person of the 
Commander-in-Chief, whose name is associated by the 
German people with the victory of Tannenberg, and to 
the feelings which prevailed at his Headquarters, after 
the result of the operations around Vilna, it was im- 
possible for the Chief of the General Staff to allow 
these remarks to pass without a more determined reply. 
This ran as follows: 

" Much as I regret that Your Excellency should 
(without any cause consider the present moment ^ suited 
for explanations of events of the past, which are there- 
fore unimportant at the moment, I should not trouble 
to refute your statements, if they concerned only me 
personally. 

" But as it concerns a criticism of orders issued by 
G.H.Q., which, as is well known, have in all important 
cases met with the previous consent of His Majesty, I 
am unhappily compelled to do so. 

iThe French offensive in Champagne was at its height, and 
the offensive against Serbia had just begun. Both claimed the 
full attention of G.H.Q. 



i64 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

" Whether Your Excellency agrees with the views 
of G.H.Q. does not matter, once a decision has been 
made by His Majesty. In this case every portion of 
our forces has to adapt itself unconditionally to G.H.Q. 

" The dispatch of forces from your area during 
the war to places where pressure was to be exerted, is 
no particular achievement, for it took place at the 
direction of G.H.Q., which can alone be responsible 
for such action. 

" What Your Excellency says about the expression 
* mistake ' used by me in the telegraphed correspond- 
ence concerning the transference of the nth Army 
Corps is not correct. I considered it a mistake to 
march two divisions to a station at which only fifteen 
trains can be loaded daily, and made it clear that such 
an order had not proceeded from me. 

" What operations Your Excellency had in mind in 
your effort to stigmatize * the plan of campaign 
favoured in the summer,' is not clear to me. 

" The attack by the Narew Group can scarcely come 
into question, for Your Excellency admitted person- 
ally in Posen that it was more a matter of sentiment, 
whether the Narew or the Niemen operations were 
decided upon. After the plentiful experiences of last 
winter, however, I am unable to rely on the feelings 
of other persons with regard to my proposals, but must 
depend solely on my own convictions, which con- 
sidered the Narew operations to be more opportune. 

" It could only refer to the rejection of your later 
proposal to strengthen the left wing of your Army 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 165 

Group with troops from Mackensen and Woyrsch. 
But this was based on two preliminary conditions 
which proved to be wholly unfounded. 

" I do not hesitate to say today that the acceptance 
of your proposal would have been disastrous for us. 

" Direct proof of this lies in the irrefutable fact 
that, if we had accepted the proposal, we should never 
have been in a position to transfer in time those forces 
which are urgently required for the support of the 
Western front. Any examination of the situation 
from the point of view of time and distance, with due 
regard to the condition of the railways and other 
transport systems, proves this beyond question. 

" It is true that Your Excellency does not seem to 
have been informed of these conditions until very 
late. Otherwise the repeated and urgent requests for 
the dispatch of the loth Army Corps would have been 
quite incomprehensible. 

" I can deduce indirect justification for my view 
from the course of the operations south-east of Vilna. 
Exactly what I feared and prophesied took place there. 
One cannot hope to strike a comprehensive and deadly 
blow, by means of an encircling movement, at an 
enemy who is numerically stronger, who will stick at 
no sacrifices of territory and population, and, in addi- 
tion, has the expanse of Russia and good railways be- 
hind him ; and particularly an encircling movement on 
the main front, in the course of which large sections 
of one's own troops are unavailable for action, whilst 
marching into position. The surprise required for 



i66 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

success is, as this war has often shown, never success- 
ful enough to prevent the enemy from taking counter- 
measures in time. 

" But it is indeed possible to inflict quite enough 
damage on such an enemy for our purposes by keep- 
ing up contact with him all along the front and thus 
preventing him from shifting his troops ; then, to take 
him really by surprise in a well-chosen spot and with 
comparatively weak but strongly-concentrated forces 
to thrust deep into his lines. Examples of this are 
given by Mackensen's and Woyrsch's campaigns and 
also Gallwitz' tactics at Prassnyscz. 

"A similar opportunity was, in my opinion, re- 
cently offered Your Excellency at Orany. 

" If, in spite of my attitude to your operations, I 
did not propose to His Majesty to interfere, but even 
supported them in every way, the reason for this is to 
be found in my respect for the convictions of another 
person so long as they keep within the necessary limits, 
and so do not threaten to harm operations as a whole; 
and because it is impossible to gauge with mathematical 
precision the issue of any operations which are carried 
out with the energy usual in such cases. 

" I will report to His Majesty the scruples which 
Your Excellency raises against the withdrawal of the 
two divisions. I must refuse to bring the remaining 
points of your telegram to the knowledge of the 
Emperor, because they do not concern authenticated 
considerations of past events, about which, therefore, 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 167 

I do not intend in any case to approach the Supreme 
War Lord in these grave days." 

The Emperor's decision was to the effect that the 
divisions were to be relinquished as ordered by the 
Chief of the General Staff. For the rest the latter 's 
telegram fulfilled its purpose. The Commander-in- 
Chief in the East acquiesced in it. For several months 
there was a pause in these discussions, and the whole 
situation was helped thereby. It was not until the 
situation became acute in the summer of 1916, that 
the Eastern Command resumed its efforts to influence 
the conduct of the war. 

The Army Group continued its endeavour to ad- 
vance in the direction of Smorgon, Dvinsk and Riga 
until nearly the end of October, and inflicted upon the 
enemy, particularly in his counter-attacks, more dam- 
age than did the latter upon it. No particular gain 
was achieved. 

PERMANENT POSITIONS IN THE EAST, WINTER, I915-16 
(See Map 4) 

A permanent position was taken up for the winter 
along the line: confluence of the Beresina and the 
Narew — east of Vilna — Lake Narotch — west of 
Dvinsk — Dwina on both sides of Friedrichstadt — 
Mitau — Schlok. 

South of this stood Prince Leopold's Army Group 
behind the Servetch — the Schara — east of Baran- 
pvitchi — along Lake Vygonovskoye — the Oginski 



i68 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Canal — the lasiolda as far as the Pripet.^ It had 
been pushed thus far forward by continuous and often 
heavy fighting in order to afford reHef to the opera- 
tions of the Northern Army Group, and had reached 
its lines at the middle of September. 

On the 25th, G.H.Q.'s orders were issued for the 
establishment of these consolidated positions on the 
German front from the Pripet to the coast. 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFENSIVE IN VOLHYNIA, 
END OF SEPTEMBER, I915 

A few days later this was begun in the Austro-Hun- 
garian sector south of the Pripet. 

The offensive measures begun by the Austro-Hun- 
garian G.H.Q. at the end of August had not only 
produced no decided advantages but had even led to 
a serious reverse. 

After initial successses in Eastern Galicia which 
facilitated a continued advance of the Austro-Hun- 
garian front to the Strypa and past Brody, and as- 
sured material security for Lemberg, the left wing of 
the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army suffered a sensible 
defeat on the west bank of the Sereth during the first 

1 In point of fact the right wing of Prince Leopold's Army 
Group stretched about twenty-five miles beyond the Pripet south- 
wards, because the protection of the flank of the railway centre, 
Brest-Litovsk, as well as of the railways leading eastwards 
from thence, was to be kept in German hands. But this made 
no alteration in the agreement that the front south of this river 
was to be secured, as a matter of principle, by the Austro-Hun- 
garian G.H.Q. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 169 

ten days of September. The situation could only be 
restored by G.H.Q. consenting to the employment of 
forces which were intended for the Serbian front, by 
promising to replace them with German troops there. 
This assistance was given on condition that the 
Volhynian offensive was abandoned, because no gains, 
but probably further losses, were to be expected from 
it, owing to the newly-apparent deficiency in the of- 
fensive powers of the Austro-Hungarian troops. But 
before the corresponding orders issued by the Austro- 
Hungarian G.H.Q. could take effect, the position in 
Volhynia developed more unfavourably than that on 
the Dniester and the Sereth. 

The 4th Austro-Hungarian Army, which was ad- 
vancing from the Lutsk region upon Dubno-Rovno, 
collapsed so completely before a powerful Russian 
counter-attack east of the Styr sector towards the mid- 
dle of September, that grave consequences were to be 
feared. In this case, too, G.H.Q, found itself com- 
pelled not to refuse the urgently requested assistance. 
Two divisions were immediately moved southwards 
from Prince Leopold's Army Group. Their inter- 
vention speedily brought the enemy to a standstill at 
the Styr sector. It is true that one more condition 
had to be attached to the sending of these troops. It 
had proved to be necessary to put the left wing of the 
Austro-Hungarian front under German command. 
The 4th Austro-Hungarian Army, which stood on the 
Styr in the neighbourhood of Lutsk, together with all 
the Austro-Hungarian and German troops north of it 



I70 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

as far as the right wing of Prince Leopold's Army 
Group, were combined to form the Linsingen Army 
Group. 

The winter positions of the Austro-Hungarian front 
stretched from Rumania along the Bessarabian fron- 
tier to the Dniester, then ran behind this river, behind 
the Strypa, east of Brody, behind the Styr, and 
sprang back below Rafalovka to the Stochod, follow- 
ing the course of the latter to 25 miles south of the 
Pripet. 

The 191 5 campaign against Russia fulfilled the in- 
tentions of G.H.Q. in view of the comparatively small 
forces available for it. It is true that the annihila- 
tion of the enemy had not been achieved. But it was 
not put forward as a goal, nor could it have been in 
the circumstances. On the other hand, a weakening 
and crippling of the enemy had taken place, from 
which he would be unable to recover properly if we 
succeeded in keeping him in his isolated state, and 
from which it was to be expected that his fighting 
spirit would be broken for an indefinite period. This 
was bound to take place the sooner, the less he was 
in a position to feed his people and army with hopes 
of a reversal of fortune by the successes which he had 
just obtained on the Austro-Hungarian front. In the 
German sectors there were scarcely any more reverses 
to be feared. 

It was, therefore, of absolute importance to raise 
the fighting value of certain portions of the Austro- 
Hungarian troops. G.H.Q., therefore, turned its ef- 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 171 

forts in this direction. Attempts were made to 
achieve this object by the exchange of officers, by in- 
struction in the building of positions, by influence — 
through the channel of the Prussian ministry of 
War — on the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry mak- 
ing for a better use of the resources of the country, 
and many other measures besides. This had to be 
done very cautiously lest more harm than good should 
ensue. The very sensitive feelings of the Austro- 
Hungarian G.H.Q. and the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment had not to be hurt, nor their reputation among 
the peoples of the Dual Monarchy diminished. A 
great deal of improvement was effected all the same. 

In one matter, however, G.H.Q. was impotent. It 
had no possibility of exerting any influence upon the 
internal conditions of the Danubian Empire or of pre- 
venting the consequences of the existing ferment of 
feeling from affecting the Austro-Hungarian Army. 
The dangers inherent in that feeling were well known. 
Nothing was left undone in the way of warning and 
exhortation. But we never got to the roots of the 
evil. 

The period under review, rich though it was in mili- 
tary events, also witnessed great activity on the part 
of G.H.Q. in the military-political sphere. The ne- 
gotiations with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria have 
already been touched on above. I shall have occasion 
later on to deal with these and other questions in 
greater detail. But two matters of outstanding im- 
portance must be dealt with at this point. One is the 



172 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

efforts of the Chief of the General Staff to bring 
about an attempt to make peace with Russia, and the 
other the suspension, in its then form, of the sub- 
marine campaign in order not to jeopardize the con- 
clusion of the negotiations with Bulgaria. 

ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH 
RUSSIA, JULY, 191 5 

The consequences of the Gorlice-Tarnow battle for 
Russia and the (not, indeed, unexpected) failure of the 
Italian Army had strengthened our conviction that 
Germany would win the war if she succeeded, as she 
had hitherto done, in avoiding the overtaxing of her 
strength, either internally or externally. G.H.Q,, ac- 
cordingly, consistently refused to have anything to do 
with the pursuit of military successes of doubtful 
permanent value or any nebulous war aims. 

Among such aims was the hope of inflicting on the 
enemies of the Central Powers so complete a defeat 
by force of arms that they would have to sue uncon- 
ditionally for peace. The enemy's superiority of 
strength made this impossible. So far as the East is 
concerned, the reasons why this was impossible have 
already been stated several times. As for the West, 
to reckon, in the face of our very limited positive 
successes at sea, on achieving the objective in that 
theatre under all circumstances involved a fundamental 
misconception of the determination of our Western 
enemies, and of the power of resistance at any rate of 
England; it amounted, indeed, to risking far more 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 173 

than was justified on an uncertain hand. On the 
other hand, one could count, with as much certainty as 
can ever be present in war, on forcing the enemy in 
the West to abandon their intention o£ destroying us, 
if we deprived them of the prospect of defeating Ger- 
many and her alHes in the long run by exhaustion, be- 
fore they themselves had suffered irreparable losses. 
A peace, even on this basis, would really amount, in 
this war of defence, to a complete victory for the 
Central Powers, the fruits of which, while they would 
only ripen in the future, would for that very reason 
be the more secure. Accordingly, no stone should 
be left unturned which offered any prospect of lighten- 
ing Germany's heavy task and of frustrating her 
Western enemies. 

The position which developed in July, 191 5, in the 
Eastern theatre of war presented a good opportunity 
for action in accordance with this line of thought. 
It seemed clear, on the one hand, that the Petrograd 
Government must by now realize that the Russian 
Armies could not recover in any calculable time from 
the blows they had received, and in particular that 
they could not prevent the loss of the capital of Poland 
if the German operations were continued. On the 
other hand, the stubborn resistance of the Russians in 
their hopeless position west of the Vistula betrayed the 
tremendous importance attached in Petrograd to the 
retention of Polish soil, and in particular of Warsaw. 
The Chief of the General Staff, thinking it necessary to 
make use of these circumstances to our advantage. 



174 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

proposed to the Government that communication 
should be established with Russia with a view to an 
understanding, emphasizing that from the military 
point of view the advantages of a peace in the East 
were so great that the renunciation of territorial gains 
could not be counted against it. He was not shaken 
in this view by the consideration that it would prob- 
ably involve an unhappy future for the population of 
German origin in the Baltic provinces, the future of the 
whole being of more importance than that of a small 
part. 

Berlin raised no objections to the proposal, and the 
Chancellor approved the step suggested. It was un- 
dertaken, but unfortunately without any success. It 
resulted, indeed, in such an increase in hostility to 
Germany that we thought it better to break off en- 
tirely for the time all bridges with the East. This 
policy found emphatic expression in the well-known 
speech of the Chancellor in the Reichstag in the middle 
of August,^ and the army had simply to accept the 
position. 

1 In this speech the Chancellor said : 

"Our troops and those of Austria-Hungary have reached the 
Eastern frontiers of Congress Poland, and the two have now 
the task of administering the territory. 

"The chances of politics and of geographical position have 
long forced Germans and Poles to fight against one another. 
The memory of these old enmities does not diminish our re- 
spect for the devotion, the patriotism, and the determination 
with which the Polish people have defended its old Western 
civilization and its love of freedom against the Russians, and re- 
tained them even through the misfortunes of this war. I do not 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 175 

SUSPENSION OF UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE, 
SUMMER, I915 

It has been mentioned in an earlier chapter that 
since the month of February the submarine campaign 
had been carried on virtually without restrictions in the 
waters around England that had been declared as a 
war zone. Up to the end of the summer, however, 
it had only satisfied to a limited extent the hopes en- 
tertained as to its results. True, damage had been 
done to England, but there had so far been no per- 
ceptible influence on the enemy's warlike operations. 
In view of the conduct of the crews of the submarines, 
which was heroic and self-sacrificing beyond all 
praise, the reason for this could only be found in the 
fact that there were not enough boats available. 
Much time and work were required to make good this 
shortage. The navy, in spite of its well-known, often i 
even excessive, optimism, did not expect that this could '■ 
be done before the spring of 191 6. This circum- 
stance again constitutes one more earnest warning 
against the danger of the view so often held among 
civilians, who had no personal responsibility, that 
one can rely in war simply on new building. It also 
shows clearly what a disastrous mistake was made by 

imitate the hypocritical promises of our enemies, but I hope 
that the present occupation of Polish territory will be the be- 
ginning of a development which will put an end to the old 
antagonism between Germans and Poles, and will ensure to the 
country, freed from the Russian yoke, a happy future, in which 
it can plant and develop its special national characteristics." 



176 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Germany before the war, in preferring the construc- 
\ tion of battleships to the sufficient development of the 
s submarine, the real weapon of the weaker naval power. 

But this was not the only direction in which the 
submarine campaign had brought us grave disappoint- 
ment. 

America had at first attempted to obtain the sus- 
pension of the campaign by proposing that Germany 
should give it up if England would undertake to permit 
in future the passage to Germany of foodstuffs des- 
tined exclusively for the non-belligerent civil popula- 
tion of Germany, and accordingly not to be re- 
quisitioned for military purposes. America was will- 
ing to guarantee this by carrying out strict measures 
of supervision in Germany. 

Although there were very serious objections to such 
an interference in the internal life of the country, our 
Government accepted the proposal immediately. 
They were quite right to do so, for its execution would 
have involved very close relations with America, from 
which great results might be hoped. England, on the 
other hand, refused, as indeed was inevitably to be 
expected from her standpoint. What the insistence of 
the English on this policy cost the German people, 
and what a tremendous influence it had on the result 
of the war, is now a matter of history. That it con- 
tradicted the first principles, both of international law 
and of humanity, caused no anxiety to the English, 
who have never been influenced by such considerations 
when their own advantage was in question. 



OPERATIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 177 

England was, however, not content with the mere 
refusal. In March she published an Order outlawing 
everything of German origin at sea. This Order went 
far beyond the provisions of an " effective " blockade, 
although none had even been declared, and wholly dis- 
regarded the rights of neutrals. 

America, however, took up a stronger attitude of 
objection, not to the English measures, but to those of 
Germany, which were merely measures of defence 
against openly admitted breaches of international law. 
England was thus able, not merely to disregard the 
protest, but even to leave it unanswered. The note, 
however, which America addressed to Germany con- 
cerning the torpedoing without warning of an Ameri- 
can steamship (the Lusitania) amounted to a veiled 
declaration of war. After this note we could no 
longer cherish any hope that America would, even 
officially, preserve permanently the outward appear- 
ance of neutrality, and we had t-o reckon that she would 
proceed to open hostility if there were any repetition 
of such cases as the Lusitania. As such cases were 
bound to recur shortly if the campaign were continued 
in its existing form, Germany was faced with the 
choice between continuing the campaign at the price 
of bringing America into the ranks of her enemies 
on the one hand and the restriction of operations and 
the outward maintenance of peace with America on 
the other. 

If America had joined the Entente at this stage of 
the war, it would have cost us at once the help of 



178 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Bulgaria. The leaders in Sofia, with whom we had at 
this time just resumed negotiations, would never have 
made an agreement with us if America had ranged 
herself openly with our enemies. But, unless Ger- 
many gained the support of Bulgaria, it would be im- 
possible permanently to keep the Dardanelles closed 
and Russia cut off. 

The submarine campaign, with its relatively small 
actual results, was not worth this price, and we there- 
fore had to suspend operations in the form hitherto 
employed until further developments. They could 
only be continued in the form of cruiser warfare, that 
is to say, that no commercial vessel could be sunk until 
it had been overhauled and examined. 



CHAPTER VII 

ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH IN THE WEST 

IN THE AUTUMN OF 1915, AND THE 

CAMPAIGN AGAINST SERBIA 

As has already been mentioned, since about the month 
of July, 191 5, great weight had had to be given in the 
decisions as to continuing operations in the East to 
the question how we could ensure, without relaxing the 
pressure on Russia, that sufficient forces would be 
available to withstand the attack that was to be ex- 
pected on the Western front and to open up commu- 
nications through the Balkans. The question became 
more pressing as the year advanced, and we had to be 
ready to solve it at any moment in which it might sud- 
denly become urgent. The Chief of the General Staff 
was convinced that it was more important than the 
question of bringing the Russians " to their knees " 
merely by military force. 

If the German front did not hold in the West, or the 
Dardanelles were lost, no advantage that could still 
be gained against the Russians was of any value. 

CONCLUSION OF THE CONVENTION WITH BULGARIA 
(See Map 5) 

Under pressure from G.H.Q. negotiations had again 
been under way in Sofia since July for Bulgaria to 

179 



i8o THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

join the Central Powers. Ably conducted by Prince 
von Hohenlohe-Langenburg and by the new German 
military attache, Major von Massow, they resulted in 
the attendance at G.H.Q. at the end of August of a 
Bulgarian representative, the then Lieut.-Colonel 
Gantschew, to discuss the terms of a military con- 
vention. The real motive of the Bulgarians for join- 
ing us was presumably to be found in their realization 
that they could not expect from the Entente any sup- 
port in their national aspirations for the acquisition 
of the territory inhabited by Bulgarians in Serbia and 
Rumania. Even in the matter of a possible extension 
of their territory at the expense of Turkey they could 
have little to hope for from the side on which Russia 
stood, while their adhesion to the Central Powers im- 
mediately brought them, thanks to the breadth of mind 
of the Turkish statesmen, the Turkish territory to the 
west of the Maritza, for which they so earnestly 
longed. One need hardly mention that, apart from 
these considerations, confidence in the strength of the 
Central Powers and the ultimate victory of their good 
cause had great weight. 

The convention was signed on the 6th September at 
Pless by Generals Conrad von Hotzendorf and von 
Falkenhayn and by Lieut.-Colonel Gantschew. Full 
provision was made for Turkey's concurrence. 

By the convention, Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
with six divisions each, were to be on the Serbian 
frontier ready for operations within 30 days, while 
Bulgaria had to reach the same stage with at least 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH i8i 

four divisions * within 35 days. Field-Marshal von 
Mackensen was to take supreme command of all these 
troops. Germany was ready, if the undertaking de- 
veloped as was hoped, to station one mixed infantry 
brigade at Varna and one at Burgas, and to ensure, as 
far as possible, the introduction of submarines into 
the Black Sea for the defence of the Bulgarian coast. 
In this way it was hoped to influence the attitude of 
certain circles of the Bulgarian population, which could 
otherwise not be relied upon against the Russians. 
Bulgaria further undertook to have the four above- 
mentioned divisions mobilized at the latest by the 21st 
September, and to move into Serbian Macedonia on 
the nth October with at least one further division. 
Germany in return declared her readiness, in addition 
to granting substantial financial aid, to supply Bul- 
garia with munitions, so far as her own needs per- 
mitted. She also consented to induce the Turks, if 
Bulgaria desired, to defend the port of Dedeagatch 
against hostile landings, and to place the troops em- 
ployed for this purpose under Bulgarian command. 
To avoid undesirable incidents, it was agreed that 
Bulgaria was to preserve unconditional neutrality 
towards Greece and Rumania until the completion of 
the operations against Serbia, subject to an assurance 
from these states that they would remain neutral and 
not occupy any Serbian territory. A further clause, 
by Vv^hich Bulgaria was bound to allow absolutely un- 

*The Bulgarian divisions were almost double the German in 
infantry strength. 



i82 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

restricted transport of troops and material to and from 
Turkey, so soon as the Way through Serbia, the Dan- 
ube route, or through communication via Rumania 
should be open, may seem superfluous, but was never- 
theless advisable, having regard tO' conditions in the 
Balkans. 

The agreement gave us the long yearned for oppor- 
tunity to act energetically in clearing up the position 
in the south-east, where there was much to be gained. 

If we succeeded in eliminating Serbia as a serious 
factor in the v\^ar — and of that we had no doubt — 
the threat to the Austro-Hungarian flank, and with 
it the whole of the South Slav danger, would dis- 
appear. 

The establishment of communications with Turkey 
would presumably ensure the safety of the Dardanelles 
and the final isolation of Russia from her Entente 
partners. It also gave prospects of new possibilities 
for the Turkish operations in Asia. 

The adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, 
and the successes which were soon obtained in Serbia 
as a result, could not fail to have an effect on the 
attitude of Rumania. 

Sources of supply for foodstuffs, and important raw 
materials, especially copper, were rendered available. 

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SERBIA 

In view of the above facts, the Germans of necessity 
attached the greatest weight to the smooth and 
punctual carrying out of the agreement. Accordingly, 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 183 

when in the middle of September the Austro-Hun- 
garian G.H.Q, stated that, as a consequence of the 
initially successful Russian counter-offensive in 
Volhynia and East Galicia, which is dealt with in the 
previous chapter, it was not in a position to fulfil the 
obligations it had undertaken, and when the German 
liaison officer in Southern Hungary reported that he 
did not think that the Austro-Hungarian troops that 
were already assembled there were capable of offensive 
fighting, we did not hesitate to send to the Serbian 
frontier, to replace the four Austro-Hungarian 
divisions ^ that thus fell out, an equal number of 
German troops beyond the divisions agreed on. To 
secure their deployment at the proper time it became 
necessary to withdraw one division from the Western 
front, in spite of the anxious position there. It was 
only possible to take this risk because the loth Army 
Corps and other troops following them were already 
on their way from the northern part of the Eastern 
front to reinforce our troops in the French theatre. 

The hope that the campaign against Serbia could 
be carried through rapidly was based on the fact that 
both the relative strengths of the forces available and 
the strategical position favoured the allied forces. 

The Serbian troops that were still fit for battle were 
estimated to number in all 190,000 to 200,000. Our 
troops available against them were some 330,000, who 

1 In fact, the Austro-Hungarians did later send more than 
just the two divisions; some of the troops, it is true, being of 
very limited value. 



\ 



184 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

in the main must have been superior in military value 
to the Serbians. The latter could hardly be expected 
to withstand the effects of massed heavy artillery or 
of trench mortar batteries. 

Our geographical position in relation to Serbia en- 
abled us to undertake effective enveloping operations 
from the outset. We could not, it is true, take full 
advantage of this circumstance, as the Austro-Hun- 
garian troops stationed in Bosiji^ and Herzegovina, 
weakened by drafts for the Isonzo front, were not 
really equal to undertaking an offensive movement into 
Serbia. We were content that they were strong 
enough for their other task of holding the Montene- 
grins in check by their presence, little as one believed 
in the offensive capacity of the sons of the Black 
Mountain. The poor condition of the communica- 
tions rendered it impossible to assemble any German 
formations on the Bosnian-Serbian frontier, and ac- 
cording to our reports there was no possibility of 
their early improvement. 

We had accordingly to abandon the scheme of at- 
tacking the Western flank of Serbia also, confining 
ourselves to a simultaneous advance against the North- 
em and Eastern fronts. The prospects were still 
unusually favourable. On each of the two fronts we 
had forces available which were certainly superior to 
the whole of the Serbian forces in fighting value, if 
not in numbers. The enemy could thus not use the 
advantage he possessed in having interior lines, even 
apart altogether from the fact that his communications 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 185 

were insufficient for such purposes. It became the 
more difficult for him to follow this course, the more 
he decided to divert some of his forces to meet the 
troops which were to move, far to the south, from 
Bulgaria into Macedonia to cut the line to Salonica, 
the only railway link between Serbia and the outside 
world. 

The orders for the deployment of the troops and the 
beginning of operations were drawn up in agreement 
with our allies, in the light of these considerations. 

The 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army of four divisions, 
under General von Kovess, reinforced by a German 
army corps of three divisions, assembled on the Save 
and at the confluence of the Save and Danube. The 
main body of this army was to force the crossing at 
Belgrade, and the remainder at Kupinovo, and then, 
after taking precautionary measures against danger 
from the Kolubara region, to advance via Topola in 
the direction of Kragujevatz, 

A new nth German Army, under General von Gall- 
witz, who was succeeded in the command of the 12th 
Army by Infantry General von Fabeck, marched, seven 
German divisions strong, along the Danube to the east 
of the mouth of the Temes, facing the bridging points 
that had been reconnoitred there. Their main forces 
were to cross at Ram, and the rest at Semendria. A 
feint crossing was to be arranged at Orsova. The 
army was then to advance up the Morava. 

Of the I St Bulgarian Army under General Bojadien, 
the 6th division was assembled at Kula, the 5th and 



i86 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

8th round Bielogradchik, and the ist at Zaribrod, 
while the 7th division and the Macedonian legion, 
consisting of volunteers, assembled at Kostendil. 
This 7th division and the legion were later formed 
into the 2nd Bulgarian Army, under General Todorow. 
The 6th division was to move on Zaichar, sending a 
detachment to Negotin to open the Danube, the 5th 
and 8th were to move on Nish via Kniazhevatz, and 
the 1st via Pirot to the same point. The 7th division 
and the Macedonian legion were to be moved into the 
Vardar valley to cut the Nish-Salonica railway as soon 
as possible. 

The 6th October was fixed for the opening of the 
operations of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army and of 
our nth, and the nth October for the Bulgarians. 
It was possible to fix so early a date, as the prepara- 
tions for the deployment and the river crossing had 
been absolutely completed. As early as the spring 
German General Staff officers had reconnoitred the 
whole position in minutest detail, and every measure 
of preparation then possible had been taken. Every 
battery position, every possible bridging point, the 
billeting of the troops on assembly, and their supplies, 
were settled, and bridges and other crossing material, 
ammunition and commissariat, were all in readiness. 
The troops had virtually nothing to do but to march 
up and proceed instantly with the crossing. The far- 
sighted officer in charge of these preparations, Lieut.- 
Colonel Hentsch, of the Saxon General Staff, joined 
the staff of the Mackensen army group as Quarter- 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 187 

master-General. It was mainly due to his work that ) 
we were able to achieve the effect of surprise by not ^^ 
bringing the troops up until the last moment, and, 
indeed, that the whole tremendous military undertak- . 
ing of the crossing of the Save and Danube was car- 
ried smoothly through without a hitch. 

In the south-eastern theatre the program only 
suffered one modification, and that through the Bul- 
garians. It soon became clear that, owing to difficul- 
ties of administration, they would only be able to 
mobilize by the 2rd September, instead of the 21st, 
and that their main body would not be ready to move 
on the nth October, and in all probability not until 
the 15th. As, however, they asserted positively that 
they would cross the Macedonian frontier on the nth 
October, in spite of this delay, no alteration was made 
in the date (the 6th October) fixed for the opening of 
operations of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian and our nth 
Armies. We hoped by this means to have a good 
effect on the determination of the Bulgarians, and we 
were not disappointed. 

THE GREAT RELIEF OFFENSIVES IN THE WEST, END OF 
SEI'TEMBER, I915 

A more serious interruption to our plans seemed 
at the outset to threaten from events which occurred 
in the French theatre of war at the time of the deploy- 
ment against Serbia. 

The failure of the long-expected attacks to ma- 
terialize had led us in August to doubt whether the 



i88 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

attempt at relief, now that it could no longer be of use 
to the Russians, would be undertaken at all. For a 
time we were disposed to regard the enemy's advanc- 
ing preparations for attack as a feint. However, from 
the beginning of September onwards, more and more 
frequent reports went to show that we had to expect 
an early attack by the British, supported by the French, 
in the neighbourhood of Lille, with a simultaneous of- 
fensive by the French alone in Champagne. 

In Flanders and Artois, on a front of over 80 kilo- 
metres as the crow flies, the 6th Army of the Crown 
Prince Rupert of Bavaria (Chief of Staff being 
Major-General Kuhl) held the line with sixteen 
divisions from south of Ypres, immediately east of 
Armentieres, west of Lens, east of Arras, to a point 
15 kilometres from the latter town. 

In Champagne, the 3rd Army, under General von 
Einem, with seven and a half divisions, held, on a 
front of fully 50 kilometres, positions which ran from 
north of Rheims to Massiges. In touch on the left, 
as far as the Argonne, stood the right wing of the 
5th Army of the German Crown Prince, with two 
divisions in line. 

On the 2 1 St September drum fire began against the 
6th Army, and on the 22nd against the 3rd and the 
right wing of the 5th, of an intensity similar to that 
vsrhich we had for the first time employed on a large 
scale at Gorlice-Tarnow. 

Reinforcements from the scanty general reserve had 
already been sent to the threatened armies, and were 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 189 

now sent in greater numbers. The 3rd and 6th 
Armies received heavy batteries and one infantry- 
division each, the 3rd having a brigade of infantry in 
addition. 

The bombardment raged with almost undiminished 
fury in Champagne until the 24th, and in Flanders 
until the 25th September. On those days the infantry 
attacks began on both fronts. 

Although the terrible gunfire had caused hitherto 
unheard-of destruction ' both in and far behind our 
positions, in addition to very heavy losses of men, 
the French were unable to gain any vital advantages 
on the 24th in Champagne. The English, on the other 
hand, on the first day of their attack, by the employ- 
ment of gas, succeeded in occupying our foremost posi- 
tions at Loos over a breadth of 12 kilometres. They 
were, however, unable to develop this success. Inces- 
sant counter-attacks of the brave defenders not only 
prevented this, but also recovered substantial portions 
of the lost positions. The French, who attacked the 
6th Army on both sides of the Scarpe in conjunction 
with the English, achieved no successes worthy of 
mention at all. 

The position in Champagne on the 25th September 
was much more serious. Continuing their offensive, 
the French on this day, on and to the east of the 
Souain-Somme-Py road, with seventeen divisions, 
drove the remnants of two German divisions, on a 
front of 23 kilometres, with a depth of 4 kilometres, 
back into their rear positions, which unfortunately had 



190 THE GERMAN GENERAL" STAFF 

also been shot to pieces, A serious crisis arose, lead- 
ing the Staff of the 3rd Army to consider the advis- 
ability of a further withdrawal of the whole army 
front. Such a step would of necessity have led to 
very serious consequences, firstly in the moral effect, 
which would inevitably have been general, secondly in 
the tactical results on the neighbouring fronts, and 
finally by giving space to the enemy masses, which 
were crowded helplessly together against our present 
positions, to escape from their momentarily intolerable 
situation. 

Fortunately the proposed withdrawal was never 
carried out. On the urgent advice of the Chief of 
Staff of the neighbouring 5th Army, Major-General 
Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, the consideration of the 
matter was adjourned until the arrival of G.H.Q., who 
were on their way to the Western front, and after 
their arrival at noon on the 25th September, there 
was no further question of any voluntary withdrawal. 
There were still reserves available. They at once 
threw into Champagne one of the last divisions of 
the general reserve from Alsace, and the loth Army 
Corps, the Guards Corps going to the 6th Army. 
Both these corps had just reached Belgium from the 
East. Lieut. -Colonel von Lossberg, who had hitherto 
occupied a prominent position in the operations de- 
partment of G.H.Q., was appointed as Chief of Staff 
of the 3rd Army. In addition, the forward reserves 
of General von Heeringen's 7th Army, on the Aisne, 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 191 

where it was clear that no attacks were in prospect, 
were withdrawn and sent to the 3rd Army. 

This additional strength sufficed to some extent to 
break the weight of the enemy's first attacks on the 
fighting fronts, but it was insufficient to repel the 
whole offensive, which lasted for many days. The 
heavy fighting wore down the strength even of forma- 
tions freshly thrown in, all the more quickly because 
heavy rain had set in on the evening of the 25th 
September, turning the shell-torn battlefield into a 
marsh. True, the difficulties thus caused were no 
doubt even more noticeable in attack than in defence. 
The enormous numerical superiority against which we 
had to contend is well illustrated by the fact that there 
were thrown in against the 3rd Army no less than 
thirty-five French divisions, with 2,000 heavy and 
3,000 field guns. Behind them were numerous cavalry 
divisions, ready to attack, of which considerable por- 
tions actually took part. 

Accordingly, in the first half of October, G.H.Q. 
had many worn troops replaced by fresh divisions, 
drawn from quiet sectors of the front, until the ar- 
rival of further forces from the East relieved them of 
the task. Apart from the modest initial successes 
above-mentioned, the enemy had no further advan- 
tages of any importance to record. The fighting did 
not, however, die down in Flanders until the 13th, 
or in Champagne until the 20th October. 

"The greatest battle of all time," as a com- 



192 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

mander of an English guards division described it in 
divisional orders on the eve of the battle, had been 
fought. But it had not achieved the success con- 
templated by the French C.-in-C, General Jofifre, in 
his battle orders.^ 

^The order ran as follows: 

" G.H.Q., Western Army, 

" September 14th, 1915. 
"To THE General Officers Commanding: 

" The spirit of the troops and their self-sacrifice are the most 
important condition of the attack. The French soldier fights all 
the more bravely, the better he understands the importance of 
the offensive operation, and the more he trusts in the measures 
taken by his leaders. It is accordingly essential that ofHcers of 
all ranks from to-day onwards should explain to their subordi- 
nates the favourable conditions under which the next attack 
undertaken by the French forces will take place. The following 
points must be known to all ranks: 

" I. It is necessary for us to take the offensive in the French 
theatre, in order to drive the Germans out of France. We shall 
both free our fellow-countrymen from their twelve months' slav- 
ery, and wrench from the enemy the valuable possession of our 
occupied districts. In addition, a splendid victory over the 
Germans will induce neutral countries to reach a decision in our 
favour, and will force the enemy to slacken his attacks on the 
Russians in order to meet our offensive. 

"2, All possible steps have been taken to secure that this at- 
tack can be undertaken with substantial forces and tremendous 
material resources. The incessant improvement in the defen- 
sive arrangements of our inner lines, the ever more extensive 
employment of territorial troops at the front, and the increasing 
number of British troops landed in France, have enabled the 
C.-in-C. to withdraw from the front a large number of divisions, 
whose strength is equal to that of several armies, and to hold 
them in readiness for the attack. These forces, as also those 
that have remained in the line, are fully equipped with new 
weapons. The number of machine guns has been more than 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 193 

They had not driven the Germans out of France, 
not a single one of their countrymen had been freed 
from his twelve months' " slavery," and a splendid 
victory had not been won over the Germans. The 

doubled. There are large supplies of ammunition for the field 
artillery, and all worn guns have been replaced. The mechani- 
cal transport has been increased, both for supplies and for 
troop movements. Especial eflforts have been devoted to the 
heavy guns, the most important weapon of attack. A great num- 
ber of large calibre batteries have been combined and prepared, 
with a view to the next offensive operations. The ammunition 
provided for every gun is larger than the largest consumption 
yet known. 

"3. The present time is particularly favourable for a general 
attack. On the one hand, Kitchener's armies have completed 
their disembarkation in France, and on the other, the Germans 
have in the last month withdrawn troops from our front for 
employment against the Russians. Behind their thin trench lines 
the Germans have but scanty reserves. 

"4. The attack is to be general. It will consist of several 
large, simultaneous attacks, on very wide fronts. The English 
will take part with large forces, and the Belgian troops will also 
join in. So soon as the enemy is shaken, the troops on hitherto 
inactive sectors of the front will also attack, to complete the 
enemy's confusion, and force him to break up. All attacking 
troops will not merely have to take the first enemy trenches, but 
will have to force their way through, without rest day and night, 
across the second and third lines into the open country. The 
synchronization of the attacks, their weight and extent, will pre- 
vent the enemy assembling his reserves of infantry and artillery 
at one point, as he was able to do north of Arras. These cir- 
cumstances ensure success. 

"The communication of this order to the troops will not fail 
to raise their spirits to the necessary level. It is accordingly 
essential that it be communicated cleverly and in a convincing 
manner." 

On the 2ist September General Joffre added in a new order: 



194 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. 

only effect one must admit is that, not the attack, but 
the anticipation of it, and the preparation to meet it, 
had an influence on the German operations against 
Russia. But this fact cannot be credited to the battle, 
being a simple result of waging war on many fronts. 
The " greatest battle of all time " became a terrible 
defeat for the attackers. Tremendous sacrifices in 
men and material were made for a result which was 
nothing in comparison to the objectives aimed at, 
and in itself amounted to but little, for it was of no 
importance from the general point of view whether a 
few narrow sectors of the German positions had to 
be withdrawn a few kilometres or not. The defensive 
system remained absolutely unshaken. In the then 
condition of relative strength, no more could be 
achieved. 

Nor could we have done any more with all the addi- 
tional men we might have brought up by breaking 
off the Eastern operations earlier. The troops and 

" The enormous power of the blow which is to be dealt by the 
French and British troops is to be explained before the attack: 
to all regiments, in substantially the following manner : 

" There are told off for the operations : 

"35 divisions under General de Castelnau, 13 divisions under 
General Foch, 13 English divisions, and 15 cavalry divisions (in- 
cluding 5 English). 

" Three-quarters of the French forces are thus taking part in 
the general battle. They are supported by 2,000 heavy and 3,000 
field guns, whose ammunition supplies are far greater than those 
held at the beginning of the war. 

" All the conditions of a certain success are present, especially 
when one recollects that only 15 divisions and 300 guns took part 
in our last attacks in the neighbourhood of Arras." 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 195 

material available would not even then have been 
sufficient for counter-attacks, or attacks on other 
fronts, with large objectives. And to have made any 
sacrifice for the sake of local successes was not at that 
time in our interests. Without involving any preju- 
dice to the aims which we could, on a sober calculation 
of all the conditions, reasonably pursue in the East, 
the reinforcements arrived in the West at exactly the 
right moment for the task allotted to them there. Had 
they arrived earlier they might have ensured that the 
small indentations in our front should be smaller still, 
but that was of no importance for the general position, 
while their earlier recall from the Eastern front would 
have crippled the operations in progress there, the pros- 
pects of which were most emphatically described by 
the commanders on the spot as extraordinarily good. 

The earlier arrival of reinforcements from the East 
would, however, certainly have spared both leaders 
and men in France from terrible experiences. What 
G.H.Q. had to endure at that period requires no de- 
scription. 

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the German 
soldier on the Western front is entitled to most of the 
credit for the fact that the reinforcements from the 
East came up in time. His marvellous resistance in 
the pitifully shattered positions in Flanders and Cham- 
pagne warded off the danger of their reaching the 
front line too late. 

Amid death and terror he clung firm, in accordance 
with his battle orders, to the spot he had to defend, 



196 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

in countless cases even when there had long been no 
officer or N.C.O. left to set him an example. Not 
content with that, he attacked with magnificent self- 
sacrifice, the enemy masses surging over and around 
him whenever opportunity arose. Thus were formed 
firm islands and islets in the sea of destruction created 
by the enemy artillery. Against these, the first waves 
of the enemy infantry attacks were broken, but the 
masses following them pressed forward unceasingly. 
Blocks and bunches of "men formed, in which the Ger- 
man artillery tore tremendous gaps, while it became 
impossible to maintain order. Enemy reinforcements 
failed. The more men were brought up, the worse 
the position became. The offensive was throttled by 
its own mass. 

No language could be too strong to describe the 
achievements of the German troops in the Champagne 
battlefield in those days. Every great deed hitherto 
done in war paled beside their heroism. 

This tribute to the German soldier involves no de- 
preciation of his enemies. To be defeated in a fight 
against heroes is no disgrace. If the French and 
English cannot be placed on the same level as the de- 
fenders, they certainly did their duty nobly. Their 
losses are the best proof of this. The lack of success 
was due to no failure of theirs. It was probably 
mainly due to the plan of operations. The French had 
not sufficiently realized that, with the effective weapons 
of today, forces can only be advantageously massed 
for combined action within narrow limits, and that 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 197 

advantage turns to disadvantage when these limits are 
not observed. It is certain that the old phrase as to 
the impossibility of being too strong at the decisive 
moment will never lose any of its strength, but it is 
equally certain that numerical superiority alone can 
never ensure a favourable decision. 

In spite of their sorry experiences, not only in the 
Arras battle, but also in the winter battle in Cham- 
pagne, the French leaders seem to have clung to the 
conviction that a break through positions fortified by 
up-to-date means, and defended by troops of the qual- 
ity of those, especially the Germans, employed on the 
Western front, was still possible if strongly superior 
numbers could be employed. They may have been 
confirmed in their views by the success of Gorlice-Tar- 
now, coupled with the exaggerated Russian reports of 
the " masses " brought up by the Germans in that bat- 
tle. These reports would not, however, have men- 
tioned that the attack in Galicia was not undertaken 
until the Germans felt certain that they were opposed 
by troops whose morale was absolutely rotted by a 
merciless campaign. In truth, this is the chief factor 
in the solution of the problem so often discussed dur- 
ing the war, whether attempts to break through with 
the object of forcing a decision constituted a wise 
policy or not. Against an enemy in good military 
and moral condition they were certainly not to be 
recommended. Accordingly, in the whole course of 
the war, breaks-through only succeeded where this 
condition was not present. 



198 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

It would, further, be quite unjust, in describing the 
heroic deeds of the German soldiers in the defensive 
battles in the West, to forget the equally fine achieve- 
ments of their leaders. Little as these came into 
prominence in this defensive fighting as compared with 
large offensive operations, these were indeed far su- 
perior. Never in the whole history of warfare have 
human nerves been subjected to harder tests than those 
applied to the leaders in these engagements. They 
came through the test magnificently. Equal praise 
must be given to the N.C.O.'s in the trenches and else- 
where, and to the highest officers at headquarters. 

THE CROSSING OF THE DANUBE 

While the great battle in France was developing and 
raging, the deployment and preparations for attack in 
South Hungary pursued their allotted course. Instead 
of the one division that was to come from France, 
another that was on its way from Russia to the West 
was diverted to the south-east. That was the sum 
total of the influence on the Serbian campaign of all 
that the English and French had sacrificed in the 
West. 

In the course of the month of September, the Ser- 
bian shore was repeatedly shelled for purposes of de- 
ception, without any further steps being taken, but on 
the 6th October the bombardment preparatory to the 
real crossing was begun, the crossing following on the 
7th. The 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army crossed on 
the line Kupinovo-Belgrade, and the left half of our 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 199 

nth Army at Ram, the right following on the next 
day at Semendria. Feints by the troops on the Drina 
and at Orsova riveted the attention of the enemy at 
those points. Tactically, they were completely taken 
by surprise. The assurances of the Entente that the 
Central Powers could only be pretending to attack, 
and that they would reinforce the Serbians in ample 
time, had lulled the Serbian G.H.Q. into a sense of 
security. Their main forces were assembled to meet 
the Bulgarians. It was not until, at the beginning 
of October, the gravity of the danger threatening from 
the North was recognized that more or less unsys- 
tematic troop movements in that direction were under- 
taken. 

Accordingly, the 3rd Austro-Hungarian and our 
nth Army, while they were often bravely opposed, 
were nowhere resisted with real determination. The 
speed of their advance was reduced, not so much by 
the enemy's resistance as by the difficulties of ensur- 
ing supplies. Thus, the bridging material for the i ith 
Army could not be brought up until the hill country 
around Grotzka, between Belgrade and Semendria, 
had been cleared. Then bridging work was prevented 
for several days by one of the notorious Danube 
storms, called the Kossowa. It was not until the 21st 
October that we succeeded in building two bridges 
for this army. 

On this day, the heads of our columns stood roughly 
on the line Ripani, south of Belgrade, Kaliste, south- 
east of Pozarevacz. Two Austro-Hungarian Land- 



200 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Sturm brigades had crossed the lower Drina and 
reached Sabac. The ist Bulgarian Army had reached 
the Timok valley between Zajecar and Kniazevac, and 
its left wing was fighting round Pirot. The 2nd Bul- 
garian Army was approaching between Vrania and 
Kumanovo, the sector of the Vardar which it had al- 
ready cut at Veles. The railway communications of 
the Serbians to Salonica were thus broken. All the 
armies were complaining bitterly of the great diffi- 
culties caused by the lack of roads, and still more by 
the condition during wet weather of such roads as 
there were. This was especially the case with the 
3rd Austro-Hungarian Army, which, even without 
that disadvantage, found it more difficult to over- 
come the enemy resistance than the neighbouring army, 
which consisted wholly of German formations. 

G.H.Q. feared that the lagging progress of the 3rd 
Austro-Hungarian Army would lead to a general slow-' 
ing-up of the operations, and accordingly urged upon 
the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. the reinforcement of 
the army from the Isonzo front. The latter, however, 
felt unable to adopt this suggestion, as the enemy on 
the Italian front possessed a superiority of two to one. 

The position on the left wing of the nth Army, too, 
was not wholly satisfactory. The Austro-Hungarian 
group at Orsova, not, it is true, a very large one, had 
not yet succeeded in crossing the river. As a result, 
the preparations for opening communications with Bul- 
garia, which the shortage of munitions and equipment 
that was already making itself felt among the Bui- 



i 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 201 

garian forces made most urgent, could not be carried 
out. In order to clear up the situation, the Chief of 
the General Staff decided, on the 20th October, to 
bring reinforcements from the French theatre of war, 
a step which was rendered possible by the slackening 
which had meanwhile become apparent in the great 
offensive activity of the enemy in the West. The 
Alpine Corps, which had just arrived in France from 
the Tyrol, and which was so splendidly fitted for 
mountain fighting, was sent to the Banat. It had been 
withdrawn from the Tyrolese front, as not being re- 
quired there in the winter. Before, however, this 
corps had disembarked, the assistance of some small 
German forces had succeeded in getting the Orsova 
group forward and thus opening up the Danube route. 
The Alpines were thus not required at that point, and 
could be sent to the right wing of the 3rd Austro-Hun- 
garian Army, to help that to advance. The advance 
continued at all points, in spite of temporary stop- 
pages at one point or another through difficulties of 
supply or resistance by the enemy. At times consid- 
erable persuasion was required to induce the ist Bul- 
garian Army to advance. 

Nish fell on the 5th November. The central wings 
of the two Bulgarian armies occupied the capital of 
Serbia. The southern army, the 2nd, had crossed the 
line Leskovac, Vrania, Kumanovo, in the direction of 
Prishtina. It held the district of Veles. South of 
Strumitza weak attempts at attack by the French, who 
had meanwhile landed at Salonica, were easily beaten 



202 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

off. The main body of the ist Bulgarian Army had 
reached the district to the east of Alecsinac, while its 
right wing, to which the German forces that had 
crossed at Orsova had attached themselves, had ar- 
rived at Paracin. Tied down to its road transport, it 
had fallen behind the eastward column of the nth 
Army, which was already to the south-west of Paracin 
in the Morava valley. From here the front of the 
nth and of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Armies ran 
via Kralievo to Cacak. Still further to the west, 
the Austro-Hungarian brigades that had come across 
the lower Drina were at Uzice, and one Austro-Hun- 
garian division that had, after all, come from Bosnia 
lay to the east of Visegrad. 

After suffering very heavy losses in the fighting up 
to this point, the Serbians were now retreating on the 
whole front in the general direction of the plateau of 
Kossovo (" the plain of the blackbirds "), near Prish- 
tina. They offered no determined resistance save to 
the southern half of the 2nd Bulgarian Army, whose 
swift advance threatened to cut off their retreat to 
Albania, the only line of escape that still remained 
open to them. Attempts to quicken the advance of 
this army by sending portions of the 1st Bulgarian 
Army to its aid had no success. The roads and the 
problem of supply presented insuperable obstacles to 
all troop movements that could not be thoroughly 
worked out long beforehand. For this reason it 
proved impossible to employ German forces on the 
southern wing, as was repeatedly urged by the Austro- 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 203 

Hungarian G.H.Q. In addition, there was no ground 
for the fear that the Serbians might break through 
at Veles in order to join the Entente troops that were 
advancing from Salonica up the Vardar. That this 
might be attempted was within the bounds of prob- 
abihty, but it could have no prospects of success in face 
of the pressure of the main body of Mackensen's 
forces, which could operate from the North against 
the flank and rear of any such movement. Signs, too, 
of the breaking up of the Serbian Army became ever 
more clearly recognizable on the line of their retreat. 
If they were not given breathing space, their end would 
come in a few weeks. Their escape to Albania, it is 
true, could not be wholly prevented, but it could be 
rendered more difficult by accelerating the advance of 
a column of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army along 
the road from Kralievo, through Rashka, and that of 
the Bulgarians up to and beyond Prishtina in the di- 
rection of Mitrovitza. The topographical conditions 
compelled the pursuing armies simply to keep on the 
march along the few roads that were still available. 
But there was little to be feared from a flight into 
Albania. In that wild mountain country, the Ser- 
bians could not take with them artillery or transport, 
or wheeled vehicles of any description. Again, they 
could find no food there, nothing indeed but a popula- 
tion largely hostile to them, and unlikely to neglect 
the opportunity to rob them of anything they had 
left. 

In the light of this position, Mackensen's army group 



204 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

received orders on the 5th November to continue the 
operations. A request to the same effect was sent to 
the Bulgarians for their 2nd Army, which was not 
placed directly under the Field-Marshal. The concen- 
tric advance that was ordered would of necessity 
rapidly reduce the ground available for operations, 
thus forcing substantial portions of the nth Army 
into the second line. It was to this that the Austro- 
Hungarian G.H.Q. had referred in suggesting the re- 
inforcement of the Bulgarian 2nd Army by German 
troops. It has already been explained why this could 
not be done. The opportunity that thus arose of re- 
storing the German formations forced out of the line 
to their old strength by giving them good food and 
rest in more comfortable quarters in the valleys and in 
the Banat was very welcome. They were all the more 
in need of this care, as they had up to the present 
borne the main burden of the Serbian campaign, for 
the special features of which they were not adequately 
equipped. 

While the columns of the allied armies climbed up 
in the course of November to the Kossovo plateau, 
under indescribable difficulties of marching, increased 
by bad weather, and soon also by difficulties of supply, 
the question arose for urgent decision what measures, 
apart from mere defence, were to be taken against the 
Entente forces that had landed in Salonica from Gal- 
lipoli, Egypt and Northern France to relieve the 
Serbians. They had been disembarking since the be- 
ginning of October. As the Greek Government had 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 205 

not consented to this, their action involved a serious 
breach of international law, which deprived the En- 
tente even of ostensible justification for any further 
outcry against the march through Belgium as an act of 
incredible oppression. Greece did not, however, dare 
to oppose the invaders by force of arms. The de- 
fenceless position of her open coasts and towns against 
the English and French naval guns, and the fact that 
the Greek people would starve if they were deprived 
of imports by sea, were decisive of their attitude. 
Germany's allies, however, were disposed to take this 
as a ground for regarding Greece also an enemy, 
and it was not without difficulty that another point of 
view was brought to prevail. This was to the effect 
that, while Greece was certainly compelled by the letter 
of international law not to acquiesce in a breach of 
neutrality, so that her acquiescence amounted in itself 
to a breach of neutrality, yet the duty of self-preserva* 
tion prevailed over the rules of international law, and 
that this duty had forced Greece to act as she had. 
Neither the Central Powers nor Bulgaria were then 
in a position to give Greece any military assistance, or 
support in her food problems. It was, indeed, satis- 
factory enough that we succeeded in maintaining the 
friendly attitude of the Greek Government, having 
regard to the position of the country, its history, and 
the unlimited influence that the Entente were able 
to bring to bear on the Greek people. Germany had 
certainly no reason, without any perceptible military 
advantage, and merely to serve the political ambitions 



2o6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

of her allies, to procure herself a new enemy, and 
above all an enemy whose mere existence would be 
bound to have a tremendous influence on the opera- 
tions which had just begun against Serbia. In the end 
neither Austria-Hungary nor Bulgaria were able to 
deny the force and conviction of this argument. It 
was further generally recognized that, in the future 
also, everything was to be avoided that might drive 
Greece into the ranks of our enemies. 

After the Entente troops, as already mentioned, had 
been defeated by the Bulgarians in the hills to the 
south of Strumitza, they abandoned their advance in 
this direction, and marched instead up the Vardar 
valley. In the middle of November, the heads of their 
forces were on the left bank of the Cerna, facing for- 
mations from the 2nd Bulgarian Army, which had been 
diverted to meet them. The movements of the enemy 
were very slow. The inactivity of the troops in gen- 
eral led to the conclusion that they were very unwilling 
to obey orders given merely for political reasons, to 
risk their lives for Serbian interests. Nevertheless, 
if they were reinforced and advanced further, they 
might imperil our success in Serbia. Accordingly, in 
the first ten days of November, Bulgaria and the Cen- 
tral Powers, whose obligations were up to now con- 
fined to the operations against Serbia, agreed, after the 
pending operations against Serbia had been carried 
through, to take the offensive, again acting together, 
against the Entente. The Germans certainly thought 
it well to have it made clear that this agreement was 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 207 

not to be binding if the Entente extended their un- 
dertaking to a large scale Balkan operation; if that 
happened, it would have to be considered afresh 
whether an attack from our side was worth while, 
or whether it would not be better to limit ourselves 
to defending what we had gained. 

In this matter G.H.Q. acted consistently with its j 
general attitude to the Serbian undertaking. It re- 
garded it as emphatically a subsidiary operation. The 
object of the campaign would be completely achieved 
with the now impending complete defeat of the 
Serbians, which would remove the threat to the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian flank, and open the way to the Near 
East. This last circumstance even gave ground for 
hope that the enemy would abandon further attempts 
to force the Dardanelles, and in any event such at- 
tempts could no longer have much prospect of success. 
From the standpoint of the general conduct of the 
war, the only thing left to do would be to secure the 
advantages gained. If the opportunity arose inci- 
dentally to do military .or moral harm to the Entente, 
it should, of course, not be missed. The idea, how- 
ever, of seeking the decision of the war in the Bal- 
kans was wholly unsound. The German troops neces- 
sary for this could not be spared from the main 
theatres of war. The Entente could send a division to 
Macedonia more easily than the Germans could a bat- 
talion. But even if the necessary forces could have 
been made available, their effective employment would 
have been rendered extremely difficult by the nature of 



2o8 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

the country, the difficulties attending the restoration of 
the only railway communication, and the probability 
that its capacity would remain permanently very lim- 
ited. The employment in that inhospitable country of 
even a single German soldier more than was necessary, 
or for a moment longer than was necessary, to achieve 
our aim, that is, the security of our gains, could only 
be justified by some advantage of far-reaching im- 
portance to the decision of the war. 

Holding the views above stated, the Chief of the 
General Staff found himself to some extent in dis- 
agreement with the army chiefs of our allies. They 
both attached importance to the presence of German 
troops in the Balkans in as great strength and for as 
long a time as possible. In addition to the purely 
military advantages which they stood to gain by this, 
they hoped also for a furthering of their political aims. 
It was obviously useful for them to be able, as a result 
of the presence of strong German forces, to have por- 
tions of their own troops available for particular ain^s 
of their own. This motive was especially noticeable 
in the case of the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. One 
must admit that the occupation of Montenegro, car- 
ried out by them in January, 19 16, was of military 
importance as a protection to our flank, but the ac- 
companying advance into Central Albania clearly had 
no value. Both these steps, however, occupied troops 
which could have been much better employed in 
Galicia or on the Isonzo. 

This divergence of views in fundamental questions 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 209 

relating to the conduct of the war possessed elements 
of danger that were not to be underestimated, and 
which were increased by the coolness that had ex- 
isted from the first in the relations between Austria- 
Hungary and Bulgaria. The position was not im- 
proved when the two armies were brought into closer 
contact, and the points of difference brought about 
actual friction. The Bulgarian leaders were greatly 
hurt by the tendency, apparently firmly rooted among 
the Austrians, to regard, and at times even to treat, 
their allies in the Balkans less as allies than as aux- 
iliaries of inferior standing. Austro-Hungarian 
G.H.Q. complained bitterly of the Bulgarians* thirst 
for territory and of their arrogance. I make no at- 
tempt here to decide which party was in the right. 
In any case, the unhappy relations between the two 
allies did not assist the conduct of operations, and 
frequently called for the mediation of the third party 
in the alliance. So far this had always been success- 
ful, but it was doubtful whether it would always be 
available at the right moment when the attention of 
the Chief of the General Staff was more fully taken 
up with other theatres of war. 

Having regard to this situation, the Chief went into 
the question whether it would not be advisable to give 
an officially recognized and, therefore, more binding 
form to the command of the campaign, which in fact 
lay in German hands, but was exercised formally on 
the basis of complete equality. The new form would 
bring us the valuable advantage of the right of sup- 



2IO THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ervision and the unconditional veto, but it was to be 
feared that it would not secure more willing co-opera- 
tion from our allies, but would be more likely to have 
the opposite effect. In addition, a public raising of 
the standing of Germany in the alliance would have 
an unfavourable effect on the respect commanded by 
the Austro-Hungarian Government in the interior of 
the Dual Monarchy. The position would have been 
different if such a regime had prevailed from the out- 
break of war. At the present time its introduction 
would have been taken by ill-disposed persons of 
whom there were many in Austria-Hungary, as ^n 
expression of mistrust. Finally, one thought one was 
justified in expecting that the experience gained up to 
date in the campaign would enable us to avoid serious 
friction in the future. Accordingly, although both 
Bulgaria and Turkey favoured the proposal, the Chief 
of the General Staff let it drop. 

The subsequent course of events in the Balkans fully 
confirmed the correctness of the view taken by G.H.Q. 

The advance of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian and our 
nth Army to the decisive point in the neighbourhood 
of Prishtina did not, unfortunately, keep to its pro- 
gram. In the end, the advance could only be main- 
tained by the withdrawal of half of each of the armies 
in the neighbourhood of the railways, and the hand- 
ing over of their supply columns to the troops that 
remained on the march, in order to enable the latter 
to continue. The distant co-operation of these troops, 
however, had its effect on a despairing attack delivered 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 211 

by the Serbians on the 22nd November at Ferizovic, 
depriving it of all hope of success once it had failed to 
break immediately through the brave Bulgarians. 
The Serbian Army moved quickly to its fate. In the 
last days of November and on the ist December it was 
repeatedly defeated by the Bulgarian troops pursuing 
it towards Prizren, being in part taken prisoner and in 
part scattered. Weaker Serbian groups, with which 
the heads of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian and our nth 
Armies came into contact, met with the same fate. 
Only a few miserable remnants escaped into the Al- 
banian mountains, losing the whole of their artillery 
and everything else that they could not carry. There 
was no longer a Serbian Army. The Bulgarians con- 
tinued the pursuit with small bodies across the 
Djakova-Dibra line, occupied Ochrida, and dispatched 
a column to Monastir. A few small German infantry 
and cavalry formations were attached to this column, 
both for purposes of deception and to secure the pres- 
ence of capable and acceptable negotiators in the event 
of any encounter with Greek troops. To the north 
of the Bulgarians, portions of the 3rd Austro- 
Hungarian Army, repelling without difficulty 
some Montenegrin battalions that had moved across 
the frontier, advanced on Ipek, Rozaz and Bjelo- 
polje. 

The English and French troops dispatched from 
Salonica had not succeeded in altering the closing act 
of the Serbian drama. As soon as they realized this, 
they withdrew, in the latter half of November, the 



212 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

portions of their armies that had advanced over the 
Cerna back behind the sector, and now held against 
the main body of the 2nd Bulgarian Army a line run- 
ning from the Cerna, west of Kavadar, behind the 
Vardar to Mirovca, and thence to Lake Doiran. 
Their condition led to the conclusion that, in spite of 
the shortness of their rear communications, they had 
not succeeded in satisfactorily arranging the question 
of supply. 

The plan of a combined attack upon this force by 
German and Bulgarian troops, under the supreme com- 
mand of Field-Marshal von Mackensen, had already 
of necessity been given up, for the time being, in the 
middle of November. On closer examination it had 
appeared that, before the restoration of the Vardar 
valley railway via Nish to Kumanovo (end of De- 
cember), it would be impossible to supply any more 
troops in that district than the Bulgarians that w6re 
already there. Even these were only just able, and 
that irregularly, to bring up enough to cover their re- 
quirements in foodstuffs and other essentials. The 
plan was carefully taken up again for a moment at the 
end of November, on apparently reliable reports that 
the Entente did not intend to hold Salonica, for the 
Chief of the General Staff certainly did not propose 
to let slip the chance of a victory apparently so easy 
and certain. It was intended to limit the number of 
the troops as far as possible, and to carry nothing 
that could possibly be dispensed with, in order to re- 
duce the difficulties of the enterprise. But this plan 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 213 

was not carried out. Acting on advice from German 
G.H.Q. to seize independently any opportunity that 
arose, and on the news that a retirement (probably 
the result of reports as to the advance of the German- 
Bulgarian column on Monastir) was in progress 
among the Entente troops, Bulgarian G.H.Q., in full 
knowledge of the position, ordered an attack of the 
2nd Army on the 5th December. The enemy were 
thrown back, and retreated southwards on the whole 
front, suffering considerable further losses as they 
went. They were unable even to maintain a covering 
position level with Lake Doiran, the Bulgarians threat- 
ening to outflank it by swift and skilful reinforce- 
ment of their troops to the east of the lake. The 
Entente troops fell back in bad order to Salonica, 
where they eagerly took up their position in the for- 
tified lines which had been under construction since 
the beginning of October. 

At the request of German G.H.Q., the 2nd Bul- 
garian Army in their pursuit did not cross the Greek 
frontier. The army was already suffering consider- 
able want, which it was impossible to remedy, as the 
allies had made no timely provision to deal with the 
situation, and the enemy in falling back had com- 
pletely destroyed such few communications as there 
were, including the railway line in the Vardar valley. 
It could not be expected that the Bulgarians under 
such conditions could achieve any rapid successes 
against prepared positions, and this all the less be- 
cause the entry of the Bulgarians alone into Greek 



214 -THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

territory would have forced even the Greek Govern- 
ment to take active steps against them, and because 
the enemy were being continually reinforced from 
Gallipoli. The operation seemed thus to be develop- 
ing into an imdesirable adventure. 

At the end of December, 19 15, and the beginning 
of January, 1916, the question of an attack on Sal- 
onica was again thoroughly examined more than once. 
The Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. was more favourably 
inclined towards the proposal than the Bulgarian, al- 
though the former were unable to provide troops for 
the enterprise. The Bulgarians appeared less enthusi- 
astic, as they had already completely achieved their 
main war aim, the conquest of Macedonia. This cir- 
cumstance alone made the whole undertaking some- 
what unsafe. It is not customary among Balkan 
troops to fight well in a cause of which they cannot 
see the direct advantage for their own people. Ac- 
cordingly, when Field-Marshal von Mackensen re- 
ported in the middle of January that, in view of the 
difficulties of supply, a fully prepared offensive against 
Salonica could not be begun before the middle of 
April, it was ordered that, while the main grouping 
of the troops for the offensive was to be carried out, 
the troops concerned were in the first place to con- 
struct permanent positions. 

G.H.Q. took up a less favourable attitude to the 
continuation of the offensive against Salonica with the 
aid of any substantial body of German troops so 
soon as it appeared that such an offensive was no 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 215 

longer necessary to compel the Entente to renounce 
their designs in the Dardanelles. This was the case 
at the beginning of January. On the morning of the 
8th January, 19 16, the last English soldier left Gal- 
lipoli. More German troops than were absolutely nec- 
essary for the support of the Bulgarian fronts could 
no longer be left in the Balkans. They could only 
have served particular political aims of the Austro- 
Hungarians or the Bulgarians, and not the general 
aims of the war, not to mention any German aim. 
The entry of the Bulgarians into Salonica would of 
necessity have had a very unfavourable effect on 
Greek feeling towards the Central Powers. In all 
probability a campaign against Greece would have be- 
come inevitable. The only advantage that Germany 
could have reaped frorn such a campaign would have 
been to secure submarine bases in the Peloponnesus, 
certainly a substantial advantage, but by no means 
sufficient to outweigh the inevitable disadvantages. It 
was certain that our allies would have made further 
large demands upon our resources for the campaign, 
which would have been highly unwelcome to us. We 
were also reluctant to be faced by the increased Aus- 
tro-Hungarian claims in the Balkans, which would 
have been certain to follow any Bulgarian successes. 
At the very least grave differences between the allies 
were to be feared. The possession of Salonica must 
have been very tempting to both of them. It was 
further to be feared that the attention of the Austro- 
Hungarians would be attracted to the Bc^lkans far 



^ 



2i6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

more than was desirable in the interests of the main 
fronts, a danger, indeed, that already existed. It is 
true that the expulsion of the Entente would have had 
the very desirable result for the Bulgarians that they 
would have been free from any direct danger, but 
that was only of very doubtful advantage for the gen- 
eral conduct of the war. The Entente troops that 
would be released in this way would be available for 
employment in other theatres of war, while the Bul- 
garians would not. They were not fitted for such 
employment, nor was their Government bound to sup- 
ply them. Any alteration of the convention on this 
point would have been very difficult to secure under 
the pressure of Bulgarian public opinion, which was 
wholly unfavourable to such foreign undertakings. 
The Bulgarian people could only be favourably in- 
fluenced in their attitude by feeling that they were 
still threatened and under a duty to fight, and by hav- 
ing an attractive war aim before their eyes. From 
the general point of view of the Central Powers there 
was little objection to the development of trench war- 
fare in the Balkans, which was so greatly feared by 
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. If the Bulgarians 
kept strong detachments of the Entente forces occu- 
pied by these means, they would be rendering a great 
service to the common cause. This was quite pos- 
sible. One could justifiably hope that the Entente 
would not, by a voluntary evacuation or by the em- 
ployment of insufficient forces, expose themselves to 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 217 

a second severe moral defeat such as they had just 
suffered at the Dardanelles. On the other hand we 
had no need to fear a defeat, even if the Bulgarians 
were left with the smallest possible support of German 
troops. The lie of the ground was extraordinarily 
favourable to defence in the lines now held by Macken- 
sen's Army Group. If the enemy had already failed, 
under similar conditions, to achieve any decisive suc- 
cess in the Vosges, in the Carpathians, or on the 
Isonzo, in spite of great efforts, the same result could 
be confidently expected here, where the climate and 
many other circumstances favoured the defence. 

In the permanent positions the ist Bulgarian Army, 
under General Bojadieff, with two Bulgarian infantry 
divisions and one brigade of cavalry, occupied a line 
from Lake Ochrida, through Monastir, where there 
was a German detachment attached to the army, fur- 
ther along the Greek frontier southwards and south- 
west-wards from Prilep. It had thrown out covering 
forces on the flanks in Albanian territory to Dibra and 
Elbasan. The nth Army, under General von Gall- 
witz, with two German and two and a half Bulgarian 
divisions, held the Greek frontier from Natja as far 
as Belasica Planina, to the north of Lake Doiran. 
In reserve behind this army the German Alpine Corps 
lay around Veles and Stip. The 2nd Bulgarian 
Army, under General Todorow, had moved with three 
Bulgarian divisions on to the Strumitza-Jenikioj- 
Petric-Nevrokop line. The German troops not in- 



2i8 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

eluded here, who had crossed the Danube in October, 
were in part in rest camp in Southern Hungary, and 
in part already back on the Western front. Instead 
of the one complete German division demanded by 
Bulgaria in the convention, we had sent to the Black 
Sea, with their consent, merely a strengthened brigade 
of the loist division; the position there made this re- 
duction possible. The German troops remaining in 
the Balkans with the Bulgarians did everything that 
lay in their power to assist their allies in the conduct 
of trench warfare, for which they were temperament- 
ally less fitted, and insufficiently trained and equipped. 
H success was only slow in this, the main fault lay 
with the difficulties experienced by the teachers in 
making themselves understood by their pupils owing 
to the differences of language. 

The crossing the Greek frontier from the permanent 
positions was for the time being only permitted to 
airmen, in reprisals for an Anglo-French air raid on 
Monastir, and in cases where the tactical position im- 
peratively demanded. This restriction was due to con- 
sideration for the difficult position of the Government 
and the King of Greece, a consideration similar to that 
which had weight in many decisions taken during the 
Balkan campaign. It was never allowed to prevail 
over military arguments, but the Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff thought it wise to give effect to it wherever 
this was possible without injury to military interests. 
In difficult circumstances the Government and the 
King had faithfully kept the promise they had given 



ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THROUGH 219 

to Germany, and she had not so many friends in the 
world that she could allow herself to throw one away, 
least of all one who had shown herself capable of 
disinterested action. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 

The campaign of 191 5 had taken a course other than 
might have been expected at the beginning of the 
fighting season. 

We had been compelled to abandon our intention of 
conducting the operations in the West in such a way 
that the French and English would lose all hope of 
changing the situation in their favour before France 
bled to death. The very moderate achievements of 
the Allied Army, due far more to the domestic cir- 
cumstances of the Dual Monarchy than to the enemy, 
had prevented its realization. We had, therefore, 
been compelled, so far as the Western theatre was con- 
cerned, to be satisfied with holding the line we had 
won. Thanks to the wonderful bearing of the Ger- 
man troops our defence had been brilliantly successful, 
a defence which can surely have had no equal in the 
past and which the future will find it hard to match. 
The tremendous moral impetus which the field-army 
received from the spirit prevailing among the vast 
majority of the people at home played an overwhelm- 
ing part. 

In the East we had not reached the goals we had 
set before us. They had not included the total de- 

220 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 221 

struction of the Russian Armies. We had kept within 
the limits of the possible in confining ourselves to par- 
alysing the offensive power of the colossus so ef- 
fectively that recovery would hardly be possible. 

If the troops, both officers and men, of the Central 
Powers did their duty in the East serious danger from 
that quarter was no longer to be apprehended. Dis- 
tant, but clearly recognizable, clouds already an- 
nounced the .approach of the revolutionary storm 
which was to burst over the realms of the Czar. 

The alliance with Bulgaria and the destruction of 
the Serbian Army had opened the road to the south- 
east. Any future menace from that army or from 
the direction of the Dardanelles seemed to have been 
removed once and for all. 

The position of Austria-Hungary had been relieved 
to a quite extraordinary degree. The Serbian danger 
was a thing of the past, the Rumanian had been re- 
duced to a minimum. The tactics adopted against 
Italy had been magnificently justified and there was no 
ground for doubting that they would continue to 
prove successful in the future. 

From these successes we had to draw the appropri- 
ate lessons for the conduct of the operations in the 
coming year. 

The Austro-Hungarian General Staff, as a result 
of their consideration of this matter, did not hesitate 
in the middle of December, 19 15, to contemplate an 
offensive against Italy. In order to have Austro-Hun- 
garian forces commensurate with such a task at their 



222 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

disposal they asked us to leave nine German divisions, 
besides the German troops already in Galicia, in order 
to release Austro-Hungarian formations from the 
Galician front. On the Italian front they planned to 
attempt a break-through from the Tyrol in a south- 
easterly direction, with the right wing approximately 
on a line from Trent to Schio. The Austrian Staff 
thereby hoped to make the enormous salient described 
by the enemy lines in north-east Italy untenable and 
perhaps cut it off altogether. As soon as this opera- 
tion had rendered Italy " utterly harmless," we were 
promised that the forces thus released — forces esti- 
mated by that Staff, in any case much too generously, 
at 400,000 men — should be transported for a de- 
cisive blow on the Western front. 

This project contemplated an operation which must, 
once at least during the war, have certainly attracted 
the attention of every General Staff Officer who took 
a look at the map of the Italian theatre of war. It 
was very inviting. 

Looked at from the special Austro-Hungarian point 
of view the lights blotted out the shadows. Free 
from cares as regards all other fronts, the Dual Mon- 
archy could concentrate its whole strength against 
Italy. In that country it saw its own private enemy. 
Against it advantages were to be obtained which lay 
outside the sphere of interests of the great ally in the 
North. Such a victory was not to be shared with 
another. 

But from the point of view of the war as a whol^ 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 223 

the matter appeared in a different light. To put an- 
other nine German divisions into the front line in 
Galicia would have further enabled our enemies in the 
West to complete and augment their equipment and 
meant complete inactivity, so far as we were concerned, 
on the German fronts. We could not even estimate 
when that situation would end. We could not allow 
the troops in the West, who had already endured and 
suffered heavily from that situation for more than a 
year, to go on doing so indefinitely. Their admirable 
courage, supported as they were in every conceivable 
way by the High Command, did not show the slightest 
signs of wavering. 

But we could not take the resjponsibility of subject- 
ing them to this new trial, especially as it meant re- 
quiring further sacrifice for the sake of an operation, 
the prospects of which, on a cool examination of all 
the circumstances, seemed necessarily small if only 
Austro-Hungarian forces were to be employed in it. 
We could not trust the execution of so great an un- 
dertaking to our ally alone after her performances in 
Galicia and Serbia. 

It is true that it might have been possible to employ 
the nine German divisions, which the Austrian Head- 
quarters demanded, directly in the proposed offensive 
on the Tyrolese frontier, instead of putting them into 
line in Galicia, as was suggested. They would have 
brought the winning of a great victory tangibly nearer. 
But even that would not have been sufficient to justify 
the sacrifice of German blood and all it meant. Only 



224 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

such a victory as would have definitely decided the 
war against Italy could have justified that. From the 
point of view of the war as a whole it was really im- 
material whether the Italians held their lines on the 
Alps and the Carso Plateau, as at the moment, or with- 
drew them to a position from Lake Garda to the mouth 
of the Po, or even further back. It was quite certain 
that Rome would not be compelled to abandon the war 
by any reverse, however severe, in the extreme north- 
eastern corner of the country. She could not pos- 
sibly do so against the wishes of the other Entente 
Powers, on whom she was entirely dependent for 
money, coal and food. If Italy did not go out of the 
war, no forces of the Central Powers would be re- 
leased for the French front, still less so as we de- 
scended irito the plains from our existing positions in 
the Eastern Alps and the Carso mountains, which were 
ideal for defence against superior numbers. Lastly, to 
continue the offensive against the Western Alps, more 
than three hundred miles away, was quite beyond the 
powers of the Alliance. Only there AA^ould it begin 
to have a really uncomfortable effect on the Western 
Powers. 

The Chief of the General Staff laid these views be- 
fore the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters in the fol- 
lowing telegram of December i6th, 191 5: 

" As your Excellency's proposal in the course of our 
conversation yesterday raises a question which I have 
had continuously in mind, I am able to give you my 
views on the subject in detail today. Your Excellency 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 225 

expresses the view that Germany is not doing any- 
thing for the war against Italy. 

" I do not exactly know on what reasoning that 
view is based. Every one knows that from the first 
German troops have been doing what has been for 
Austria-Hungary very useful work against Italy. 
Even Rome knows it well enough. Germany has only 
declined to declare war herself on Italy. The grounds 
for that refusal have been discussed in detail earlier, 
and been recognized as sound on all sides. Even today 
Germany would not hesitate for a moment to take part 
in active operations against Italy if her participation 
would be advantageous and if her means permitted 
it, having regard to the fact that she is bearing the 
whole burden of the war against Belgium, France and 
England, and by far the greater share of the burden 
against Russia and Serbia. The answer to this last 
question will be found in the following considerations. 

" Your Excellency is planning a thrust from the 
region of Trent on a front of about thirty miles — 
therefore up to and beyond a line approximately from 
Schio to Feltre — for which purpose eight to nine 
Austro-Hungarian divisions, to be relieved by German 
troops, are to be brought from the Galician front. 

" There is no doubt that if such an operation were 
successful it would have a very great effect. Yet all 
my ripe experience goes to show that quite five and 
twenty divisions will be needed for its execution, which 
can be neither a strategic nor tactical surprise, since the 
deployment is limited to a single railway. My doubts 



226 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

as to whether your Excellency can be in a position to 
collect, from the Italian front as well as the Galician 
divisions, such a force on the selected sector are all 
the greater inasmuch as the nature of the country 
there, the present season and the very strong positions 
held by the Italians, mean that only troops of specially 
high offensive value can be considered. I do not know 
whether it may be possible to get up the heavy artil- 
lery which will be required — we put this at not less 
than a battery for every i6o yards of front on the 
sector to be attacked — as well as the copious sup- 
plies of ammunition it needs. 

"If an offensive force of the strength mentioned 
and the requisite artillery cannot be concentrated, and 
if supply cannot be assured in continuous and abundant 
measure, on purely military grounds we can only op- 
pose the operation with all our might. As the Car- 
pathians and Masurian Lakes battles in January and 
February of this year showed us only too well, it 
would have no prospect of decisive success and only 
two certain consequences. 

" On the one hand it would make an enormous, pos- 
sibly a fatal, hole in the reserves of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Army. On the other it would impose a state 
of complete inactivity on the German fronts after the 
withdrawal of the nine divisions to the special Austro- 
Hungarian front. In the long run that could only 
be borne if we could hope that the operation would 
bring a definite decision in the war. Your Excellency 
believes you may expect such a decision. Unfor- 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 191 5 227 

tunately I cannot share your opinion. Even if the 
blow succeeds it will not be fatal to Italy. Rome will 
not necessarily be compelled to make peace because 
her army has suffered a heavy defeat in the extreme 
north-east of the country. She certainly cannot make 
peace against the wishes of the Entente, on whom she 
is absolutely dependent for money, food and coal. 
Nor do I believe that it would have the slightest in- 
fluence on England and Russia if she threatened them 
that she would have to desert them or regaled them 
with pictures of her misery. On the contrary, I think 
it very probable that if the worst came to the worst 
these two pillars of the Entente would not be deeply 
grieved to see a partner who did so little and asked so 
much out of the business altogether. He would still 
be their slave. 

" After this explanation your Excellency will not be 
surprised if I recommend that the Austro-Hungarian 
General Staff should hand over to the German High 
Command all the troops it can make available, after 
making provision for the unconditional security of 
their positions against any attack on the Italian fron- 
tier and in Galicia, as compensation for the German 
divisions attached to the army group south of the 
Pripet.^ 

^ According to the agreement between the two General Staffs, 
the security of the sector of the Eastern front south of Pripet 
was entrusted exclusively to Austria-Hungary. The leaving of 
two German divisions in the Southern Army east of Lemberg 
was justified by the fact that two Austro-Hungarian divisions 
were attached to Prince Leopold's Army Group in the German 



228 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

" There is no intention of using any such accession 
of strength for offensive purposes, but these forces 
might be put to very good use by releasing German 
units from the front which would then be available 
for active operations. I have not yet definitely de- 
cided where these active operations are to take 
place." 1 

The Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. thereupon let its 
proposal drop through, insisting that they held fast to 
their view that a decisive victory against Italy was 
possible. As no new or better grounds were put for- 
ward there was nothing to make the Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff change his mind. Indeed, it was rather the 
other way when the Austrian Staff simultaneously an- 
nounced that they could not regard the Balkan cam- 
paign as closed. There was, therefore, definitely no 

sector of the Eastern front. But we had received no such com- 
pensation in the north for the German troops left behind with 
Linsingen's Army Group or those on the right wing of Prince 
Leopold's Group south of the Pripet. These troops amounted 
to more than four divisions. 

1 There was no necessity to enter more closely info this ques- 
tion in the telegram as, after my conversation with the Austro- 
Hungarian G.H.Q., there could not have been the slightest doubt 
that these " active operations " would in no case take place on 
the Eastern front, in the holding of which Aft stria-Hungary par- 
ticipated. Still less was it necessary to emphasize that there was 
no intention of employing Austro-Hungarian troops for these 
operations. 

We gave the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. more detailed informa- 
tion of our intention to open operations in the Meuse sector at the 
end of January, 1916. 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 229 

question of an operation in the Italian theatre in view 
of the fact that they were not sufficiently strong. 

The Chief of the General Staff raised no objection 
to the operation in the Balkans contemplated by Aus- 
tria-Hungary. It aimed at the occupation of Monte- 
negro, and the defeat of the weak Italian detachments 
which had meanwhile landed in Northern Albania. 
The proposal was inspired mainly by political con- 
siderations. But it could not be said that it had no 
military importance. The use of Montenegrin terri- 
tory by the Entente as a base for operations against 
Serbia or Montenegro was always possible, though not 
exactly probable in view of the character of the coun- 
try. The results at which the Austro-Hung^rian 
G.H.Q. aimed could be obtained with ease and cer- 
tainty. According to all reports no prolonged resis- 
tance was to be expected from Montenegro ; the heroic 
days of the race were apparently a thing of long ago. 
The dependence of the force the Italians had landed 
on its sea base and its very bad communications in 
Albania, not to mention its weakness in numbers, 
promised little more in the way of opposition. Every 
victory won by Austria-Hungary by her own efforts 
was bound to have a welcome effect on the morale of 
her army and the nation. It is true that there was 
always a danger that Austria-Hungary would lock up 
forces in this enterprise in a way that might adversely 
affect the conduct of the war as a whole. The Aus- 
tro-Hungarian G.H.Q. were, therefore, repeatedly and 



230 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

emphatically warned of this and also given a firm hint 
that the new undertaking gave them no right to delay 
the release of the German units in line south of the 
Pripet. 

The necessity for some such warning arose out of the 
course of events in Galicia. On December 24th, 191 5, 
the Russians attacked the Southern (General Count 
von Bothmer's) Army and the Austrian 7th Army 
under General von Pflanzer-Baltin on the whole front 
from Burkanow on the Strypa to the Rumanian 
frontier east of Czernowitz, and continued their stub- 
born efforts into the middle of January, 1916. 
Though they did not obtain the slightest success 
against the Southern Army and, thereupon, soon de- 
sisted, the fighting fluctuated for a long time on the 
front of the Austrian 7th Army, against which the 
enemy directed his chief pressure. Although the 
enemy was not in materially superior numbers this 
army only maintained its positions with difficulty. Its 
reserves had been insufficient and, further, inward de- 
fects had revealed themselves. In the end, it is true, 
the hostile attacks were, on the whole, beaten off. 
But it was to be assumed that the same internal condi- 
tions prevailed among the other Austro-Hungarian 
Armies on the Galician front, and this compelled us 
to devote serious attention to these revelations. 

The Austro-Hungarian operations in Montenegro 
and Albania progressed quickly and successfully, as we 
anticipated. The Montenegrins had been overthrown 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 231 

by the middle of January, and in February the Itahans 
were repeatedly defeated in a number of small actions 
and thrown back over the Vojusa. 

In the so-called New Year's Battle, to which I have 
just referred, the Russians had for the most part em- 
ployed half-trained troops, with few officers, and those 
of little value, for an attack at an unfavourable season 
of the year. We could therefore only assume that in 
so doing they had some special and urgent object in 
view. The only object of that kind, as far as the 
Chief of the General Staff could judge, was the hope 
of influencing the attitude of Rumania. If that judg- 
ment was right it was all the more urgent to adhere 
to our view that no great new enterprise should be em- 
barked upon before our relations to that State were 
cleared up. 

Rumania's attitude to the Central Powers had been 
obscure from the first day of the war, and after the 
death of King Charles I. in August, 19 14, became sus- 
picious. Every time Austria-Hungary suffered a re- 
verse it got worse, until it was hardly more than veiled 
hostility — only to become almost friendly as soon as 
a victory was won over Russia. 

Neither the German nor the Austrian General Staff 
had any doubt that the political leaders of Rumania 
intended to follow the same course which had led to 
such cheap victories in the last Balkan war. They only 
intended to take part in the mighty struggle when they 
could do so without risk. Accordingly they were 



232 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

postponing the day of decision and taking the greatest 
pains to avoid committing themselves in any way to 
either side. 

This waiting attitude was facilitated by the fact 
that German policy had not succeeded in peace time in 
obtaining the confirmation of the treaty concluded with 
Rumania by the Rumanian Parliament, an event which 
would alone have given it legal sanction. On the 
other hand, this attitude was rendered difficult by the 
very active party in the country which was uncondi- 
tionally pro-Russian and pro-French. This party was 
boisterously demanding Rumania's adhesion to the 
Entente, and in this they were receiving distinguished 
support from adroit diplomatists working with un- 
limited supplies of money. 

In anticipation of these developments the German 
General Staff had ceased to place any serious reliance 
in peace time on Rumania's adhesion if war broke out. 
Nevertheless, the vacillating attitude of that country 
was having unpleasant consequences for the military 
operations of the Central Powers. Austria-Hungary 
was always very sensitive to the situation in that 
quarter. Our communication with Turkey and Bul- 
garia was seriously hindered, at times almost inter- 
rupted. Rumania interpreted the principles of inter- 
national law as regards neutrality in a way that could 
not be regarded as less than benevolent to the Central 
Powers, but was none the less very questionable. 
This became more noticeable after the Entente began 
the attack on the Dardanelles. As early as the spring 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 233 

of 19 1 5 we had had to look into the question whether 
it was advisable to compel Rumania by force of arms 
to adopt an attitude more in keeping with her moral 
obligations. We had decided against such a step. As 
long as the Russian pressure on Austria-Hungary in 
Hungary and Galicia continued in full force no op- 
eration against or through Rumania was possible. 
The forces required could not be made available, even 
though the powers of resistance of Rumania could 
only be considered small in view of her lack of arms 
and ammunition. 

The question came up for consideration again when, 
at the end of the summer of 191 5, it had to be de- 
cided whether we should seek to clear our path to the 
southeast through Rumania or through Serbia. The 
Chief of the General Staff chose the Serbian route. It 
was true that Bulgaria, our new ally, saw no objection 
whatever to an attack on Rumania. Quite the con- 
trary. The healthy hatred in every Bulgarian heart 
against the treacherous foe in the Balkan War would 
have made her only too anxious to participate in other 
circumstances. On the other hand, her yet more 
ardent desire to recover possession as speedily as pos- 
sible of the old Bulgarian territory torn from her by 
Serbia as well as her defective military equipment 
made it necessary to adopt the shortest route. That 
route led through Serbia. Even apart from those con- 
siderations we should have been compelled to decide in 
favour of it. Bulgaria was not in a position to un- 
dertake operations against Rumania as long as her 



234 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

southern and western flanks were not secured against 
Greece and Serbia. The internal situation in Austria- 
Hungary just after the beginning of the ItaHan of- 
fensive made it imperative that she should be relieved 
of the Southern-Slav danger, which was always po- 
tential so long as Serbia had not been overthrown. 

Moreover, there had been a material improvement 
in Rumania's attitude after our break-through at 
Gorlice-Tarnow. Her frontiers had been thrown 
open more almost every day. The rapid overthrow of 
Serbia had intensified this favourable development. 
We got as far as negotiating for the delivery of large 
quantities of Rumania corn, which was calculated to 
relieve the approaching food and fodder famine in 
Germany, and still more in Turkey. The equally 
urgent demand for oil seemed likely to be met from 
Rumanian sources. 

Of course no one at German G.H.Q. allowed the 
accommodating spirit shown by the Rumanian au- 
thorities to blind them to their true feelings. All of 
us were perfectly clear that it was solely due to the 
compulsion of circumstances, and could become the 
reverse as soon as those circumstances changed. We 
therefore clung fast to our notion that matters must 
finally be cleared up as regards Rumania. 

It was principally with that object in view that the 
bulk of the troops withdrawn from Mackensen's 
Army Group in November and December, 19 15, and 
January, 191 6, were retained in Southern Hungary. 
When the Tsar of Bulgaria visited G.H.Q. at the be- 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 235 

ginning of 1916, the Chief of the General Staff came 
to an agreement with General Yekoff, the Bulgarian 
acting Commander-in-Chief, that an ultimatum, with 
a short period of grace, should be issued to Rumania, 
and, if no satisfactory reply to this was returned, 
joint operations were to be undertaken. It was cer- 
tainly doubtful whether it would have been possible 
for the Bulgarians to carry out the obligations they 
had undertaken. The shortage of everything, from 
which their troops on the Greek frontier were suffer- 
ing, and the very low capacity of their communications 
between that region and the Danube were serious ob- 
stacles. 

The compact was never put into execution. Ru- 
mania carried out in exemplary fashion the terms of 
the corn agreement, which had meanwhile been con- 
cluded. Besides she reinsured herself as regards the 
Entente, with whom she concluded a similar agree- 
ment. The latter, however, did not alter the fact 
that the supplies we received from Rumania warded 
off a severe famine in Germany, and especially Turkey. 
Moreover, other economic relations were once more 
established. 

The result of all this was that the political tension 
became less acute, a change which justified certain 
hopes for the future, in the opinion of the diplomatists. 
But we did not succeed, and there was, in fact, no 
prospect of our succeeding, in persuading Rumania to 
throw in her lot once and for all with the Central 
Powers by diplomatic methods. The diplomatists be- 



236 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

lieved that even the employment of the last of these 
methods, an ultimatum, was bound to fail. The mere 
issue of an ultimatum would mean a temporary inter- 
ruption of the corn deliveries, and if it were followed 
up by an allied attack on Rumania these deliveries 
would stop for an indefinite time. Having regard to 
the economic situation in Germany and Turkey such 
a turn of events was seen to be disadvantageous to us. 
The attack we had planned was abandoned for the 
present. Our renunciation was rewarded by the com- 
plete fulfilment of the agreement with Rumania, which 
made our position secure as regards food and raw ma- 
terials, the receipt of which was considered indis- 
pensable at that time. 

How difficult it is to organize the delivery of sup- 
plies of this kind from a conquered country received 
ample illustration from our experiences in Rumania — 
and the Ukraine — later on. 

In that respect our reasoning was perfectly just. 
But there is another question whether in the end it 
would not have been still better for the general course 
of the war if we had cut the knot with the sword. 
Those who incline to that view must be reminded that 
the ground on which they stand is quite weak. Could 
the Central Powers have held out if neither food nor 
oil had been supplied by Rumania in 1916? Would 
Germany have been able to maintain her line on the 
Western front in 19 16, if she had forced the battles 
of Verdun and the Somme, with a large part of her 
reserves, small enough in themselves, by the Black 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 237 

Sea. He who can answer that question uncondition- 
ally in the affirmative must be endowed with pro- 
phetic judgment. 

Nor must it be forgotten that Rumania's entry into 
the war on the side of the Entente was finally brought 
about by an event which was not foreseen and could 
not have been foreseen — the breaking of the Austro- 
Hungarian front in the summer of 19 16 by an enemy 
who for the Eastern theatre was certainly not su- 
perior. 

In the discussion of the Serbian campaign it was 
mentioned that it also put an end to any threat from 
the Dardanelles. After the English and French had 
withdrawn troops from that theatre for the defence of 
Saionica they dared not wait for the relief measures, 
which in the first place, by the supply of raw material, 
Germany organized for Turkey immediately after the 
opening of the Danube and the railway, to produce 
their effect. At the beginning of January they com- 
pletely evacuated Gallipoli once and for all. It was 
to be anticipated with certainty that after his terrible 
experiences and so serious a moral defeat, the enemy 
would not again attempt any enterprise in that quarter. 
The evacuation released forces which were large for a 
country like Turkey, which was very exhausted after 
nearly six years of continuous war. The Turkish 
Staff, always ready to make sacrifices, offered themi 
for use in Europe. 

For the present, however, such employment seemed 



238 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

to be purposeless. For the next few months in the 
European theatre nothing could be expected of troops 
which, according to German standards, were insuf- 
ficiently equipped, badly clothed and untrained. Fur- 
ther, there were insurmountable technical railway dif- 
ficulties in the way of their transport. Moreover, the 
internal situation in Turkey, and more particularly the 
Arab danger, made it imperative that they should be 
transferred to the Asiatic provinces of Turkey to re- 
lieve the pressure of the Entente in that quarter. Ac- 
cordingly we decided to do without them for the time 
being, and only suggested that such troops as could 
not be employed in Asia, owing to the low capacity of 
the one railway — and that not continuous — which 
communicated with that theatre, should in any case be 
brought up to a standard which would enable them to 
be brought to the European battlefields later on. 

As regards operations in Asia the Chief of the 
General Staff proposed a further attempt on the Suez 
Canal. As the English were directing all their ef- 
forts to the capture of Bagdad at the end of 191 5 such 
an attack seemed to have certain prospects and would 
serve to draw off British troops from Salonica, as well 
as from Mesopotamia. The employment of the troops 
to be used against the Suez Canal for the defence of 
Bagdad was impossible, owing to the difficulties of 
supply and transport. As regards that front we had 
to confine ourselves to wait for the appearance of the 
divisions which had started on their march thither 
some months before, the arrival of the war material 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 239 

which was in course of transport, and the effect of 
the presence of Field-Marshal Baron von der Goltz, 
who was also on his way there. 

On the Armenian front also there was nothing for 
it but to wait — even though a Russian offensive was 
known to be imminent. Only small reinforcements 
could be dispatched — and that quite by degrees — to 
that theatre, in view of the enormous distance, the bad 
communications, and the supply difficulties in a coun- 
try which had been drained of its resources. It was 
known that preparations for this offensive had been set 
on foot immediately after the arrival of the Grand 
Duke Nicholas, that is, in the late autumn, when, as a 
result of the defeats on the Eastern front in Europe, 
he had exchanged his command there for the command 
in the Caucasus. 

It has been said above that the Chief of the General 
Staff was unable to agree with the views of his Austro- 
Hungarian colleague as to the future plan of opera- 
tions. His own conclusions rested on considerations 
which he expressed as follows in a document written 
at Christmas, 19 15, to serve as a basis for the report 
to His Majesty the Kaiser: 

" France has been weakened almost to the limits of 
endurance, both in a military and economic sense — - 
the latter by the permanent loss of the coalfields in the 
northeast of the country. The Russian armies have 
not been completely overthrown, but their offensive 
powers have been so shattered that she can never 



240 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

revive in anything like her old strength. The army 
of Serbia can be considered as destroyed. Italy has 
no doubt realized that she cannot reckon on the realiza- 
tion of her brigand's ambitions within measurable time 
and would therefore probably be only too glad to be 
able to liquidate her adventure in any way that would 
save her face. 

"If no deductions can be drawn from these facts, 
the reasons are to be sought in many circumstances, 
the details of which there is no need to discuss. But 
the chief among them cannot be passed over, for it is 
the enormous hold which England still has on her 
allies. 

" It is true that we have succeeded in shaking Eng- 
land severely — the best proof of that is her imminent 
adoption of universal military service. But that is 
also a proof of the sacrifices England is prepared to 
make to attain her end — the permanent elimination 
of what seems to her the most dangerous rival. The 
history of the English wars against the Netherlands, 
Spain, France and Nlapoleon is being repeated. Ger- 
many can expect no mercy from this enemy, so long 
as he still retains the slightest hope of achieving his 
object. Any attempt at an understanding which Ger- 
many might make would only strengthen England's 
will to war as, judging others by herself, she would 
take it as a sign that Germany's resolution was weak- 
ening. 

" England, a country in which men are accustomed 
to weigh up the chances dispassionately, can scarcely 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 191,5 241 

hope to overthrow us by purely military means. She 
is obviously staking everything on a war of exhaustion. 
We have not been able to shatter her belief that it will 
bring Germany to her knees, and that belief gives 
the enemy the strength to fight on and keep on whip- 
ping their team together. 

" What we have to do is to dispel that illusion. 

" With that end in view, it will not, in the long run, 
be enough for us merely to stand on the defensive, a 
course in itself quite worthy of consideration. Our 
enemies, thanks to their superiority in men and ma- 
terial, are increasing their resources much more than 
we are. If that process continues a moment must 
come when the balance of numbers itself will deprive 
Germany of all remaining hope. The power of our 
allies to hold out is restricted, while our own is not 
unlimited. It is possible that next winter, or — if 
the Rumanian deliveries continue — the winter after 
the next, will bring food crises, and the social and 
political crises that always follow them, among the 
members of our alliance, if there has been no decision 
by then. Those crises must and will be overcome. 
But there is no time to lose. We must show England 
patently that her venture has no prospects. 

" In this case, of course, as in most others involving 
higher strategic decisions, it is very much easier to 
say what has to be done than to find out how it can 
and must be done. 

" The next method would be an attempt to inflict a 
decisive defeat on England on land. By that I do not 



242 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

mean here the island itself, which cannot be reached 
by our troops. Of that the navy is profoundly con- 
vinced. Our efforts can therefore be directed only 
against one of the Continental theatres where England 
is fighting. As far as our own Continent of Europe 
is concerned, we are quite sure of our troops, and are 
working with known factors. For that reason we 
must rule out enterprises in the East, where England 
can only be struck at indirectly. Victories at Salonica, 
the Suez Canal, or in Mesopotamia can only help us 
in so far as they intensify the doubts about England's 
invulnerability which has already been aroused among 
the Mediterranean peoples and in the Mohammedan 
world. Defeats in the East could do us palpable 
harm among our allies. We can in no case expect to 
do anything of decisive effect on the course of the 
war as the protagonists of an Alexander march to 
India or Egypt, or an overwhelming blow at Salonica, 
are always hoping. Our allies have not the necessary 
means at their disposal. We are not in a position to 
supply them, owing to the bad communications, and 
England, which has known how to swallow the humili- 
ations of Antwerp and Gallipoli, will survive defeats 
in those distant theatres also. 

" When we turn from them to the European theatre, 
where England can be struck at on land, we cannot 
close our eyes to the fact that we are faced with an 
extraordinarily difficult problem. 

" In Flanders, north of the Lorette ridge, the state 
of the ground prevents any far-reaching operations 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 243 

until the middle of the Spring. South of that point 
the local commanders consider that about 30 divisions 
would be required. The offensive in the northern 
sector would need the same number. Yet it is im- 
possible for us to concentrate those forces on one part 
of our front. Even if, as was planned, we collected 
a few more divisions from the German sectors in 
Macedonia and Galicia, in violation of our military 
and political convictions, as well as common prudence 
(the Army Headquarters Staffs report that is not 
feasible at all on the front north of the Pripet), the 
total reserve in France would still amount to little 
more than 25 or 26 divisions. When all these are 
concentrated for the one operation all other fronts 
will have been drained of reserves to the last man. 
The dangers that involves for our most sensitive 
points — Champagne, the Woevre, Lorraine — as 
well as the risk of being unable in any case to come to 
the help of our allies in an emergency, are more than 
any one dare undertake to face, in view of the fact 
that as a rule the modern purely frontal battle means 
a slow start. Moreover, the lessons to be deduced 
from the failure of our enemies' mass attacks are de- 
cisive against any imitation of their battle methods. 
Attempts at a mass break-through, even with an ex- 
treme accumulation of men and material, cannot be 
regarded as holding out prospects of success against 
a well armed enemy, whose morale is sound and who is 
not seriously inferior in numbers. The defender has 
usually succeeded in closing the gaps. This is easy 



244 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

enough for him if he decides to withdraw voluntarily, 
and it is hardly possible to stop him doing so. The 
salients thus made, enormously exposed to the effects 
of flanking fire, threaten to become a mere slaughter- 
house. The technical difficulties of directing and sup- 
plying the masses bottled up in them are so great as to 
seem practically insurmountable. 

" We must equally discountenance any attempt to 
attack the British sector with comparatively inadequate 
means. We could only approve that course if we 
could give such an attack an objective within reason- 
able reach. There is no such objective. Our goal 
would have to be nothing less than to drive the English 
completely from the Continent and force the French 
behind the Somme. If, at least, that object were not 
attained, the attack would have been purposeless. But 
even if it is reached, our ultimate aim will not yet 
have been secured because England may be trusted not 
to give up even then, and further, France herself 
would not have been very hard hit. For that purpose 
a second operation would have to be undertaken. It 
is very questionable whether Germany would be able 
to dispose of the forces required. The idea of pro- 
curing them on a large scale by raising new forma- 
tions cannot be entertained for this winter. In view 
of the pressing shortage of officers with sufficient 
training,, such a step is not of immediate military 
value, and threatens to impose a dangerous strain on 
the situation at home. 

" The upshot of this discussion is that the attempt 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 191 5 245 

to seek a decision by an attack on the English front in 
the West cannot be recommended, though an oppor- 
tunity of doing so may arrive in a counter-attack. 
In view of our feelings for our arch enemy in this 
war that is certainly distressing, but it can be endured 
if we realize that for England the campaign on the 
Continent of Europe with her own troops is at bottom 
a side-show. Her real weapons here are the French, 
Russian and Italian Armies. 

"If we put these armies out of the war England is 
left to face us alone, and it is difficult to believe that 
in such circumstances her lust for our destruction 
would not fail her. It is true there would be no cer- 
tainty that she would give up, but there is a strong 
probability. More than that can seldom be asked in 
war. 

" It is all the more necessary that we should ruth- 
lessly employ every weapon that is suitable for strik- 
ing at England on her own ground. Such weapons 
are the submarine war and the conclusion of a political 
and economic union between Germany, and not her 
allies only, but all States which are not yet entirely 
under England's spell. This review is not concerned 
with the formation of such a union. The solution of 
that problem is the exclusive sphere of the political 
leaders. 

" The submarine war, on the other hand, is a weapon 
to itself. It is the duty of those who are conducting 
the war to explain their attitude on this question. 

" Submarine warfare strikes at the enemy's most 



246 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

sensitive spot, because it aims at severing his oversea 
communications. If the definite promises of the naval 
authorities, that the unrestricted submarine war must 
force England to yield in the course of the year 191 6, 
are realized, we must face the fact that the United 
States may take up a hostile attitude. She cannot in- 
tervene decisively in the war in time to enable her to 
make England fight on when that country sees the 
spectre of hunger and many another famine rise up 
before her island. There is only one shadow on this 
encouraging picture of the future. We have to as- 
sume that the naval authorities are not making a mis- 
take. We have no large store of experiences to draw 
on in this matter. Such as we have are not alto- 
gether reassuring. On the other hand, the basis of our 
calculations will be materially changed in our favour 
if we can increase the number of our submarines and 
make progress with the training of their crews. For 
all these reasons there can be no justification on mili- 
tary grounds for refusing any further to employ what 
promises to be our most effective weapon. Germany 
has every right to use it ruthlessly after England's un- 
conscionable behaviour at sea. The Americans, Eng- 
land's secret allies, will not recognize that, but it is 
doubtful whether, in face of a determined diplomatic 
representation of Germany's standpoint, they will de- 
cide to intervene actively on the Continent of Europe. 
It is even more doubtful whether they could intervene 
in sufficient strength in time. If we refuse to adopt 
unrestricted submarine warfare, it means that we are 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 247 

abandoning what all competent experts assure us is a 
sure advantage of inestimable value for a drawback 
which is serious but only problematical. In Germany's 
position that course is not permissible. 

" When we come to the question how we are to 
proceed against England's tools on the Continent, Aus- 
tria-Hungary is pressing for an immediate settlement 
of accounts with Italy. We cannot agree with that 
proposal. If we adopted it, it would advantage Aus- 
tria-Hungary and her future prospects only, and not 
directly the prospects of the war as a whole. Even 
Italy's desertion of the Entente, which is scarcely 
thinkable, will make no serious impression on England. 
The military achievements of Italy are so small, and 
she is, in any case, so firmly in England's grip, that it 
would be very remarkable if we let ourselves be de- 
ceived on that score. Moreover, Italy is that one of 
our enemies whose internal conditions will soon make 
her further active participation in the war impossible, 
provided the Austro-Hungarian Army continues to do 
its duty at all. No one knows whether an attack on 
her would accelerate or delay this beneficent process. 
On that account it is better to leave her alone, especially 
as any further concentration of Austro-Hungarian 
troops on the Italian front is undesirable in view of 
her task in the East. 

" The same applies to Russia. According to all re- 
ports, the domestic difficulties of the giant Empire 
are multiplying rapidly. Even if we cannot perhaps 
expect a revolution in the grand style, we are entitled 



248 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

to believe that Russia's internal troubles will compel 
her to give in within a relatively short period. In this 
connection it may be taken for granted that she will 
not revive her military reputation meanwhile. We 
need not be anxious about that. On the contrary, it 
is probable that any such attempt, and the losses it 
must involve, would only hasten the process of dis- 
integration. Moreover, unless we are again prepared 
to put a strain on the troops which is altogether out of 
proportion — and this is prohibited by the state of our 
reserves — an offensive with a view to a decision in 
the East is out of the question for us until April, 
owing to the weather and the state of the ground. 
The rich territory of the Ukraine is the only objective 
that can be considered. The communications towards 
that region are in no way sufficient. It is to be pre- 
sumed that we would either secure the adhesion of 
Rumania or make up our minds to fight her. Both are 
impracticable for the moment. A thrust at Peters- 
burg, with its million inhabitants — whom we should 
have to feed from our own short stocks if the opera- 
tions were successful — does not promise a decision. 
An advance on Moscow takes us nowhere. We have 
not the forces available for any of these undertak- 
ings. For all these reasons Russia, as an object of 
our offensive, must be considered as excluded. There 
remains only France. 

"Fortunately these views, based more on negative 
grounds, are supported by the corresponding positive 
grounds. 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 249 

" As I have already insisted, the strain on France 
has almost reached the breaking-point — though it is 
certainly borne with the most remarkable devotion. 
If we succeeded in opening the eyes of her people to 
the fact that in a military sense they have nothing 
more to hope for, that breaking-point would be reached 
and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. 
To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass 
break-through, in any case beyond our means, is un- 
necessary. We can probably do enough for our pur- 
poses with limited resources. Within our reach be- 
hind the French sector of the Western front there are 
objectives for the retention of which the ^French Gen- 
eral Staff would be compelled to throw in every man 
they have. If they do so the forces of France will 
bleed to death — as there can be no question of a 
voluntary withdrawal — whether we reach our goal or 
not. If they do not do so, and we reach our objec- 
tives, the moral effect on France will be enormous. 
For an operation limited to a narrow front, Germany 
will not be compelled to spend herself so completely 
that all other fronts are practically drained. She can 
face with confidence the relief attacks to be expected 
on those fronts, and indeed hope to have sufficient 
troops in hand to reply to them with counter-attacks. 
For she is perfectly free to accelerate or draw out her 
offensive, to intensify it or break it off from time to 
time, as suits her purpose. 

" The objectives of which I am speaking now are 
Belfort and Verdun. 



250 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

"The considerations urged above apply to both, 
yet the preference must be given to Verdun. The 
French Hnes at that point are barely twenty kilometres 
distant from the German railway communications. 
Verdun is therefore the most powerful point d'appui 
for an attempt, with a relatively small expenditure of 
effort, to make the whole German front in France 
and Belgium untenable. The removal of the danger, 
as a secondary aim, would be so valuable on military , 
grounds that, compared with it, the so to speak ' in- 
cidental,' political victory of the ' purification ' on 
Alsace by an attack on Belfort is a small matter." 

At Christmas, 191 5, it was decided to give effect to 
the views which had crystallized out of this process of 
reasoning. However, even before a beginning could 
be made we were compelled to abandon an important 
part of our plans. 

When the unrestricted submarine campaign was to 
be opened in February the Chancellor raised his voice 
against it. He demanded a postponement of several 
weeks — to the beginning of April — so that he might 
have time to make another attempt to come to some 
agreement with the United States. We protested that 
we should have nothing to expect from the negotia- 
tions, in view of America's attitude hitherto, and that 
no moment could be more favourable for the opening 
of submarine activity than the period of excitement 
preceding the approaching presidential election, but 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 251 

the Chancellor brushed these aside, as well as our 
anxiety that a later start would prejudice the success 
of the submarine campaign. In this he was supported 
by the changed attitude of the Chief of the Naval 
Staff, Vice-Admiral von Holtzendorff, who had now 
come round to the view that a short postponement 
would not materially prejudice our ultimate aim — to 
paralyse England in the course of 19 16 — because the 
new construction coming forward in the meantime 
would make good the loss of time. 

A decision was given in favour of a further post- 
ponement of the unrestricted submarine campaign. 
For the time being our submarines were only per- 
mitted to attack arrned enemy merchant ships, with- 
out a previous summons to stop. No notice was taken 
of the Chief of the General Staff's hint that this method 
would be quite useless, and give no real results, because 
the inevitable mistakes of the submarine commanders 
in deciding whether a particular ship was armed or 
not would lead to complications with neutrals. 

However, as it turned out, it was not only a ques- 
tion of postponement. Before the agreement with 
America envisaged by the Imperial Chancellor had 
been concluded, the torpedoing of an unarmed vessel, 
the Sussejn;, raised the very case that might have been 
anticipated. In a Note which was as unpredecented 
technically as in its tone, America demanded that for 
the future submarine warfare must be carried on only 
in those forms which had been prescribed by inter- 
national agreement for cruiser warfare. After this, 






252 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

even the greatest optimists could hardly remain in 
doubt as to what attitude the United States would 
adopt. Further regard to her wishes was not only 
useless but positively dangerous in consequence of the 
loss of tinie. 

Accordingly, in April the Chief of the General Staff 
again demanded that an immediate start be made with 
I the unrestricted submarine campaign. He laid all the 
i greater emphasis on this because the Chief of the 
\ Naval Staff insisted that he must adhere to his well- 
I known view as regards the offensive co-operation of 
I the naval forces in the war in any other form than by 
\ the submarine campaign. The employment of the 
High Seas Fleet could only be considered under ex- 
ceptionally favourable tactical conditions. Other- 
wise the disparity of numbers would mean no hope of 
victory, but rather the danger that an enterprise aiming 
at a decision would end with a serious weakening of 
the fleet. In that case not only would the protection 
of the coast be jeopardized, but also our command of 
the Baltic, which it was as vital to maintain, on ac- 
count of the imports of ore from Sweden, as the se- 
curity of our shores. 

The result of the only great naval battle of the 
war, as may be observed here, in anticipation of the 
objection, does not give the lie to' that view. It was 
put to the test in the battle near the Skagerrak a few 
weeks later, on May 31st, which took the form of a 
chance or accidental encounter. It brought immortal 
laurels for the German war flag, so quickly faded, but 



THE POSITION AT THE END OF 1915 253 

it certainly did not prove that the opinion of the 
Chief of the Naval Staff as to the present use of the 
German fleet was wrong. Whether, as has often been 
alleged, a surprise attack by our fleet, aiming at a 
decision in the first days of the war, would have pro- 
duced any other result must remain open to doubt. 

On the question of the submarine war the political 
leaders did not adopt the view of the Chief of the 
General Staff. They could not be brought round to 
it, even by his insistence on the fact that the opportune 
employment of the unrestricted submarine war was a 
wholly essential ingredient in our war plans and hopes. 
They proved it by informing the American ambassador 
of Germany's abandonment of the unrestricted subma- 
rine campaign without telling the Chief of the General 
Staff of their intention beforehand. When he heard 
of this he considered it his duty, having regard to all 
the circumstances, to accept the fait accompli. Had 
he persisted, against the Kaiser's wish, in his request 
to be relieved of his office and for the appointment of 
a successor, it would have been construed as a demon- 
stration against an Imperial order already given, and 
the opposition on this question between the military 
and political leaders would have been revealed to the 
outside world — to the detriment of Germany. 

It was too late to effect any essential change in the 
situation, and in any case so much time had been lost 
that it had become extremely doubtful whether any 
decisive results could be obtained in the current year, 
that is, before the bad weather set in in August. 



254 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

In these circumstances it was more to the point to 
avoid the danger of America's entry into the ranks of 
our open enemies, and therefore to postpone the de- 
cision as to the adoption of the unrestricted subma- 
rine campaign until we could see better how the opera- 
tions in progress on land should turn out. Any other 
attitude would have been justified only by definite as- 
surances by the naval authorities. They could not be 
given, however. For that reason we also turned down 
the proposal, which was put forward at various times 
during the summer of 1916, that experiments should 
be made by giving our submarines full freedom of ac- 
tion in circumscribed areas, such as the English and 
Irish Channels. These would have been half meas- 
ures. Results of really decisive military value could 
not have been expected, whereas a break with America 
would have been a certainty. 



CHAPTER IX 
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 

VERDUN 
(See Fig, 4, Page 256) 

A CONSIDERABLE time before the decision dealt with 
in the preceding chapter — an offensive in the Meuse 
sector, with Verdun as the objective — was made 
known to the commands concerned, extensive prepara- 
tions for feint attacks had been made according to 
instruction in Upper Alsace by Gaede's Army Detach- 
ment, for the purpose of misleading enemies and 
friends alike, and the same thing, though on a smaller 
scale, was done in the 4th, 5th, 6th and 3rd Armies. 
These operations were continued when the prepara- 
tions for the operations in the Meuse region started in 
earnest after Christmas, 1915. In this way we suc- 
ceeded in keeping the enemy for a long time in un- 
certainty as to the sector to be chosen for attack. 
The first more or less definite information on the sub- 
ject seems to have reached him in the closing days of 
January or early in February through incautious re- 
marks let fall in Berlin social circles and communi- 
cated by some renegade. This circumstance proves 
once more how indispensable it is that the closest se- 

255 



256 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

crecy regarding future plans be observed, even among 
one's own people. 

The working out of the operations was influenced in 
a marked degree by consideration of the physical pecu- 
liarities of the country in question and the nature of 
its soil. 

The ascent from the Woevre plain — which a wet 
winter and early spring had turned into a swamp — 
to the precipitous eastern slopes of the Meuse 
" Heights " was so difficult as to be out of the question, 
so far as the main operation was concerned. There 
was no prospect of success until, we had cleared the 
way for it by an attack on the heights themselves. An 
overwhelming obstacle to the attack from the south was 
the barrier of trackless hills, with their dense under- 
growth, which, if practicable at all for close bodies 
of troops or motor transport would only become so 
after much tedious work on clearing. 

The same conditions applied to the Argonne Sector. 

Had the attack been made still further west, in the 
Aisne district or in Champagne, it would not have 
corresponded with our strategic conception. It would 
have become a break-through operation on the familiar 
plan. But this we were particularly anxious to avoid ; 
in fact, it was absolutely necessary to avoid it, in view 
of the general situation and the limitations of the 
resources at our disposal. Our object, which was to 
inflict on the enemy the utmost possible injury, with 
the least possible expenditure of lives on our own 
part, could not be achieved on the other side of the 




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THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 257 

Argonne. There the enemy had ample space in which 
to evade the blow, while we had not sufficient troops 
to follow up our blow indefinitely. 

Thus there remained as the theatre of operations 
only the region north of Verdun on both sides of the 
Meuse, from the foot of the Argonne in the west to 
the Orne valley in the east. The breadth was between 
thirty and forty miles. To make full use of the op- 
portunities for attack it afforded it would have been 
necessary to employ a far greater number of troops 
and much more artillery and ammunition than we had 
at our disposal. It had been impossible to raise the 
strength of the Army Reserve on the entire Western 
front. In more than twenty-six divisions or so it had, 
indeed, been thought for a time that the necessary in- 
crease of the Reserve might be brought about by 
straightening out of individual sectors, above all the 
projecting salients between Arras and the district south 
of Laon. Experiments made on the spot proved, how- 
ever, that any such hope was fallacious. This front 
was already held so lightly that not more than two or 
three divisions could be economized in this way. The 
increase resulting in the reserves was not considered to 
be of sufficient importance to compensate for the num- 
erous drawbacks which must have been the conse- 
quence of following such a course. For the construc- 
tion of the new positions there was not nearly enough 
labour available on the spot. To supply it we would 
have been compelled to make still further demands 
on the homeland, already suffering from a serious 



258 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

shortage in this respect. And the same difficulty ex- 
isted with regard to the materials required for the 
construction of our positions. Moreover, it was not 
to be expected that in a few weeks it would be possible 
to build lines of a strength in any way comparable to 
those which had taken more than twelve months to 
construct. Valuable, in fact irreplaceable, technical 
material would have been lost, and important railway 
connections behind the front would have been inter- 
rupted and cut. The Chief of the General Staff re- 
garded these considerations as having so much weight, 
that he did not hold it admissible to allow any devia- 
tion from the principle of not abandoning a strategic 
position once it had been gained, except in return for 
sure and definite advantages. 

At least a third of the Army Reserve had to be kept 
behind those sectors of the front, against which it was 
considered likely that relief offensives would be made; 
and since the whole German front — the Army Re- 
serve excluded — had to be held with only about one 
man to the yard, this precaution seemed necessary. 
The reserves in the West could no longer be materially 
increased by the addition of units from other theatres 
of war. Apart from the units the transfer of which 
had already been decided upon, none, according to 
reports from the Staffs of the Army Groups on the 
spot, could be spared. If the prescribed limits in this 
respect were overstepped, great perils would have had 
to be risked. 

The recruiting position in The Empire, our concern 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 259 

for the maintenance of the economic structure of the 
country > as well as the shortage of officers, no longer 
allowed us to raise new formations of well mixed 
troops. We had to impose strict limits on ourselves 
in this direction in order to meet the extremely urgent 
demand for fresh artillery and aviation units. 

The question whether further demands on the forces 
of our allies were to be recommended was thoroughly 
considered. In any case, the idea was not feasible. 
Turkey had as yet no troops available which it was 
possible to train, equip and transfer to France. The 
Bulgarians were not pledged to render assistance out- 
side the Balkan peninsula. Their troops, even had it 
been possible to bring them to the Western or the 
Eastern front, would assuredly have shown them- 
selves reluctant to serve there. Moreover, the reduc- 
tion of their forces in the Balkans would, it was feared, 
produce an unfavourable effect on the attitude of 
Rumania, and also of Greece. Lastly, the Austro- 
Hungarian troops, as a whole, could not be consid- 
ered as specially cut out for the very hard fighting on 
the Western front, if indeed they were sufficiently 
trained. The gratifying fact that they were offering 
a stout resistance on the Italian front against very 
great odds is only a superficial proof to the contrary. 
A considerable share of their successes must be attrib- 
uted to the inferior fighting capacity of the Italians, 
and to the favourable nature of the terrain. Even 
with the employment of Austro-Hungarian troops on 
the Western front the danger of reverses in the West, 



26o THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

and in the East as well, would in all probability have 
by no means vanished. The possibility of such conse- 
quences outweighed the advantages promised by co- 
operation, the more so as Austria-Hungary, in the 
opinion of German G.H.Q., absolutely needed all its 
really trustworthy troops, in other words those having 
a German or a Magyar reserve, to secure the safety of 
her own fronts. Moreover, all her armies put to- 
gether barely sufficed to fulfil the special obligations to 
look after the Serbian and Italian fronts and do her 
share in the East which she had undertaken. Still, 
despite German pressure, the Dual Monarchy had not 
succeeded in bringing up their armed forces even pro- 
portionately to the same strength as that of Germany. 
To repair their own internal organic deficiencies 
quickly enough was apparently not possible for the 
Austrians — at any rate, during the course of the war. 
No doubt, however, very much more might have been 
done in this direction if the governing circles in Aus- 
tria-Hungary had seriously devoted themselves to 
making an end, once and for all, to their habit of 
"muddling through." The Austro-Hungarian Gen- 
eral Staffs could not do that themselves. Besides 
they got into the habit of relying on the fact that in 
the long run Germany would be compelled to come to 
the rescue. 

ATTACK ON THE EAST BANK OF THE MEUSE 

According to the figures ^already given, there were 
/ on the Western front seventeen or eighteen assault 

I 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 



261 



divisions of effectives available. Of these nine were 
needed for the first attack on the right — eastern — 
bank of the Meuse, if it was to be carried out with the 
necessary determination. Some more had to be kept 
in readiness for the relief of the battle units, in order 
to give the operation the effect of the continuity 
which was part of our plans. The form of the front 
itself showed that this was the only place where the 
main attack could be delivered. The sharp, far- 
projecting angle formed by the enemy's front north- 
east of the armoured fort of Douaumont offered from 
the outset encircling possibilities such as are rarely to 
be found in a war of position. There was also the 
hope of being able to maintain the important ad- 
vantage of producing an enveloping effect as the opera- 
tion proceeded. 

The danger that as we got forward on the east bank 
of the Meuse, we should come under a harassing long 
range, flanking fire from the enemy artillery on the 
west bank was recognized. 

The danger could be minimized only by pushing 
forward out positions, and, therefore, by an attack on 
that side. For this we had but a relatively small force 
available, as the calculations given above will show. 
It was very doubtful whether this force, whether it 
waited for the beginning of the assault on the east 
bank or made its attack even earlier, would have met 
with success. For it would have had to take purely 
frontally a strong well-constructed position, occupied 
by an enemy in superior strength, and, further, to 



\ 



262 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

make the attack on a very narrow front. Moreover, 
, the lie of the land was in no way favourable to opera- 
I tions on the west bank. If the attack should fail here, 
there was the danger that the exposure of our flank on 
I the east bank would presumably be permanent, as we 
* had not sufficient troops to go on repeating the at- 
tempt. 

The conditions for the western attack might be 
materially improved if it followed after the attack to 
the east of the river. We could certainly count on a 
big initial success for our powerful thrust on the east. 
Its effect must make itself felt on the other bank, to the 
extent that the French, in order to check it, would 
probably be forced to use the nearest troops in line on 
the west bank. Consequently a certain weakness was 
to be expected there. More important still, there ap- 
peared to be the possibility, even if our attack on the 
east bank should result in an advance of but a few 
kilometres, of effectively outflanking the foremost 
French lines west of the Meuse. This was calculated 
to make the attack west of the river much easier. The 
Chief of the General Staff decided for that reason to 
let the western attack start later than the main attack. 
That arrangement had the further advantage that the 
troops it was previously proposed to employ for the 
operation west of the river would not yet be tied to 
the ground, and would therefore be available in the 
event of a hostile relief offensive on another part of 
\ the front. All previous experience showed that such 
relief offensives must always be reckoned with. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 263 

Shortly before Christmas, 19 15, the Headquarters 
Staff of the Army of Lieut.-General the Crown Prince \ 
Wilhelm, whose Chief of Staff was General Schmidt / 
von Knobelsdorf, received definite orders (though, for j 
reasons of secrecy, these orders were verbal at first) j 
to attack the French positions north of Verdun on the | 
right bank of the Meuse. The 3rd Army in Cham- j 
pagne, which had formed part of this Army Group \ 
since the autumn fighting in 191 5, was again detached j 
from it, in order that the Headquarters Staff might not I 
be involved in events which had but slight relation to \ 
the heavy task entrusted to it. On the other hand. 
General von Strantz's Detachment in Lorraine 
(Woevre), General von Falkenhausen's — in Lorraine 
(on the right bank of the Moselle), and in Lower 
Alsace — as well as Gaede's — in Upper Alsace, were 
attached to it. They stood in such close relation to the 
group on the Meuse that everything happening to 
them was bound to react there immediately and vice 
versa. 

Besides the troops already on the spot, nine thor- 
oughly rested and specially trained divisions were as- 
signed to the Staff of this Army Group for the opera- 
tion, so that each division had less than two kilometres 
of front to attack. Further, a large number of di- 
visions were also kept in readiness for the relief of 
exhausted units. Finally, it was decided to bring up 
immediately three picked divisions in case that situa- 
tion, to which reference has been made, should arise 
in which, as the operations on the right bank pro- 



264 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ceeded, a thrust on the left might appear helpful and 
promising, and the position in the rest of the front 
seqmed to permit it. An extraordinary amount of ar- 
tillery of the largest calibre was allotted both to the 
troops on the sector selected for the offensive and 
those on the adjacent sectors on the west bank of the 
Meuse and in the Woevre, which at the outset were 
to give artillery support only. The supply of am- 
munition considerably exceeded the quantity which 
all previous experience suggested as likely to be needed. 
Similarly, every demand for labour and equipment was 
complied with. 

In order to divert the attention of the enemy from 
all these preparations, the other armies in the West 
were charged with the task of keeping him busy by 
small enterprises on their sectors. In this they ac- 
quitted themselves in exemplary fashion. 

On the 9th of January the 3rd Army attacked at 
Maisons de Champagne, on the 12th of February at 
Ste. Marie a Py, and on the 13th of the same month 
at Tahure. On the 28th and 29th of January the 
2nd Army had a fine success at Frise, south of the 
Somme. The 6th Army struck on the 26th of Janu- 
ary at Neuville, on the 8th of February to the west of 
Vimy, and on the 21st of February east of Souchez. 
Gaede's Army Detachment pushed forward into the 
French lines near Obersept on the 13th of February. 
Everywhere the appointed objectives were reached, and 
the enemy suffered heavy losses. The relatively slight 
German losses sustaine4 on these occasions were justi- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 265 

fied, for it is highly probable that these operations ^ 
materially contributed to mask our plans. In return, 
it was only in the nature of things ttiat larger opera- 
tions other than the main attack already planned should 
be discountenanced. When the 3rd Army inquired 
whether it was still to undertake a big attack on its 
sector, it was informed accordingly, and the following 
remarks were added in explanation of the plans to be ; 
followed in the Meuse sector : " Our precise problem | 
is how to inflict heavy damage on the enemy at critical | 
points at relatively small cost to ourselves. But we 
must not overlook the fact that previous experience I 
of mass attacks in this war offer little inducement to 
imitate them. It would almost seem as if the ques- 
tions of command and supply in these attacks were 
insoluble." 

On the day appointed for the opening of the attack 
the condition of the ground in the Meuse district, 
soaked with continuous rain, prevented any movement 
of the troops, while the poor visibility in the cloud- 
laden sky made artillery work impossible. Not till | 
the middle of the month did the weather improve 
sufficiently to admit of the bombardment starting on 
the 2 1st of February. 

The successful infantry attack on the following day 
was carried out with an irresistible impetus, and the 
enemy's first lines were simply overrun. Nor could 
the advanced fortifications, constructed in peace, stop 
the brave attackers, although these works were not 
much damaged by our artillery. On February 25th 



266 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

the 24th (Brandenburg) Infantry Regiment stormed 
Fort Douaumont, the strong and reputedly im- 
pregnable north-eastern pillar of the Verdun defence 
system. Simultaneously the enemy gave way in the 
Ome valley as far as south of the Metz- Verdun road, 
so that the German front here also moved forward to 
the foot of the Heights of the Meuse. From many 
signs it was clear that this powerful German thrust 
had not only shaken the whole enemy front in the 
West very severely, but that its effects had not been 
lost on the peoples and the Governments of the 
Entente. 

However, the Headquarters Staffs of the Army 
Groups considered it necessary to stay the forward 
movement against the Heights. Violent — one may 
say desperate — counter-attacks by troops collected in 
extreme haste from all parts of the front had begun. 
They were repulsed everywhere with very heavy loss 
to the enemy. The situation might have changed, 
however, had we not brought up our artillery, which 
had been unable to follow fast enough over the still 
barely passable roads, and assured the supply of am- 
munition and food. 

ATTACK ON THE WEST BANK OF THE MEUSE 

Meanwhile the enemy had with astonishing rapidity 
brought a number of powerful batteries of artillery 
into position behind the Marre ridge, on the western 
bank of the river. Their half-flanking effect made 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 267 

itself severely felt on our assault troops. The dis- 
comfort caused by these guns had to be stopped. This 
could not possibly be effected from the right bank of 
the Meuse, for here we had our hands full in dealing 
with the enemy forces immediately confronting us. 
The only means available — as had been foreseen and 
prepared for — was to push forward the German front 
on the left bank so far that its artillery could deal 
with the Franco-British forces on the Marre ridge 
more effectively than before. We now had troops 
available to carry out this necessary movement. Apart 
from a weak attempt in Champagne, there had been no 
relief attacks by the enemy in any other sectors, and 
our observations showed that no preparations for any 
immediate attack of this sort were in hand. Indeed, 
it had become highly improbable. The French had 
nearly got together the whole of their reserves from 
the rest of their front, and had quickly handed over to 
the English the sector near Arras, formerly held by 
them, in order to provide the wherewithal to hold 
their positions in the Meuse sector. The English had 
been compelled, by taking over the Arras sector, to 
extend their line so much, that nothing on a big scale 
from this direction was to be apprehended. To be 
sure, the formation of Kitchener's conscript armies in 
England was proceeding vigorously. Thus it was to 
be anticipated that the forty to forty-two English di- 
visions, whose presence on the Continent had been es- 
tablished, would be nearly doubled at no very distant 



, 268 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

date. Whether, and when, these new troops would 
become fit for use in an offensive was still, .however, a 
matter of uncertainty. 

In these circumstances the question that had to be 
considered by G.H.Q. was whether to intimate that the 
continuance of the operation on the Meuse would be 
abandoned, and a new enterprise started on another 
front. This measure would have meant a complete 
departure from the views on which the attack north 
of Verdun was based. Nor was there any reason for 
doing so. We had hitherto achieved what we had set 
out to achieve, and there was every reason to hope 
we should do so again in the future. As a matter of 
fact, that is what actually happened. No offensive 
elsewhere had particularly good prospects. The 
enemy still held their line in great strength. The 
English, for example, had from seven to eight men to 
every metre of their front. Success was to be gained 
against positions so strongly held as these only by em- 
ploying the artillery we had concentrated on the Meuse. 
Further, it would have meant a great loss of time, and 
the enemy would assuredly have taken advantage of 
this to transfer his reserves likewise. It was there- 
fore decided to renounce the idea of changing the 
scene of operations. 

The attack carried out on the 6th of March and in 
the succeeding weeks on the west bank succeeded to 
this extent, that the French were thrown out of their 
foremost lines with heavy casualties every time. Ow- 
ing to the peculiar conformation of the country we 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 269 

could not use these successes to bring our artillery far 
enough forward, and consequently the preparatory 
work here had to be continued. Intense fighting lasted 
for the whole month of April on the western bank. 
Not till our occupation of the main portion of Hill 
304, on the 7th of May, was there any momentary 
pause in our attack in this sector. 

The conduct of the actions in the Meuse sector was 
at first directly in the hands of the H.Q. Staff of the 
Crown Prince's Army Group itself. But with the ex- 
tension of operations some relief of the burden on this 
Staff became necessary. Accordingly, in March, 
while preserving its control, we put General von 
Mudra (Chief of Staff, Major Kewish) in command 
on the right bank, and on the left General von Gall- 
witz (Chief of Staff, Colonel Bronsart von Schellen- 
dorf [Bernard]), whose command of the nth Army 
in Macedonia was taken over by Lieutenant-General 
von Winckler. 

In April General von Mudra was succeeded by Gen- 
eral von Lochow (Chief of Staff, Major Wetzell), 
and in July Lieutenant-General von Francois (Chief 
of Staff, Major von Pawelz) took General Gallwitz' 
place. 

As already stated, there had been a temporary ces- 
sation of our attack in the western sector ; but it must 
not be assumed from this that things had become ab- 
solutely quiet there. Here, as on the eastern bank, 
the fighting raged continuously and more fiercely than 
ever. The French saw to that with their practically 



270 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

incessant counter-attacks. The artillery battle never 
stopped. The raids of the defenders were generally 
relieved by big thrusts carried out by forces far su- 
perior to those of the attackers. For example, a par- 
ticularly resolute thrust was made on the 22nd and 
23rd of May, in the region of Douaumont, and for a 
time our hold on the armoured fort was in danger. 

For our part, we usually confined ourselves to send* 
ing our opponents home with bloody pates, recovering 
from him such small patches of ground as he might 
have gained here and there, and, where necessary, ef- 
fecting slight improvements in our positions. Never - 
! theless, this fighting without visible or — for the man 
\ at the front — tangible result afforded the sternest test 
imaginable of the capabilities of the troops. With 
i very few exceptions they stood the test most brilliantly. 
I The enemy nowhere secured any permanent ad- 
\ vantages ; nowhere could he free himself from the 
German pressure. On the other hand, the losses he 
sustained were very severe. They were carefully 
noted and compared with our own, which, unhappily, 
were not light. The result was that the comparison 
worked out at something like two and a half to one : 
that is to say, for two Germans put out of action five 
. Frenchmen had to shed their blood. But deplorable 
) as were the German sacrifices, they were certainly 
■ made in a most promising cause. The operations de- 
veloped in accordance with the plans oa which their 
execution had been based. To be sure, crises arose 
occasionally: as when the enemy slackened in his 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 271 

convulsive efforts, and we had to decide whether in- 
creased pressure would pay at that point, or whether 
it were better to shift our attack to somewhere else; 
or, again, whether it would be more profitable to re- 
frain from heavy attacks, or whether, finally, we 
should make up our minds to risk large forces in order 
to improve our own positions. 

A crisis of the kind last-mentioned was caused by 
the fight around Douaumont already referred to. It 
had shown that the German lines there must be further 
advanced very appreciably if the fort was to be se- 
cured permanently. That, however, considering the 
local conditions, could only be brought about by means 
of an attack on a large scale. We had therefore to 
decide for it. The position on the rest of the front 
was favourable to such a decision. The long-pending 
attack for the relief of the Meuse sector was an- 
nounced. In the sectors of the 6th, 2nd and 7th 
Armies, as also of the Falkenhausen Army Detach- 
ment, preparations for an offensive on the part of the 
enemy had been observed. Those on the purely 
French fronts could certainly be regarded only as 
feints. In the light of recent events on the Meuse, 
it was not credible that the French themselves could be 
strong enough to attempt a big enterprise. But the 
movements on the English front, which was being 
continually reinforced from the homeland, demanded 
more serious attention. This was especially the case 
as regards the Somme area, where the preparations 
had assumed a definite shape. The 2nd German 



272 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Army stationed there had been materially strengthened 
by the transference of troops and artillery. Notwith- 
standing these withdrawals and the reliefs which had 
to be held in readiness for the Meuse sector, our army 
reserve was always strong enough to furnish suf- 
ficient troops to reply by a lusty counter-push to any 
possible enemy attack. It was not yet clear whether 
the French would be able to take part in an English 
attack. It was now hardly possible for them to con- 
centrate a decisive superiority. However, thanks to 
their reckless inroad on their colonies, they still dis- 
posed of more than enough man-power to bring at 
least a portion of their reserves up to strength and to 
make them fit for an offensive. In order to interrupt 
this process, a fresh German success on the Meuse 
was imperative. 

The end of May saw the beginning of the opera- 
tions designed for this purpose. In the first place, 
the Cumieres positions on the left bank were taken. 
During the first days of June the armoured fort of 
Vaux, with the outworks in its neighbourhood, was 
captured by our brave troops after long and — even 
for the Verdun battle — extraordinarily stubborn 
fighting. On the 23rd of June the village of Fleury, 
standing on a rock, and the armoured works of 
Thiaumont were stormed. Splendid feats of arms 
were accomplished. Once more they provoked furious 
but futile counter-attacks, which must have cost the 
enemy dear. After' these had been crushed, it was 
resolved to proceed during the next few weeks with 



,t^ 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 273 

the preparation of our attack on the works in the inner 
line of defences — Conville, La Laufee. We had thus 
good prospects of securing enveloping positions the 
possession of which would make the citadel and its 
neighbourhood a hell for the French, and also ma- 
terially reduce the German casualties. 

But before going into the further development of 
events on the West front, it is necessary to devote 
attention to what was happening meanwhile in the 
other theatres of- war. 

THE RELIEF OFFENSIVE IN THE EAST IN MARCH, I916 

At first we had had practically no explanation of the 
total absence of relief offensives on the part of the 
enemy on the Western front during the first weeks 
of the operations on the Meuse. Not till later did the 
absorption of so many French troops in the Verdun 
fighting solve this riddle. Up to the 17th of March 
the French must have put in at least twenty-seven 
infantry divisions, fresh, or newly brought up to 
strength; to the 21st of April, thirty-eight; to the 8th 
of May, fifty-one, and to the middle of June far more 
than seventy. Thereafter, owing to the necessity of 
having to replenish their beaten units, they were left 
without the means to attempt anything decisive on 
other fronts. On the German side, however, it had 
not been even necessary to send half as many into 
the battle, and this comparison strengthened G.H.Q. in 
its conviction that its intentions in the operation oa 
the Meuse could be realized. 



274 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Even more surprising than the continued absence of 
attempts at a relief offensive in the West was the 
opening of a rehef offensive on quite a big scale on 
the northern portion of the Eastern front in the second 
half of March. 

Since the battles at Dvinsk had been broken off in 
November, 191 5, everything had remained quiet at 
this point. On the i8th of March, however, the Rus- 
sians attacked in the Lake Dryswjaty-P'ostawy sector, 
and on both sides of Lake Narotsch, in very strong 
force and with an immense expenditure of ammuni- 
tion. During the next few days their efforts were ex- 
tended to several points of practically the whole front 
as far as south of Riga. They were continued with 
extraordinary tenacity until the beginning of April. 
They might, however, be described as bloody sacrifices 
rather than attacks. Helpless in their massed forma- 
tion, their storming columns of badly-trained men, led 
by officers as bad, suffered frightful losses. All suc- 
cess was denied them, save for one casual local break- 
through south of Lake Narotsch, and the ground lost 
was retaken by us without difficulty in a counter-at- 
tack. By way of reinforcement, the Army Group 
which was attacked required only a single division, 
which was stationed south of the Niemen, at Barano- 
vici. Nor was this division asked for by the Group 
Headquarters, and even this was got, not from the 
Army Group Staff, it was offered by G.H.Q. 
i There was no doubt whatever that these attacks by 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 275 

the Russians were simply carried out under pressure 
from their Western allies and for the sake of helping 
them. No responsible leader, unless under constraint 
from outside, would have let such inferior troops at- 
tack well-built positions like those held by the Ger- 
mans, Even if the enemy had met with initial suc- 
cesses, they could not have been turned to good ac- 
count, owing to the state of the roads at that time 
of the year. The general impression, from the course 
which the fighting took, was that G.H.Q.'s opinion of 
autumn, 191 5, that the offensive power of Russia was 
paralysed had been confirmed. That impression was 
in no way altered by the fact that, individually, the 
Russians fought with their habitual contempt of death. 
That alone can never win successes against modem 
weapons in the hands of reliable troops. After these 
experiences it must have been evident that something 
quite improbable would have to happen if any faith 
could be placed in the capacity of the enemy to win 
real victories on the Eastern front. Further, that 
opinion was justified by the fact that the Russians had 
far more than two-thirds of their whole fighting 
strength — over a million and a half — opposed to 
the six hundred thousand men on the German front 
north of the Pripet, and there were no indications 
of any kind to suggest that a transfer to the front of 
our allies in the south was in progress. 



\ 



276 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE TYROL IN 
^ MAY, 191 6 

Unfortunately, however, that " something quite im- 
probable " materialized. Despite our warnings, the 
Austrian General Staff clung to the idea of an offen- 
\ sive from the Tyrol front to the south-east. They 
/ could not find it in their hearts to let slip what ap- 
peared to be so inviting an opportunity of settling ac- 
counts with the Italians. Moreover, there was a 
special temptation in the thought of being able to carry 
out the project with their own resources, without the 
German advice they regarded as " patronizing." 

When the Chief of the General Staff heard, through 
rumour, of the plan, which was not officially com- 
municated to him, he tried to deter the Austrian 
G.H.Q. from proceeding with the scheme, by demand- 
ing the heaviest Austro-Hungarian artillery for the 
operations in the Meuse sector. This heavy artillery 
was of very little use for trench warfare in Galicia 
and Italy, but indispensable for an offensive from the 
Tyrol. However, the Austrian Staff did not agree to 
give them up, and it did not seem an appropriate time 
to protest in another form. After all, it was Austria- 
Hungary's business how she used her own troops on 
a front she was holding by herself. We told our ally 
often and emphatically, that the security of the Eastern 
front must not suffer through any of their many 
projects. Thereafter they could not easily lose sight 
of what was an absolutely vital necessity to them. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 277 

We trusted, also, to the fact that transfers of troops 
from one seat of war to another, which might disturb 
the equilibrium, could not escape the attention of the 
numerous German liaison officers with our ally, and 
would be reported in good time. In both of these 
expectations the Chief of the General Staff was de- 
ceived. 

On the 14th of May the Austrian General Staff in- 
formed us that, weather permitting, they proposed to 
launch an attack on the Tyrol front from the Adige to 
the Sugana valley.^ 

On the very next day the attack, for which the 
troops had been ready for six weeks, but detained by 
the snow, began. They got forward rapidly at first, 
though having to grapple with very difficult country, 
and soon had to overcome a number of strong works 
constructed in peace time. The Italians were unable 
to withstand the heavy artillery fire and the vigorous 
attacks of the pick of the Austro-Hungarian armies, 
so long as they were still fresh. By the end of May 
the centre of the attack had reached the region of 
Asiago and Arsiero, but the wings were still a long 
way behind. The right, which had got as far as Mori, 
in the valley of the Adige, had made practically no 
progress. The left had just about reached Strigno in 
the Brenta valley. The troops — too few for the 
length of front attacked — were now exhausted. It 
was difficult for the artillery to follow them. Even by 
the 27th of May the Austrian G.H.Q. had been com- 
1 See Sketch 3, Page 222. 



278 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

pelled to ask us to give up a division of the Austrian 
1 2th Corps, which was in Prince Leopold's Army 
Group, for the Italian front. As this corps had a 
purely Rumanian reserve, which could hardly be em- 
ployed against Italians and had, moreover, shown itself 
to be untrustworthy in the autumn of 191 5, this sug- 
gestion furnished significant indications as to their 
critical situation on the battle- front. 

Meanwhile the Italian counter-attacks had begun. 
Conducted with superior numbers, drawn partly from 
the Italian Reserve Army around Vicenza and partly 
from the Isonzo, they brought the offensive to a com- 
plete standstill. It became clear early in June — and, 
indeed, before things grew lively in the southern half 
of the Eastern front — that our ally could neither con- 
tinue their offensive, remain in the salient they had 
reached, nor yet take advantage of the weakening of 
the Italian Isonzo front, due to the transfer of troops 
to the Tyrolean front. As regards this last alterna- 
tive, the Austrian Staff even doubted whether, in case 
of an Italian attack, they would succeed in holding 
their own Isonzo positions, which had also been un- 
duly denuded for the benefit of the Tyrolese opera- 
tions. But before the necessary conclusions could be 
drawn from this unpleasant situation, the blow fell 
like a bolt from the blue in Galicia on the 4th of June. 

brussiloff's offensive, JUNE, 19 1 6 

After the failure of the March offensive in Lithu- 
ania and Courland, the Russian front had remained 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 279 

absolutely inactive. Up to the beginning of June, as 
far as it was possible to judge from the very accurate 
reports the Headquarters of the Central Powers re- 
ceived, not a single battalion or battery had been . 
moved from the front north of the Pripet to the \ 
Austro-Hungarian sector south of the marshes. As | 
a matter of fact, no transfer of troops on a scale worth \ 
mentioning did take place. We could thus feel con- I 
fident that our allies, as formerly, were opposed by | 
an enemy but slightly superior. Later calculations ■* 
were to show that the Russian superiority amounted 
to a few divisions. However that may have been, in 
any case there was no reason whatever to doubt that 
the front was equal to any attack on it by the forces 
opposing it at the moment. This view was also held 
with complete conviction by the Headquarters Staff 
of the Linsingen Army Group, which had control of 
the most northerly section of the Austro-Hungarian 
front. General Conrad von Hotzendorf had given a 
very strong expression of the same opinion in an an- 
nouncement respecting the situation made in Berlin 
on the 23rd of May. He declared that a Russian at- 
tack in Galicia could not be undertaken with any 
prospect of success in less than from four to six weeks 
from the time when we should have learnt that it was 
coming. This period at least would be required for 
the grouping together of the Russian forces, which 
must be a necessary preliminary thereto. In some- 
what disquieting opposition to the important assertion 
was the energy with which, on this same occasion, 



28o THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

timely German support from north of the Pripet was 
demanded, in case of need, for the Austro-Hungarian 
front forces. This promise was most willingly given, 
on the supposition that some movement of Russian 
troops from north to south must have taken place. 
However, before any indication of a movement of 
this sort had been noticed, to say nothing of an- 
nounced, a most urgent call for assistance from our 
ally reached German G.H.Q. on the 5th of June. 

The Russians, under the command of General 
Brussiloff, had on the previous day attacked almost 
the entire front, from the Styr-bend, near Kolki, be- 
low Lutsk, right to the Rumanian borders. After a 
relatively short artillery preparation they had got up 
from their trenches and simply marched forward. 
Only in a few places had they even taken the trouble 
to form attacking groups by concentrating their re- 
serves. It was a matter, not simply of an attack in 
the true sense of the word, but rather of a big-scale 
reconnaissance, which would show the hard-pressed 
Italians that their ally was trying to help them. As 
became known later, July ist was the date the Entente 
had in view, a date appointed by the Supreme Com- 
mand, for the big simultaneous offensive on the 
Eastern and Western fronts. 

A " reconnaissance " like Brussiloff 's was only pos- 
sible, of course, if the General had decisive reason for 
holding a low opinion of his enemy's power of resist- 
ance. And on this point he made no miscalculation. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 281 

His attack met with splendid success, both in Volhynia 
and in the Bukovina. East of Lutsk the Austro- 
Hungarian front was clean broken through, and in 
less than two days a yawning gap fully fifty kilometres 
wide had been made in it. The parts of the 4th Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Army, which was in time here, melted 
away into miserable remnants. 

Things went no better with the 7th Austro-Hun- 
garian Army in the Bukovina. It flowed back along 
its entire front, and it was impossible to judge at the 
moment whether and when it could be brought to a 
halt again. On the other hand, the Southern Army 
stood its ground on the Strypa, and north of it the 
2nd Austrian Army, held firm in its positions west of 
Tarnopol and east of Brody, as did the ist Austrian 
Army up to its left wing, which was involved in the 
collapse of the 4th Austrian Army on the Ikwa. 

All the available reserves of the sectors, still holding 
especially the Germans in the Southern Army and 
Linsingen's Army Group, were immediately flung into 
the threatened fronts. Nevertheless, when the losses 
of the allied armies, both in men and in materiel, and 
the details of the behaviour of the troops in the battle 
were made known, there was no doubt possible that 
but for strong German support we should have seen 
a complete collapse of the whole front in Galicia. 

The mere holding of ground in Galicia had but 
slight importance for G.H.Q. In fact, it was prac- 
tically limited to seeing that the continued exploitation 



282 JHE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

of the oil wells was assured. On the other hand, a 
fresh Russian invasion of Hungary or another threat 
to Silesia could not be allowed. The realization of 
either of these events was bound to bring about the 
speedy exhaustion of the Central Powers. 

We were therefore faced with a situation which had 
fundamentally changed. A wholesale failure of this 
kind had certainly not entered into the calculations of 
the Chief of the General Staff. He had considered it 
impossible. 

The simplest way of dealing with the situation ap- 
peared to be to hastily concentrate a strong German 
Army Group in Poland, West Galicia, or Hungary and 
proceed to a counter-attack with far-reaching aims. 
The Austrian General Staff strongly recommended 
that proposal. But however attractive this idea ap- 
peared in theory, it was barely possible in practice. 

The great superiority of the enemy on the German 
portion of the Eastern front has already been referred 
to. Apart from the surpassing efficiency of the German 
troops, the equilibrium could only be maintained if 
those troops were supported by really well-built posi- 
tions supplied with an abundance, but not a dead- 
weight, of mobile material. There were no such po- 
sitions further back, and on that account, for us to 
withdraw our front with a view to shortening it in 
order to release troops, promised no results. We had 
even to anticipate that all the troops we intended to 
draw from Hindenburg's Army Group would have to 
be sent to Prince Leopold's Army Group, as the latter 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 283 

had no counter-positions behind it as suitable for 
defence with reduced numbers as that in which their 
hnes lay at the moment. Lastly, the technical diffi- 
culties of evacuating the present front, in the face of 
an enemy with threefold superiority in numbers, and 
even then crouching to spring, were so formidable, 
that we shrank from the idea. We were faced with 
the danger that the old proverb, about the many dogs 
which will always end by killing game if you turn 
them loose, however harmless they may be by nature, 
would once more come true. 

Consequently, it was credible enough when the 
Staffs of the two army groups reported that they might 
gradually be able to release troops for the Galician 
front, but that they could not surrender them, any- 
how 'not within the time required, to form an of- 
fensive group, as the Austrian General Staff proposed. 

This group could only have been formed by bring- 
ing very strong forces simultaneously from the West. 
This would involve delay during which the last line 
of resistance left to the Austrians in the East would 
be broken down. It would, in fact, have been neces- 
sary to carry on the war 'against Russia without our 
allies. For this, however, the troops available from 
the West were inadequate even if it were decided to 
withdraw behind the Meuse or to the frontier. Even 
a constant shifting of the centre of gravity of our 
attack could never compensate for the disadvantages 
which must inevitably follow such a sudden cessation 
of our pressure in the West. 



284 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

The proposal of the Austrian G.H.Q., therefore, 
could not be accepted. 

The converse was equally unacceptable: the idea of 
our simply leaving the East to look after itself, send- 
ing no reinforcements from the Western front, but 
carrying on the war here with the greatest possible 
pressure, and awaiting the development of events in 
the Russian theatre of war. It would have been pre- 
sumptuous to rely on a failure of the Russian leader- 
ship similar to that of the autumn of 1914. They 
had learnt too much in the meantime for this. Also, 
as a result of the loss by our allies of far more than 
200,000 men in three days, the mere numerical su- 
periority of the Russians had become too great. 
There was therefore, no hope of forcing a decision 
in the West before the military and political break- 
down of Austria. Such a break-down meant in any 
circumstances the loss of the war. 

There remained the adoption of the system of re- 
liefs which the German command in the East unani- 
mously urged. 

Those German reserves on all fronts which could be 
in any way spared without actually endangering the 
front itself, were to be thrown with all possible speed 
into Galicia and Volhynia so as to bring the Russians 
to a standstill where they threatened most, and to 
strengthen the Austrian line where it seemed most 
brittle. Only by this means could we hope to succeed 
in welding the different parts of our ally's army not 
yet hopelessly shattered into a weapon capable of co- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 285 

operating effectively with our own; only in this way 
could we check the disorder which had already spread 
considerably along the lines of communication of the 
southern half of the Eastern front, and which was 
threatening to frustrate all efforts to save the situation. 

There is no doubt that even so limited a withdrawal 
of reserves made the position on the Western front 
much less favourable. The intention of nipping in 
the bud by means of a heavy counter-attack the offen- 
sive then being prepared by the English had to be 
dropped. The reserves of men and ammunition which 
were being held in readiness for this were too seriously 
reduced by the claims of the East. We could, how- 
ever, rely on our brave troops in the West to weather 
the gathering storm even without this help. On the 
Meuse it was necessary, as a result of the plan of op- 
erations in hand, to help the development of the 
situation within bounds that were in keeping with the 
forces available. 

On the 8th June the Chief of the General Staff in- 
formed Austrian G.H.Q. that German G.H.Q. was 
prepared to help within the limits imposed by these 
considerations. It was regarded as the most urgent 
task to bring to a standstill the Russian troops attack- 
ing in the Lutsk area, because there was imminent 
danger of their rolling up those parts of the Austrian 
1st and 2nd Armies that were still holding. The 
enemy advance in Bukovina seemed for the moment 
less menacing. In the mountains the pace would be 
bound to slacken greatly of itself. Accordingly, four 



286 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFE 

or five German divisions — one from each of the Army 
Groups of Prince Leopold and Hindenburg, and three 
from the Western front — were to be united with 
some of the sounder Austrian troops in the neigh- 
bourhood of Kovno, under the command of General 
von Linsingen, with Colonel Hell as Chief of Staif, 
to undertake a combined offensive to the south-east. 
The necessary conformity of action on the part of the 
Austrian ist Army with this attack-group was ensured 
by placing the former under the command of Von 
Linsingen' s Army Group. It was further stipulated 
that in future the German Staff, in addition to the 
control of the operations, should be ensured full in- 
sight into the internal condition of the Austrian troops 
under their command. Hitherto the Austrian G.H.Q. 
had persistently refused the encroachment of the au- 
thority of the German Command into the Austrian 
sphere of authority which these measures involved. 
They had maintained that it would undermine their 
prestige in the eyes of their own army, and that the 
German Command, who did not understand the pe- 
culiar circumstances of the Dual Monarchy, could not 
produce better results from its troops, and would 
have serious friction with the local authorities and the 
people. These considerations had been weighed on 
the German side. There is no doubt that to a certain 
extent they were justified. The facts that had come 
to light, however, as to the conduct of our ally in 
carrying out the Italian " Excursion " excluded hence- 
forward any such consideration. As it appeared, the 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 . 287 

Galician front was not only weakened by the with- 
drawal of troops for the benefit of the Italian front, 
but even its capacity for resistance had been reduced 
below any reasonable standard by the withdrawal of 
its strong complement of artillery, the importance of 
which for unreliable troops is well known, and fur- 
ther, the loss, partly by exchange and partly by the 
addition of unreliable reserves, of a considerable part 
of its most reliable elements. This explained the col- 
lapse. There must be no repetition of these occur- 
rences. To prevent it the Chief of the General Staff 
demanded a second guarantee by uniting the front 
between the Pripet and the Dniester under the com- 
mand of Field-Marshal von Mackensen. This plac- 
ing full powers in the hands of the Commander of a 
part of the front, as it was intended should hence- 
forward be the case with the Field-Marshal, had many 
objections as regards the unity of command. How- 
ever, in view of the seriousness of the situation and 
the personality of the Field-Marshal, it was thought 
that these could be laid aside. But Austrian G.H.Q. 
flatly refused to consider this plan, maintaining that 
to put it into practice in the present situation would in- 
volve a diminutio capitis for themselves which would 
have a harmful effect. As this argument could not 
for the moment be refuted, and as, moreover, north of 
the Dniester the 2nd Austrian Army alone was not 
under German control, the appointment of the Field- 
Marshal was provisionally abandoned. For the same 
reason it was still found impossible at the end of June 



288 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

to give a similar position to Field-Marshal Hinden- 
burg, as had been intended. On the other hand, the 
German General von Seeckt was appointed Chief of 
Stajff to the Austrian 7th Army, which occupied the 
sector south of the Dniester as far as the Rumanian 
frontier. Austrian G.H.Q. finally pledged themselves 
not to carry out any important operations without first 
coming to an agreement with German G.H.Q. 

The impetus, unusual for Russian troops, with which 
the offensive was launched in the first few days, soon 
slackened. Where they were opposed by German or 
even by the sounder Austrian divisions, they were 
brought to a complete standstill. The Russian failure 
to have adequate reserves at hand was their own un- 
doing. Not until the enemy command realized the 
full extent of their success, which came as a surprise 
even to them, were orders given to hurry up with all 
possible speed some of the masses of men that were 
accumulated in front of Hindenburg's Army Group. 
At the beginning of the attack by Linsingen's Army 
Group on the i6th June, which was launched on an 
extensive scale from Kovel, Vladimir Volynsk and 
Gorochov, the enemy in the Lutsk area had advanced 
two days' march beyond the Styr. He never got an 
inch further here, although with ruthless sacrifice of 
life he drove his reinforcements, now graduallv begin- 
ning to come up, again and again against the allied 
lines. 

On the contrary, in several places we succeeded in 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 289 

driving him .back appreciably, true, only after heavy 
fighting during the second half of July, and after 
bringing up further German troops. These had again 
to be drawn for the most part from the West, as the 
weakening of the Russian front facing Hindenburg's 
Army Group was not realized to an extent at all ap- 
proaching the reality until later. Prince Leopold's 
Army Group was not in a position to supply any fur- 
ther reinforcements. General von Woyrsch's Army 
Corps, which belonged to this group, had in the mid- 
dle of June been actually attacked by an enemy su- 
periority of five to one. They had brilliantly repulsed 
the enemy, but it was certainly to be expected that he 
would before long renew his attempts to break through 
the shortest line of communication behind the German 
Eastern front, and seize the railway junction at Bar- 
anovitschi. By the end of the month he brought up 
no less than thirteen divisions from the north against 
this narrow front, only one less than the strength of 
the reserves withdrawn at the same time from before 
Hindenburg's Army Group for the front south of the 
Pripet, five or six times as long. 

Like Woyrsch, the very thinly-occupied position of 
Linsingen's left wing on the Styr below Kolki was 
expecting a big attack. The Russians had apparently 
realized the impossibility of making any further 
progress in the neighbourhood of Lutsk. They were 
occupied with the formation of shock groups, to be 
used against the Styr sector and the north wing of the 
Austrian 2nd Army. This army had during the June 



290 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

fighting actually evacuated the position it had hitherto 
held on the Ikwa, but had already formed a new front 
on the line Salotsche-Werben, which it was stubbornly 
defending. 

In this it was brilliantly supported by the behaviour 
of the Southern Army of General Count von Bothmer, 
which held out unflinchingly in its original trenches on 
the Strypa, even when the Russians south of the 
Dniester, in the headlong course of their victory, not 
only occupied the whole of Bukovina, but at the end 
of June even reached Tlumatsch and Kalomea, right 
on the flank of the Southern Army. At the same time 
the enemy in the mountains were pressing on towards 
Hungary through the passes. Both the Jakobeny and 
Tartar passes had to be considered as seriously threat- 
ened. The sectors concerned had also been already 
strengthened with German reinforcements. The 
Tlumatsch sector had received a division from Mac- 
edonia and part of the Southern Army. Detachments 
to the strength of about a division, made up of rein- 
forcements from various parts of the Western front, 
had been pushed into the mountains. This stiffening 
had, however, proved insuflicient to have any lasting 
influence on the general retirement. Several times 
when their neighbours gave way, they, too, were 
washed back by the flood of the Russian masses. 
Often the great distances made it impossible to bring 
them in time to the places where they were needed. 
The front required further attention. The Chief of 
the General Staff suggested the trial of " reliefs " on 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 291 

similar lines to those adopted with Linsingen's Army 
Group in the Lutsk area. At the beginning of July a 
new Austrian army, the 12th, was to be formed out 
of weak detachments from the Italian, Western and 
North-Eastern fronts, and stronger ones from Lin- 
singen's Army Group, the Austrian 2nd Army and the 
Southern Army, arid to be sent to the Dniester above 
Halitsch, where it was to join with the inner wing of 
the Southern and Austrian 7th Army on what would 
as far as possible be a surprise counter-attack along 
the Dniester. To facilitate unity of purpose for the 
three armies they were to be united to form an army 
group. The command was to be given to the Austrian 
heir-apparent, Field-Marshal Archduke Charles, as it 
was hoped that his appointment would spur Austria- 
Hungary to special efforts on this front. The Arch- 
duke was given a German Chief-of-StafT by the trans- 
ference of General von Seeckt from the staff of the 
Austrian 7th Army to the new army group. 

In these measures just discussed, consideration of 
the attitude of Rumania was already playing a part. 
With every forward step of the Russians this attitude 
grew less favourable. The frontiers were again 
closed. News came to hand of the renewal of serious 
negotiations on the question of joining the Entente. 
Statements were known to have been made by the 
King and Queen, and by several leading men, which 
left no doubt as to their real feelings and intentions. 
Moreover, it was known that the war material neces- 



292 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

sary for Rumania's entry into the war was actually 
on the way through Russia, but that several weeks must 
elapse before it could be delivered. Finally it was 
thought that Rumania's entry into the war need not 
be expected until the end of the harvest, and then only 
if Austria's position grew still worse in the meantime. 
Otherwise the very cunning politicians in Bukarest 
would find it difficult with Bulgaria in their rear to 
throw for such high stakes. 

The obvious plan to forestall the threatening Ru- 
manian attack by an attack of our own was in July 
not feasible. Nor was it so, we may add at once, in 
July, or even August. The troops and material re- 
quired for the difficult off'ensive over the Southern 
Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps were more 
urgently needed elsewhere. Still less could they be 
held ready for defensive action on the Hungarian 
South-East frontier. The allied Command already 
decided to conduct the war against Rumania north of 
the mountains by means of a counter thrust. The 
preparations for this began soon after the Russian 
break-through at Lutsk. Austria, in view of her po- 
sition, was only able to take a minor part. All the 
keener was the activity on the German side. The 
reorganization of units was at once begun, and these 
were specially trained and equipped for the theatre 
of war for which they were intended. Further, the 
improvement of the very inefficient railways in and 
approaching this region was undertaken by German 
railway troops to ensure a quick advance in case of 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 293 

need. The necessary reconnaissance for possible op- 
erations was taken in hand. 

The above review of the position of the Central 
Powers in the middle of 1916 requires for its comple- 
tion a supplementary account of the events that led up 
to it in the Balkan and Asiatic theatres of war. 

EVENTS IN THE BALKANS IMMEDIATELY PREVIOUS TO 

THE SUMMER OF I916 

(Map 5) 

In Albania no change of importance had taken place 
since January. The Austrian push had during Febru- 
ary reached and passed the Skumbi sector, but a further 
advance against the Italians in their prepared posi- 
tions behind the Vojusa had been abandoned. The 
material available had proved inadequate. Austrian 
G.H.Q. also required a large part of this before long 
to carry out their plans on the Italian front. The 
enemy gained no advance from this. Apparently the 
difficulty of the ground hindered him just as much as 
it had already hampered the Austrian operations. 

Neither had the situation in Macedonia materially 
changed. The attack on Salonica had been finally 
abandoned in March. The enemy had meanwhile so 
strengthened themselves, and their positions, that very 
great resources would have had to be thrown into the 
scale to ensure a success which at the best could have 
borne no just proportion to the means involved. 
From the point of view of the war as a whole, it re- 
mained more advantageous to know that between two 



294 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

and three hundred thousand men were being chained 
to that distant region than to drive them from the 
Balkan peninsula, and thence to the French theatre 
of war. That any serious danger could arise to our 
defence on the Macedonian front was regarded as 
outside the bounds of possibility. The German-Bul- 
garian positions were favoured in a quite unusual way 
by the nature of the country, and in accordance with 
the circumstances were fortified with exceptional 
strength. The Bulgarian troops could be relied upon 
to fight well henceforward in defence of Macedonia, 
to them sacred ground. The example of the few 
German stiffening troops with whom they fought in 
close comradeship had a good effect. An enemy of- 
fensive had no hope of success unless it were followed 
up in great strength. If, however, the necessary 
masses were thrown in, the difficulties of reinforce- 
ment must become insuperable. In both cases there 
was no clear objective within reasonable reach for 
an enemy offensive. It could only have become effec- 
tive if it were pressed as far as the interruption of the 
Nisch-Sofia-Constantinople railway. To reach this, 
more than two hundred and fifty kilometres of most 
difficult and pathless mountain country had to be 
crossed. It was out of the question that the enemy 
would embark on such an enterprise. As a matter of 
fact, they did not seriously venture on it for more 
than two and a half years. When in September, 191 8, 
they at last advanced to the attack, they knew quite 
well that no resistance would be offered. The Ger- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 295 

man troops had been withdrawn from the Macedonian 
front, and the Bulgarians had meanwhile been com- 
pletely demoralized by political intrigue. In view of 
this state of affairs, G.H.Q. did not approve the plans 
of Mackensen's Army Group for further improving 
our position, in case of an enemy attack, by pushing 
forward the Bulgarian ist Army on its right wing 
beyond Fiorina. The considerable loss of strength 
which this would certainly entail was not desirable. 
Also, it did not seem^out of the question that such a 
penetration of Bulgarians into Greece would cause an 
unfavourable outbreak of national feeling, and cause 
Greece to join the Entente, To avoid this, the Greek 
Government had actually ordered the demobilization 
of the army. This, however, had not gone so far as to 
make a serious encounter with Greek troops impossible. 
The Turkish fronts in Asia, apart from Armenia, 
were, not so safe as the Balkans, but were still suffi- 
ciently secure for no alarm to be felt. 

ASIA IN THE SUMMER OF I916 

The exceptional mildness of the winter of 191 5-16 
had made it possible for the Russians to attack in 
Armenia as early as January. The very inferior 
Turkish 3rd Army, suffering in many ways from lack 
of supplies, was everywhere pressed back. On the 
1 6th of February the capital, Erzerum, had to be 
evacuated. In the middle of April the important port 
of Trebizond also fell into Russian hands. Thus 
nearly the whole province of Armenia was lost. The 



296 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Turks re-established themselves on a line from Platana 
on the Black Sea through Zighana, north-west of 
Baiburt, and through Mamakhatun to Bitlis and along 
Lake Wan. They had suffered such heavy losses, and 
their service of reinforcements worked so unsatisfac- 
torily, that further progress of the enemy had to be 
anxiously expected. Until the middle of the year, 
however, there was no sign of this. The Russians 
had the same difficulties to contend with as the defence. 
In the Irak region the hopes that had been built on 
the arrival of Field-Marshal Baron von der Goltz and 
the reinforcements that he had brought with him were 
in the last weeks of 191 5 unexpectedly fulfilled. The 
Anglo-Indian Army of General Townshend, marching 
on Bagdad, was forced to retreat in the battle at 
Ctsiphon, a few miles from the gates of Bagdad, and 
then surrounded by the Turks in Kut-el-Amara on the 
Tigris. Very vigorous but over-hasty attempts at re- 
lief on the part of the English along the Tigris, and 
the Russians, utterly regardless of Persian neutrality, 
through Persian territory, could do nothing to avert 
their fate. At the end of April Townshend had to 
surrender. A few days after Field-Marshal Baron 
von der Goltz succumbed to spotted fever, caught 
while visiting Turkish hospitals. This surrender was 
a great triumph for the Turks. Unfortunately they 
were too weak and too badly equipped to take ad- 
vantage of it in Irak, where the summer heats had 
already set in. It was also not thought advisable to 
attempt a serious thrust on the Tigris, so long as the 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 297 

Russian Army was not pressed back. The van of this 
army had already reached Rewandus and Chanikin in 
Western Persia. They found themselves, however, 
in such a difficult position for further action, that at 
the end of June they withdrew east again without wait- 
ing for the Turkish attack that had been planned. 

It had not yet been found possible to begin the in- 
tended fresh advance from Palestine against the Suez 
Canal. It had not been possible during the cool season 
of 1915-16 to bring up the necessary material with 
sufficient promptitude. Further, a serious Arab rising 
against the Turkish Government had crippled the 
power of the latter in this region. First kindled in 
El Hejaz by English intrigue and English money, this 
rising quickly spread over the Arabian peninsula, and 
also unsettled the Arabian population of Syria, as well 
as the Bedouin tribes of the Syrian Steppes as 
far north as the Euphrates. Appearing as it 
did in the guise of religious mummery, it furnished 
a conclusive proof that Turkey's attempt by the procla- 
mation of the so-called " Holy War " to rouse the 
Mohammedan population against the English had, on 
the whole, miscarried. The threads of religious kin- 
ship stretched to Persia, Afghanistan, India, Northern 
Africa and Egypt, but nowhere was the feeling 
strong enough to overcome the fear of England's arm. 
Only in Cyrenaica, where the Italians were the enemy, 
did the movement gain appreciable importance, and 
did, indeed, influence the course of events on the 
Italian front. 



298 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

The internal condition of the Turkish Empire had 
grown worse through the want of sufficient food in 
the centres of population, which was due not so much 
to lack of actual supplies as to the undeveloped state 
of the means of transport. A serious crisis- in Con- 
stantinople was fortunately averted by the timely de- 
livery of Rumanian wheat. In other spheres, too, 
such as those of finance and recruiting, the length of 
the war was making itself severely felt, although on 
the German side no means was left untried that seemed 
likely to stop this evil, or at least to mitigate its con- 
sequences. It is impossible to praise too highly the 
bearing of our allies; not even under these trying cir- 
cumstances was there ever the slightest wavering. 
They steadfastly rejected the Entente's repeated at- 
tempts to reduce them, and saw to it that so far as 
was within their reach the Entente activities among 
the people should not develop into more serious mis- 
chief. 

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME, I916 
(Figure 5) 

We left the French theatre of war at the point 
when before Verdun the great German success of the 
23rd of June against Thiaumont had been won. On 
the following day the long-expected and hoped-for 
enemy offensive was begun in front of the 2nd Army 
— General Fritz von Below, with Major-General 
Griinert as Chief of Staff — on both sides of the 
Somme, after artillery preparation and gas attacks. It 




Fig. 5. 



Mnchelepot^ 



The Battle of the Somme 



a — German line on July 1, 1916. 
b— Enemy attacks on July 1, 1916. 
c — German line on July 10. 
d — German line on August 29. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 299 

was directed against the German sector from north of 
Gommecourt to south of Chaulnes. Not only the 
English, but the French also took part. At the point 
of attack the positions north of the Somme were held 
by five divisions, those south of the river by three. 
Close behind were three divisions in reserve, ready to 
be sent into the line immediately. A third division, 
which, however, had been heavily engaged on the 
Meuse, was in the third line. The requests of the 
Commander of the 2nd Army as to reinforcements 
made in the last weeks during which the attack was 
expected had been met as fully as possible. In ar- 
tillery and aircraft it had, indeed, been impossible to 
meet his demands completely, in view of the situation 
in Galicia. The heavy diversion of troops to this 
front had necessitated the abandonment of our inten- 
tion of breaking the enemy attack by a counter-thrust 
planned on a large scale. The necessary forces for 
this were not available in the West. Nor could they 
be withdrawn from the Meuse battle-field, as owing 
to the peculiarities of this area it was not safe, even 
after the defensive had been resumed, to reduce our 
forces there below a certain limit. Nowhere was it 
more important not to give the enemy any opening for 
an advance than on the Meuse, where the most im- 
portant German lines of communication still lay al- 
most within his reach. In view of the lack of ade- 
quate troops for a counter-thrust, it had also been 
necessary to reject the suggestion that it might be 
expedient shortly before the attack began to withdraw 



300 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

the German positions at the point of attack, which 
were fairly well known to the enemy. This would 
have reduced our losses for the moment, and would 
have hampered the enemy. He would have been 
forced to bring forward his artillery and prepare the 
attack afresh. In the end this manoeuvre would 
merely have amounted to an exchange of excellent 
positions for others less good and to a brief postpone- 
ment of the decision which the Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff was anxious to bring about without delay. 
There was little to be gained on the German side by a 
temporary postponement of the issue, but much to 
lose, since a continuance of the existing state of tension 
would further prejudice freedom of decision and 
movement. 

The artillery preparation of the enemy continued 
almost without interruption until the ist of July. 
Vast masses of munitions, for the most part of Amer- 
ican origin, ,were hurled into the German lines. All 
obstacles were completely swept away, and the trenches 
themselves were for the most part flattened out. Only 
a few particularly solidly built could stand before this 
savage hail of shell. Still worse, however, was the 
way in which in many cases the men's nerves suffered 
under this seven days' fire. 

The French attacked with seven divisions in the 
first line and five in the second south of the Peronne- 
Albert road, on a front of about sixteen kilometres, 
the English with twelve divisions in the first line and 
four infantry, as well as several cavalry divisions be- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 301 

hind, north of the road on a front of about twenty- 
four kilometres. With this superiority it was in- 
evitable that the enemy should score the usual initial 
successes when, on ist of July, the storm at last broke. 
The gains of the English were even less than usual. 
North of the Bapaume-Albert road they did not ad- 
vance a yard, south df the road not appreciably be- 
yond the first German line. The French gains were 
greater: the whole of the German first line from Fay 
to south of Hardecourt, north of the Somme, was lost. 
In several places the attack penetrated the second line. 
Even in this sector there was no question of the in- 
tended break-through having succeeded. The position 
became more serious when the local command allowed 
itself to be persuaded by the French successes to 
evacuate the German second-line between the Estrees- 
Foucaucourt road and the Somme, where it was still in 
our hands, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the 
troops in the line Biaches-Barleux-Belloy-Estrees, who, 
it is true, had suffered severely from the enemy fire, 
and their relief from the main reserves sent up from 
G.H.Q, This allowed the enemy during the first 
weeks of the battle to take us in the flank on the north 
bank, which was very serious for the German troops 
there, who were heavily engaged on their front, and 
was of great importance for the further advance of 
the enemy. This indecision as to the handling of de- 
fensive action was, however, quickly overcome. After 
this, the attack south of the Somme was unable until 
the end of August, when this battle came to an end, 



302 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF. 

to achieve any successes worth mentioning, although in 
the first days of July wave after wave broke upon the 
German lines. For the rest the French capacity for 
attack soon calmed down south of the Somme after 
those first few days of storm. Want of strength did 
not permit the French Command to attack on both 
banks at the same time. They decided, therefore, in 
order to preserve touch with the English, to transfer 
the centre of gravity of the attack to the short French 
front north of the Somme. 

Here and on the English front the battle was stub- 
bornly continued. In July and August it developed 
into one of those battles of materiel in which on both 
sides hitherto unheard of masses of artillery and am- 
munition, and, on the enemy's side, of men were ex- 
pended. On the German side we were, for good 
reasons, extraordinarily economical in our use of men. 
Nevertheless, the number of the troops accumulated 
on the scene of the battle soon became so great, that 
it was no longer possible to direct the battle from one 
place. For this reason the command of what had 
hitherto been Second Army Headquarters, under Gen- 
eral Fritz von Below, with Colonel von Lossberg as 
Chief of Staff, was limited to the sector north of the 
Somme, while General von Gallwitz, with Colonel 
Bronsart von Schellenberg as Chief of Staffs was trans- 
ferred from the Meuse area, took over the command 
of the newly- formed ist Army, and at the same time 
that of Gallwitz' Army Group, in which the two 
armies were combined. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 303 

Once again the unsurpassed fighting qualities of the 
German soldier were shown up in the strongest light. 
Always inferior numerically, he gave ground step by 
step before the fury of the enemy artillery only where 
a stand had, in fact, become impossible. He was al- 
ways ready to tear back lost ground from the enemy, 
and to take advantage of every weakness. The losses 
in this stubbornly contested struggle were heavy on 
both sides, but those of the enemy were unquestionably 
the heavier. If by the evening of the second day of 
the battle it was quite certain that the break-through 
planned by the English and French would not succeed 
after the first week, G.H.Q. knew with equal certainty 
that the enemy was also to fail to reach his objective 
in the " nibbling " tactics to which he had been com- 
pelled to resort after the miscarriage of the break- 
through. As with the losses the numbers thrown into 
the attack were so greatly out of proportion to those 
employed in the brave defence, that, however long the 
operations lasted, loss of morale or fatigue were bound 
to affect the enemy first. In fact, the only result of 
the eight weeks of desperate enemy effort was that at 
the end of August the German front was pressed back 
on a front of twenty kilometres both sides of the 
Somme nowhere more than seven kilometres. And 
even then the German reserves on the West front 
had not been exhausted. 

The clever propaganda of the Entente, which unfor- 
tunately was making itself felt within the Empire, 
has made out the Battle of the Somme to be a serious 



304 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

disaster for Germany. It is true our losses were very 
heavy. In reality, however, it had had comparatively 
little influence on the further course of the war, in no 
way proportionate to the sacrifices of the Entente, or 
to the result that for many months the Entente were 
practically crippled. 

The events on the Somme have no connection with 
those of August on the Italian front, which led to the 
loss of the right bank of the Isonzo. Even if the 
Battle of the Somme had not been fought, G.H.Q. 
would not have sent any German troops to Italy for 
purposes of defence, because in the light of past ex- 
perience they could not hope to exercise any favourable 
influence on the achievements of Austria. 

In Galicia the most dangerous moment of the Rus- 
sian offensive had been passed before the first shot of 
the Battle of the Somme was fired. The events that 
followed, in any case, had no decisive influence on the 
numbers of the reinforcements sent East. The posi- 
tion there was regarded as still very serious, but no 
longer critical. It is improbable that the decision only 
to withdraw just sufficient forces from the West for 
the work in hand would have been altered if the Battle 
of the Somme had not taken place. 

The only tangible gain, then, of this battle to the 
enemy remains in its effect on the situation on the 
Western front. As a matter of course, an expendi- 
ture of strength such as the enemy favoured demanded 
the use of correspondingly strong forces for the de- 
fence. The operations in the Meuse area were not 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 305 

yet, however, immediately affected. On the nth July 
we were still able, by a strong thrust, to advance our 
line on the east bank almost to the works of Souville 
and La Laufee. After this it was the tension of the 
whole situation, and especially the necessity to husband 
our materiel and ammunition, which necessitated the 
abandonment of any big German offensive operations 
on the Meuse. The Headquarters of the Crown 
Prince's Army Group were instructed to carry on the 
offensive calmly and according to plan, so as to give 
the enemy no good reason for concluding that he could 
hope for its cessation. This, too, was quite success- ^ 
ful, for the French were unable to bring up reinforce- 
ments from the Meuse to the Somme front until Sep- 
tember, when following on the change in the Chief of 
the General Staff the " Verdun-offensive " had been 
completely abandoned. 

More than three-fifths of the entire French forces 
were ground in the mill of the Meuse area before 
August, 1916. That they were able, in spite of this, 
to take part in the operations on the Somme, must be 
attributed as regards personnel to the unexpectedly ex- 
tensive use of colonial troops, as regards materiel \ 
entirely to American support. The part played by i 
America in this way was also important, in that she ' 
alone made it possible for the English to carry on the 
Somme struggle as long as they did. This participa- 
tion did not indeed violate the letter of international 
law, but it meant a slap in the face for real neutrality. 
On the one hand, America was seeking to prevent 



3o6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Germany from using every weapon against her deadly 
enemies, partly by appeals to international law coupled 
with veiled threats of war, partly by protestations of 
her peaceful intentions. On the other hand, the Great 
Republic not only shut her eyes to the grossest viola- 
tions of this same international law by these same 
enemies, but even supplied them on a large scale with 
the weapons for Germany's destruction. We may 
think what we like about America's attitude towards 
the war. The shame which such conduct has brought 
upon her will never be wiped out. 

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF JULY AND AUGUST, I916 
iVide Map 6) 

For the Russians in the East, the opening of the 
Battle of the Somme was the signal for redoubled ex- 
ertions. There is no doubt that in this they were 
acting on fresh instructions from the Entente. It is 
scarcely conceivable that their own leaders could still 
hope for decisive results. 

During the month of July and the first half of 
August there was no complete cessation of the Russian 
attacks along the vast Eastern front, stretching from 
the Baltic to the Southern Carpathians, and these were 
often carried out on several parts of the front at the 
same time. The sector held by Hindenburg's Army 
Group was attacked at Riga, Friedrichstadt and 
Diinaburg, though in most cases only by way of a 
demonstration. Against Woyrsch's section of Prince 
Leopold's Army Group the enemy hurled himself 




MAP. 6. 

Brussiloff's Offensive in the Summer of 1916 

f^P^""'"^" »"<! Austro-Hungariaii line at the beginning of the attacl<. 
u — Line on July IS, 1916. 
c — I.ine at end cif August. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 307 

times without number with the greatest stubbornness. 
Linsingen's Army Group had frequently to resist his 
onslaughts on the lower Stochod and the middle Styr. 
The Austrian 2nd Army had to fight hard at Werben, 
east of Brody, and round Salotsche. With the South- 
ern Army of Count von Bothmer the fighting was 
focussed on Burkanow and Butschatsch, both on the 
Strypa, and, later, at Monasterzyska and Tlumatsch, 
south of the Dniester. In the sector held by the Aus- 
trian 7th Army, the Russians strove to gain access to 
the mouths of the Carpathian passes during the first 
ten days of August, also pressed forward south of the 
Dniester towards Stanislau. Here, as with Bothmer 
and" the Austrian 7th Army, the attacks did not die 
down until the middle of August, whereas, with Hin- 
denburg's Army Group, they were practically aban- 
doned by the middle of July, with Woyrsch and Lin- 
singen at the end of this month. From all accounts 
the Russian losses must have been nothing short of 
colossal. The poor shooting of their artillery, com- 
pared with their achievements in the early days of the 
war, was unable to give sufficient preparation for the 
attacks, and the infantry, driven forward in unwieldy 
mass-formation, were usually unable to cross the zone 
of our machine-gun fire. The objectives gained were, 
therefore, of little importance compared with the 
strength expended. 

In the sectors held entirely by German troops they 
were absolutely nil. 

In Linsingen's Army Group the troops on the Styr 



3o8 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

were pushed back behind the Stochod. The Austrian 
2nd Army had to evacuate the Hne Werben-Salotsche, 
which it had held so well, and with it the town of 
Brody, but re-established a front a few kilometres 
west, and bravely held its ground on the line Ber- 
estetschko-Sokolowka, and the region between Slots- 
chow and Salotsche. In this region it was in touch 
with the Southern Army, which, after repulsing many 
attacks in admirable syle, was ordered to withdraw 
from its positions on the Strypa to a line behind the 
Zlota Lipa, as the retirement of the Austrian 2nd 
Army and the advance of the Russians in the sector 
held by the left wing of the Austrian 7th Army, as 
far as the Zlota Bystrzyca, west of Stanislau, about 
the middle of August, threatened seriously to endanger 
the lines of communication of Bothmer's Army. 

The attack planned by the Army Group of the Arch- 
duke Charles, with the object of forcing the Russian 
divisions in the Carpathians to withdraw behind the 
Dniester, and therewith to effect an improvement in 
the attitude of Rumania, which was rapidly becoming 
unfavourable, was not carried out. It became neces- 
sary to divert the troops intended for this purpose 
as soon as they came up, to strengthen the more brittle 
parts of the line, as in general the scanty reserves 
behind the whole battle front had to be kept ready 
for immediate employment in any part of the line, if 
we were to offer effective resistance in those sectors 
where the Russians attacked from time to time. 

Meanwhile, in high political and other circles at 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 309 

home, the desire was being urgently expressed to give 
Field-Marshal von Hindenburg a wider field of ac- 
tivity. The aim was to make the Field-Marshal Chief 
of the General Staff. The Imperial Chancellor was 
an eager advocate and promoter of this movement. 
Although hopes in the province of military achieve- 
ment, as well as of winning over the Field-Marshal 
to support the Chancellor's war policy, might favour 
this appointment, the primary motive lay in the sphere 
of domestic politics. Efforts were made to effect the 
appointment by the methods usual in political cam- 
paigns of this kind, allusions in the Press, pressure on 
those in high places, diplomatic reports and other 
similar means. The Chief of the General Staff did 
not hear of this until later. He had, however, to give 
way, and welcomed the fact that this widening of the 
sphere of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg's authority 
so far coincided with the exigencies of the military 
situation as to open a way for once more concentrating 
the command of the Eastern front in German hands, 
which was considered desirable. This had become all 
the more expedient in view of the fact that the dis- 
posal of reserves mentioned above had given rise to 
differences of opinion as to whether a particular army 
group was in a position to spare reserves or not. 
There had been particular friction in the case of 
Hindenburg's Group. Field-Marshal von Mackensen 
was no longer available for the purpose in question. 
For him an important task was waiting in another 
theatre of war, with which we shall have to deal later. 



310 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Neither was it possible to appoint him over Field- 
Marshal Hindenburg's head. 

Apart from this, there was only one leader to be 
considered whose prestige would ensure respect in the 
eyes of our ally. The Kaiser accordingly, with the 
approval of the Emperor Francis Joseph, entrusted 
to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg the command of 
the Eastern front from the right wing of the Austrian 
2nd Army in the neighbourhood of Salotsche, east of 
Lemberg, to the Baltic coast, to date from the 30th 
July, The Chief of the General Staff agreed to this 
arrangement, as he hoped, wrongly as it turned out, 
that it would obviate all difficulties as to unity of com- 
mand. The following were placed under the orders 
of the new Commander of the Eastern front — the 
Austrian Army already mentioned, the Army Groups 
of Linsingen and Prince Leopold, and the Army 
Groups hitherto commanded by Field-Marshal von 
Hindenburg, and now taken over by General von 
Eichhorn. In the first half of August six more di- 
visions were given to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, 
for disposal on the front under his command. Two 
of these came from the Western front, and were in 
need of recuperation, but could in case of necessity 
be employed against the Russians. Two divisions 
were newly formed from troops drawn from differ- 
ent sections of the East and Western fronts. The 
last two consisted of Turkish troops offered by the 
Ottoman Command for use in the European theatres 
of war after the evacuation of Gallipoli by the English 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 311 

at the beginning of 19 16. The reasons which pre- 
vented use being made of these at that time have 
already been explained. When these scruples had 
been overcome, Austrian G.H.Q. had not been able to 
make up their minds to accept the renewed offer, al- 
though the employment of these well-disposed and 
reliable troops on their front would have been most 
useful. In the meantime they had been able still fur- 
ther to perfect their training. In the fighting in East 
Galicia, during September and October, they proved 
themselves an uncommonly valuable asset to the South- 
ern Army, in whose sector they were placed. Though 
Field-Marshal von Hindenburg's new front, even be- 
fore it was strengthened by the six divisions just men- 
tioned, was no longer regarded to be in a critical po- 
sition, after the arrival of these, it should not only have 
been equal to any call that might be made upon it, but 
should also have been in a position to send reinforce- 
ments anywhere where there was a shortage of men. 
The commander of the front did not, however, share 
this opinion. During August he repeatedly and em- 
phatically voiced his misgivings, not only as to the 
security of his own front, but also of that immediate 
adjoining it, and of the Rumanian frontier. They 
proved to be unfounded. 

The southern part of the Eastern front, from the 
left wing of the Southern Army to the Rumanian 
frontier, remained an independent command under the 
Archduke Charles. Under his command were the 
Southern Army, the Austrian 3rd Army, which had 



312 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

replaced the 12th Austrian Army by a change of name, 
and the Austrian 7th Army. It has already been men- 
tioned that the Archduke's Chief of Staff was a 
German. 

In addition to advantages in the province of strat- 
egy and executive command, the Chief of the General 
Staff hoped to get, by these innovations, a grip on the 
inner administration of the various units which would 
enable us to increase the fighting value of the Aus- 
trian Army. There had always been a crying need 
for this, and since the break-through at Lutsk it had 
become even more vital. 

This newly acquired grip did not, it is true, give us 
any security against a repetition of such strategical 
mistakes in the conduct of the war as a whole as the 
Austrian offensive against Italy. There was no means 
of obtaining unconditional control, as it always re- 
mained dependent on the good-will of our allies. 
Nevertheless, it had become essential to effect some 
change in the system of " joint command," which had 
been hitherto, at least, nominally in force. The dis- 
astrous consequences of the Tyrol enterprise had de- 
stroyed all confidence in this system. The granting 
to G.H.Q. of a right of supervision could no longer 
be evaded. The institution of a " Supreme Com- 
mand of the Central Powers " in German hands had 
therefore become a necessity. When this proposal was 
submitted through the Chief of the General Staff, 
Turkey and Bulgaria confirmed their previous attitude 
by immediate assent. Austria raised the already 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 315 

known objections, which, as has already been pointed 
out, were from many points of view justified. After 
the disastrous experiences of the past, however, no de- 
cisive importance could now be allowed to attach itself 
to these. Finally, this was admitted by the leaders of 
the Dual Monarchy themselves. The formal settle- 
ment of these negotiations did not occur, however, 
until after the change in the Chief of the German Gen- 
eral Staff took place at the end of August. 

Ostensibly the final deciding factor in this change 
was the declaration of war by Italy and Rumania. 
But before these developments are further gone into 
let us turn our attention to certain events in the realm 
of politics which stand in close connection with this 
change. 

THE LIBERATION OF POLAND 

Since the occupation in 191 5 of " Congress Poland " 
there had been no truce to the differences of opinion 
as to the ultimate fate of Poland, although the proverb 
of not dividing the skin until the quarry is slain should 
have been borne in mind. The Governments of Berlin 
and Vienna were agreed that complete " liberation 
from the Russian yoke " must be granted and secured 
for the Poles. But as to the way in which this lib- 
eration was to be effected it was for a long time found 
impossible to agree. This was inevitable. German 
policy took this direction only out of necessity, be- 
cause it could find no better solution to the problem 
of Poland's future. Austria, on the other hand, was 



314 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

heart and soul for the liberation, from which she hoped 
to reap great advantage in the future. 

The Chief of the General Staff regarded this scheme 
with distrust. He considered it inexpedient to cut 
off the St, Petersburg Government from any possi- 
bility of again seeking a rapprochement with Germany. 
Moreover, from observation of the Polish-speaking 
population of his own province of West Prussia, he 
had come to the conclusion that it was impossible to 
establish permanently a satisfactory, neighbourly re- 
lationship between a Polish State risen from the ashes 
and the German Empire. The Polish irredenta had 
already caused Prussia much anxiety. This was 
bound to be increased, if, as a result of this movement, 
an independent Polish State were set up with all the 
hope in its own future of a new birth. There is no 
doubt that Austria would be able, through her connec- 
tions in Galicia, to exert a paramount influence over 
the youthful State. This it was to be feared would 
give rise to friction, which might be fatal to the al- 
liance. The exclusively Western orientation of Ger- 
man policy which would then necessarily follow was, 
from a military point of view, highly undesirable, in- 
volving as it would dealing with great but uncertain 
powers, instead of powers weak, it is true, but inti- 
mately known. It is true that the Prussian troops 
from the Polish-speaking areas had in general done 
their duty loyally during the war. That they would 
continue to do so if they knew that beyond the frontier 
was a Polish State with quite different ambitions from 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 315 

Germany's was in the highest degree improbable. 

Further, nothing could be more likely to prejudice 
calm judgment than the promises of the partisans of 
Poland's liberation that Germany would thereby gain 
an immediate increase in military strength from Polish 
resources. It was scarcely to be expected that the 
youth of Poland, who have so admirably shown them- 
selves ready to do their duty against the Russian Em- 
pire, would flock with any particular enthusiasm to 
the German standards, which were as abhorrent to 
them as those of Russia. Even if an army could be 
raised, it would be impossible to place full confidence 
in the troops. That such troops are more of a burden, 
and in certain circumstances a very heavy one, than 
a help, had been more than proved by the history of the 
Austrian Army. 

When, therefore, the Chief of the General Staff was 
informed in August that the Imperial Chancellor was 
in Vienna for the purpose of finally settling the Polish 
question, he forwarded a protest and succeeded in 
postponing a decision in the matter. The question was 
not raised again until after his resignation. 

In itself an increase in the forces of the Central 
Powers would at this time have been most welcome. 
South-east of Hungary a new war was ready to burst 
into flame at any moment. 

RUMANIA DECLARES WAR 

In discussing the attitude of Rumania it has already 
been explained that after the great successes of Brus- 



3i6 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

silow her entry into the war on the side of the Entente 
was entirely dependent on further disasters to Aus- 
tria's position. Subsequent events in June and July 
hardly amounted to this. They were the logical and 
inevitable consequence of what had already happened. 
The Entente diplomatists, however, were able to put 
their own interpretation upon them for the benefit of 
the political and military leaders in Bukarest, who 
were little capable of judging for themselves. In any 
case, at the end of July the news from Rumania left 
the Command of the Central Powers no doubt that 
the decision as to when Rumania should join the ranks 
of our enemies rested on the turn of a hair, and was no 
longer in any way dependent upon the action of the 
Central Powers. It remained for the Entente alone 
to give the word. Steps had to be taken to meet this 
situation. The first efforts of G.H.Q. were directed 
towards postponing the actual break as long as pos- 
sible. The later it came the better would it be for 
the Central Powers, for it might be assumed, in the 
light of recent events, that any gain in time would 
give both the West and East fronts a better chance 
to consolidate their line and so put themselves in a 
better position to spare troops for use against the new 
enemy without danger to themselves. For this reason 
German reinforcements from the West were, during 
the last ten days of July and in August, transferred to 
those sectors of the Eastern front bordering on Ru- 
mania. It was feared that a reverse here, under the 
very eyes as it were of Rumania, even if of minor im- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 317 

portance in itself, might precipitate her entry into the 
wan As there were signs of hopes in Bukarest that 
Germany would be unable or unwilling to aid Austria 
in a war with Rumania, the error of such hopes was 
emphatically pointed out to the Rumanian Military 
Attache at German G.H.Q., and every opportunity was 
given him to convince himself that Germany had quite 
sufficient resources at her disposal for this purpose. 
To emphasize this assurance, those parts of the Ger- 
man loist Division which had been in East Bulgaria 
since the autumn of 191 5 were transferred to 
Rustchuk on the Danube, that is to say, right on the 
Rumanian frontier. The Turkish and Bulgarian com- 
mands were also instructed to make similar declara- 
tions in Bukarest. Austrian Headquarters were in- 
duced strongly to urge upon the Austrian Government 
the importance of going on with the negotiations be- 
tween the Austrian Government and Rumania as to 
the price of the latter's continued neutrality, although 
there was no prospect of their ultimate success. 

Simultaneously with these measures to avert, or at 
any rate to postpone the evil day, preparations to meet 
it were being made. The necessary redistribution of 
the German forces was hurried on, as well as the con- 
struction of railways for their transport in South 
Hungary and North Bulgaria. Field-Marshal von 
Mackensen was informed in July that in the event of 
war with Rumania he was to take over the command 
on the Dobrudja frontier and the Danube. Arrange- 
ments were made with him as to the conduct of the 



3i8 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

operations. He received instructions to take in hand 
the necessary preparations and reconnaissance work as 
far as possible without attracting attention. Lastly, 
on 29th July an agreement was arrived at, at German 
G.H.Q. between General Conrad von Hotzendorf, 
Colonel Gantschew, the Bulgarian plenipotentiary, and 
the Chief of the General Staff as to the common course 
of action to be followed in the event of a declaration 
of war by Rumania. Turkish Headquarters also be- 
came a party to this through Enver Pasha at a meet- 
ing on 5th August at Budapest with the Chief of 
the General Staff and General Conrad von Hotzen- 
dorf. 

It was regarded as a foregone conclusion that, if 
Rumania declared war, she would, in accordance with 
the ** hungry " way of thinking of her leaders and 
without much consideration for military exigencies, 
first try to get possession of the most coveted prize, 
Transylvania. It was calculated that Rumania's 
main effort would be made in this direction, and that 
comparatively weak forces of the second and third 
lines would be left to defend the Dobrudja and the 
Danube against Bulgaria. 

A decision was quickly come to as to the counter- 
move. 

Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities a new 
army under Mackensen was to invade the Dobrudja 
from Bulgaria, overrun the Rumanian bridgeheads at 
Tutrakan and Silistria and press forward to the short- 
est line between the Danube and the Black Sea. It 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 319 

was intended to form this new army from the German 
10 1st Division, part of which was already in 
Rustchuk, four Bulgarian Divisions (of which three 
were already in North Bulgaria and one came from 
Macedonia), and two Turkish Divisions from the 
neighbourhood of Adrianople. General von Conrad 
would have liked the armies to advance at once across 
the Danube instead of into the Dobrudja, so as to 
bring about an earlier relief in Transylvania, The 
Dobrudja plan, however, was kept to, as the crossing 
of the river was not considered practicable until the 
Rumanian forces in the Dobrudja had been effectively 
dealt with. Preparations were made on the German 
side for the abundant equipment of Mackensen's army 
with such modern weapons, not yet known to the 
Rumanians, as heavy artillery, mine-throwers and gas. 
The gradual assembling of men and material was to 
begin as soon as possible, because, in view of the in- 
adequacy of the communications in the Balkans, there 
remained a possibility of their not being able to ad- 
vance in time. After Mackensen's army had reached 
the line agreed upon, strong detachments were to be 
withdrawn from it and sent to Svistov in Bulgaria, 
where they were to cross the Danube and march on 
Bukarest. The technical difficulties of a crossing fur- 
ther downstream were thought too great for this to be 
attempted. To facilitate the crossing as much as pos-^ 
sible, it was decided to hold up the heavy Austrian 
rolling-stock for the Danube bridge at once in the 
arm of the Danube south of the island of Belene, 



320 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

near Svistov, for if the tension in the relations with 
Rumania increased it would become impossible to get 
it back out of Hungary. The scruples of Austrian 
Headquarters as to this measure, which it is true in- 
volved considerable danger to the valuable bridge 
works, were successfully overcome. 

While these operations were being carried out by 
Field-Marshal Mackensen, Austria was to try to hold 
up the advance of the main Rumanian forces over the 
mountains as long as possible until the attacking 
troops, which were to be dispatched immediately after 
the declaration of war, had got into position. Ger- 
many had provided five infantry and between one and 
two cavalry divisions to help in this. Austrian Head- 
quarters intended to send into Transylvania two in- 
fantry divisions and one cavalry division, all of which 
had suffered heavily in the battles on the East front. 
On arrival these divisions were to be brought up to 
full strength and recuperated. Further, at the request 
of Germany, unity of command on the Rumanian 
front from the Danube to the Bukovina was estab- 
lished by placing the Austrian ist Army under the 
orders of General Arz von Straussenberg. The first 
duty of this General was to organize South Himgary 
on a clear military basis, which had not yet been done, 
and to train into a useful fighting corps the numerous 
but weak bodies of gendarmerie, excise officers, alarm- 
troops, Landsturm, Landsturm reserves, mountain- 
troops and single infantry battalions which were at 
the disposal of Austria for the defence of her frontier, 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 321 

and to obstruct the mountain roads in readiness for 
the enemy advance. Unfortunately these precaution- 
ary measures of Austrian Headquarters were seriously 
hampered in the middle of August by the events on 
the Isonzo front. 

When the Italians met with sustained resistance in 
the higher mountain regions they broke off their coun- 
ter-attack on the Tyrolese frontier and transferred 
their reserves to the Isonzo, where they attacked in 
greatly superior strength at the beginning of August. 
The Austrians had not been able to reply quickly 
enough to this change of plan. Indeed, the troops 
thrown into the Isonzo front after the heavy fighting 
in the Tyrol no longer possessed the necessary pow- 
ers of resistance. In any case, the important bridge- 
head west of Gorz was lost on the 6th August, and, 
shortly afterwards, the town itself. The enemy 
gained ground in many places on the east bank of the 
Isonzo. This produced a serious crisis. It was even 
necessary to bring up several divisions from the East 
front, who were replaced by German troops, to restore 
the situation. It is unnecessary to point out how this 
increased the difficulties in the East, not for Austrian 
Headquarters alone, but for the general prosecution of 
the war. The evil consequences of Austria's independ- 
ent enterprise in the Tyrol were increasingly felt; the 
last of these, Rumania joining the Entente, was still 
to come. 

For this the events on the Isonzo were decisive.^ 

iMap 5. 



322 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

To the preparations for the war against Rumania 
belong the operations on the Macedonian front, which 
after a prolonged lull were carried out in August. It 
has already been mentioned that it was considered 
desirable for the improvement of our position on this 
front to advance our right wing, the Bulgarian ist 
Army, out of the Bitolj plain to the heights south of 
Fiorina and west of Lake Ostrovo. The Bulgarian 
Command had recently pointed out that a similar ad- 
vance of the Bulgarian 2nd Army on the left wing 
as far as the Struma sector would be very advantage- 
ous. The Chief of the General Staff had to advise 
against this suggestion because, in view of the danger 
of becoming involved in a war with Greece, the losses 
to be expected were disproportionate to the advantage 
to be gained. Meanwhile the situation had changed. 
The Greek Army had for the most part been de- 
mobilized. There was, for other reasons too, no 
longer any danger of an unintentional encounter with 
Greece. An improvement in our position, as well as 
a shortening of the Bulgarian line, was now desirable, 
even if it meant immediate sacrifices, for it would 
make it possible to hold troops in readiness for use 
elsewhere, in this case against Rumania. Permission 
was therefore given for these operations to be carried 
out. They began on 15th August, and after several 
battles, with varying results, finally achieved their ob- 
jective on the 28th of the same month. The usual 
lull in this part of the Balkan theatre o^ war then set 
in for a considerable length of time. In the north- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 323 

east of the Balkans, on the other hand, the torch 
of war blazed up all the more fiercely. 

On the evening of 27th August the Italian Govern- 
ment declared war on Germany, and at the same hour 
the Rumanian ambassador in Vienna handed to the 
Austrian Government Rumania's declaration of war. 
While Italy's step was treated as, what indeed it was, 
a formality requiring no answer, Germany replied to 
Rumania's action against Austria on the next day with 
a declaration of war. The situation caused by these 
declarations of war found G.H.Q. not unprepared, but 
it took them by surprise. The Chief of the General 
Staff had not expected war with Rumania until after 
the Rumanian harvest in the middle of September. 
The causes of this early move have never been fully 
explained. Later information leads one to suppose 
that France's urgent call to Rumania not to delay 
any longer was an important factor. General Joffre 
may have hoped in this way to put fresh spirit into 
those wide circles of the Entente whose morale was 
beginning to waver in consequence of the unsatisfac- 
tory progress of the battle of the Somme and the crip- 
pling of the Russian offensive in Galicia. In any case, 
the new ally reaped no advantage by following this 
advice. It required only a few telegrams from Ger- 
man G.H.Q. to bring the counter-measures to comple- 
tion which were already well advanced. The Chief of 
the General Staff of that time was no longer destined 
to direct the operations. 

On the 28th August the Chief of the Military 



324 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

Cabinet, General Baron von Lyticker, appeared with 
the message that the Kaiser had seen fit to summon 
Field-Marshal von Hindenburg to a consultation on 
the following morning on the military situation that 
had arisen through Rumania's appearance in the ranks 
of our enemies. To this General von Falkenhayn had 
to reply that he could only regard this summoning of 
a subordinate commander, without previous reference 
to him, for a consultation on a question the solution of 
which lay in his province alone, as a breach of his 
authority that he could not accept and as a sign that 
he no longer possessed the absolute confidence of the 
Supreme War Lord which was necessary for the con- 
tinuance of his duties. He therefore begged to be 
relieved of his appointment. 

As what the Chief of the General Staff regarded 
as a vital principle was at stake, a conference with him, 
summoned by His Majesty, could not hope to recon- 
cile the conflicting views. His request to be relieved 
of his office was granted in the early morning of 
August 29th. 

At the moment when Field-Marshal von Hinden- 
burg took over the conduct of affairs the general situa- 
tion was serious. 

It had never been anything else, though there had 
been fluctuations, since September 14th, 1914, re- 
mained so to the bitter end, and, owing to the enemy's 
immense superiority in men and material, could not 
have been otherwise until his resolution was broken. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 325 

It is probable that nothing contributed more to the de- 
plorable conclusion of the war than the circumstance 
that this fact was concealed from the mass of the 
German people until it was too late to save anything. 

Yet in spite of all the assertions that were made later 
and are diligently spread abroad even today, the posi- 
tion was not desperate at the end of 19 16. 

In the Western theatre the force of the enemy's at- 
tack on the Somme, which had attained the utmost 
concentration of effort, had been broken. 

Even if the enemy were to achieve a few successes 
in getting forward at a terrible cost, there was no 
doubt that, taken as a whole, their efforts were doomed 
to failure and that a recurrence of circumstances of 
such magnitude and so unfavourable for Germany was 
improbable. Even if we had not been able to bring 
these attacks to an end or convert them into an ad- 
vantage by a German attack, this was solely due to 
the reduction of our reserves in the West, a reduction 
which had been rendered necessary by the unexpected 
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian front in Galicia, 
when G.H.Q. had been unable to get timely notice of 
the critical transfer of the centre of gravity of the 
Russian attack from Lithuania and Courland to the \ 

region of Baranovici and Galicia. 1 

For the fact that in spite of giving up large forces j 

for the East the Western front not only disposed of j' 

sufficient resources to shatter the Somme offensive, \ 

but was in a position to furnish the bulk of the troops 
required to deal with the Rumanian attack, we have 



326 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

to thank the fundamental conception underlying the 
Verdun operations. To it also must be ascribed the 
fact that the French — to our great advantage — 
were able to take only a relatively small part on the 
Somme. About ninety of their divisions, that is, 
about two-thirds of their total strength, had been 
through the mill at Verdun. The German losses there 
had been not much more than a third of those of the 
enemy. It is true that in consequence of the decrease 
in the army reserve the Verdun operations had gradu- 
ally to be restricted from the beginning of July. The 
form of those operations made this possible without 
any special difficulty, and enabled the attack to be 
resumed at any time. We could still anticipate that 
such a resumption, even if it took another form, would 
have attained its purpose of bleeding France white. 
The proceedings in the French Chamber of Deputies 
in the summer of 191 6 are the best proof, if belated, 
of the soundness of that view. 

On the Russian front all real danger could be con- 
sidered as over from the moment when we had realized 
the scale on which the Russians were transferring 
troops to the south. The most northerly German 
army group now furnished the reserves which were 
required to stem the enemy's advance in Galicia. Our 
view that the Russians would not recover from the 
blows dealt them in 191 5, and therefore could not 
again become dangerous to German troops, no matter 
what their superiority in numbers might be, had been 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 327 

proved correct. Of course there was always an 
element of danger in the failure of some of the Austro- 
Hungarian troops and the internal weaknesses of that 
country. It was humanly impossible to eliminate it 
altogether. We could only reduce it to a minimum by 
smtable precautions, and that was done to the limits 
of the possible. 

The allied Staffs had done all that was possible to 
settle accounts with the Rumanians. The issue, which 
seemed certain as far as human judgment could fore- 
tell, no longer depended on them, but on the handling 
of the situation on the spot. 

The Turkish fronts in Asia, definitely a subsidiary 
theatre of war, required little consideration on a gen- 
eral survey of the whole situation. In any case, things 
were satisfactory there, apart from Armenia, where, 
however, a further Russian advance was no longer 
to be feared. Our anxiety lest the isolation of Russia 
should be terminated by the opening of the Dardanelles 
was a thing of the past. 

Even better was the situation in Macedonia. The 
German-Bulgarian front there might be considered as 
equal to any possible development within a calculable 
period. 

The Austro-Hungarian situation on the Italian 
front, such as it was left after the unsuccessful Italian 
offensive from the Tyrol, was a weak point in the 
position of the Central Powers. Yet here the ad- 
ivanced season gave us all the more grounds for hop- 



328 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

ing that we were about to enjoy a long breathing- 
space, during which we should have to see to it that 
counter-measures were taken. 

Nothing more had been done about the decision 
whether and when the weapon of submarine war, still 
held in reserve, was to be used. After the conflict 
with the political leaders over this question in the 
spring, the Chief of the General Staff had most care- 
fully avoided outwardly committing G.H.Q. in any 
way. The very necessity of preventing the enemy 
from taking countermeasures prescribed that course. 
Surprise, at least as far as it was still possible to ob- 
tain it, was a condition precedent to the effective use 
of the unrestricted submarine weapon. Besides, the 
Chief of the General Staff considered it necessary that 
active operations in the West should be undertaken 
concurrently with the opening of the submarine cam- 
paign. Yet we could not tell at the .moment when 
that would be possible. 

The strain on the homeland had, of course, been 
very great. However, our refusal to raise new forma- 
tions on a great scale after the summer of 191 5 had 
prevented that strain from reaching the breaking- 
point. Our recruiting situation was secure for a long 
time to come, and developing in a regular manner. 
We could once more consider the question of raising 
new formations on a larger scale. In spite of that we 
had succeeded in increasing the output of war material 
to correspond to requirements without dangerously 
shaking the economic fabric of the country. It was 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 329 

on the lines then laid down that the maximum produc- 
tion of the year 1917 was reached. They seemed to 
be capable of completely satisfying all demands that 
could then have been anticipated. As a matter of fact 
they not only did so, but throughout the war our 
scheme remained the model for munitions production. 

Our relations to the Turkish, as to the Bulgarian 
General Staffs, were never troubled by the slightest 
friction. Both adhered unswervingly to the alliance 
and were always ready to adopt without questioning 
any measure redom-mended by G.H.Q. 

In the same way our personal relations with the 
Austrian General Staff could not be described as bad; 
at any rate no signs of anything else could be ob- 
served in our intercourse. A certain tension which 
had arisen in the winter in consequence of an attempt 
by the Austrian Headquarters to get rid of the in- 
fluence of G.H.Q. had long vanished, after personal 
explanations. 

In our business relations with the Allied General 
Staff there was, of course, a line on the far side of 
which a certain constraint inevitably took the place of 
friendly understanding. That line was reached when 
it was a question of imposing reasonable limits, in the 
interests of the war as a whole, on the special schemes 
of Austria-Hungary, which went far beyond her re- 
sources in men and material. After the deplorable 
experiences of recent times it had become necessary to 
introduce formal unity of command and place it in 
German hands. 



330 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

This survey of the situation at that time revealed 
little that was inviting, as well as much that was 
serious. But there were no grounds for describing it 
as desperate. At any rate, neither the departing Chief 
of the General Staff nor his colleagues at the head of 
the allied Staffs regarded it as such. 

The goal towards which we had hitherto striven in 
our conduct of the campaign was to break the enemy's 
will to war, nor had we lost sight of the fact, for it was 
self-evident, that that goal could in any case be reached 
only by the offensive and the employment of all our 
resources — not by merely remaining on the defensive. 

In the first weeks of the war we had not succeeded 
in realizing — though it then seemed very probable 
that we should — our hope of forcing a decision by 
overthrowing our enemies by a, few great blows, the 
product of an extreme concentration of effort and com- 
plete disregard of all secondary issues. In the winter 
of 1 9 14- 1 5 the events in the Eastern theatre had pre- 
vented us from resuming our effort to achieve our end 
on the same lines. Subsequently the decay of our 
first ally's fighting capacity, our own weakness at sea 
and the attitude of America made it uncertain whether 
in any case we should be able to adopt that course 
again. 

But it remained unquestionably our ideal. 

But we were now engaged in a struggle in which 
the very existence of our nation, and not only military 
glory, or the conquest of territory, was at stake. We 
could not now leave out of account, seeing the way 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 331 

things had shaped themselves, that we might be placed 
in a position where the decision must be obtained not 
by the military defeat, in the literal sense, of all our 
foes, but only by hammering into them that they were 
in no position to pay the price of overcoming us. 

Faced with such a necessity, our duty to secure that 
the Central Powers should " hold out " during the war 
acquired a new and outstanding significance. A care- 
fully calculated husbanding of their war resources 
was of enormous importance, and we had uncondi- 
tionally to renounce all operations, the demands of 
which overtaxed our power to hold out. 

If the Central Powers did not hold out, or, in other words, 
if they did not maintain their revolution and power to win 
longer than their opponents, everything they had done on 
the battlefield hitherto had been in vain. The war would 
not only be lost but it would threaten our utter destruction. 
But if they held out they would win the war in the only 
way in which it could be won, seeing the strategic situation 
of Germany and her allies, opposed by practically the rest 
of the world. From that point of view it was immaterial 
for the final result whether the advantages our purely mili- 
tary achievements had brought us were great or otherwise. 

These were the considerations which had been the foun- 
dation for our prosecution of the war. In spite of the 
grievous violation of their principles by the enterprise in 
Italy our conduct of the campaign ,had stood the terrible 
testa to which it had been subjected in Galicia and on the 
Somme. We had a right to presume that it would be equal 
to the further battles with which it was forced. It did so 
completely, as every one knows. 

The Chief of the General Staff was accordingly unshaken 
in his conviction that a favourable termination of the war 



332 THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF 

was not to be obtained in any other way than by force of . 1 
arms. 

Personally in conformity with his repeated requests to be 
allowed to resign since the spring, he felt no regret that the 
burden which had been laid on his shoulders two long years 
before, at the most critical moment of the war, should 
be taken off. Owing to the situation which had arisen out 
of the differences of opinion between the highest authorities 
on the weightiest questions of policy and the prosecution of 
the war, a situation which he could do nothing to change, 
he believed that he was no longer in a position to do useful 
service to the Fatherland in his present office. 

But it was only with great anxiety that he contemplated 
the certainty that a change in that office, under the circum- 
stances, must inevitably mean a change of system in the 
conduct of the war. 



APPENDIX 
RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE OPPONENTS 



•L. of C. and recruit formations 



Note: 

(i) Only fighting troops are included- 

(2) As the strength returns of the individual units are not available, 
the numbers are calculated on a basis allowing for gaps. They cannot, 
therefore, claim absolute accuracy, but they show the comparison well 
enough. 

A. EASTERN THEATRE 



Middle of 

September, 

1914 



End of , 
December, 
1914 



3' 

End of 

January, 

191S 

4- 

End of 

April, 

191S 

^ .5- . > 
Begmnmg f 

of -\ 

June, 1916 L 



(a) on East-Prussian Germans 
frontier 140,000 

(b) on the German-Pol- 
ish frontier and in 
Poland — not al- 
ways in touch 40,000 

(c) in Galicia 16,000 

(a) on German frontier 

east of the Vistula 105,000 

(b) in Poland, west of 

the Vistula 385,000 

(c) in Galicia and the 
Bukovina 12,000 

(a) on German frontier 

east of the Vistula 125,000 

(b) in Poland, west of 

the Vistula 273,000 

(c) in Galicia and the 
Bukovina 48,000 

(a) on German frontier 

east of the Vistula 366,000 

(b) in Poland, west of 

the Vistula 184,000 

(c) in Galicia and the 
Bukovina 89,000 

(a) north of the Pripet 560,000 

(b) south of the Pripet 30,000 



Austro- 
Hungar. 


Total 




140,000 


367,000 


40,000 
383,000 




105,000 


140,000 


S2S1O00 


513,000 


525,000 




125,000 


146,000 


419,000 


525,000 


573.000 




366,000 


54.000 


238,000 


610,000 


699,000 


30,000 
456,000 


590,000 
486,000 



Russians 
160,000 



138,000 
652,000 

320,000 

847,000 

521,000 

317,000 

916,000 

610,000 

640,000 

407,00a 

720,000 

1,590,000 

650,000 



B. WESTERN THEATRE 



1. Middle of October, 1914 

2. Beginning of May, 1915 

3. Middle of July, 1915 

4. Middle of September, 1915 

5. Beginning of February, 1916 

6. Beginning of July, 1916 

333 



Germans 
1,700,000 
1,900,000 
1,880,000 
1,970,000 
2.350.000 
2,260,000 



Enemy 

2,300,000 

2,450,000 

2,830,000 

3,250,000 

3,470,000 

3,840,000 



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